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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
I. THE PROBLEM 
The port of Boston, once the most important 
seaport in the United States, has lost its former position 
of ocean trade dominance, and now ranks far down on the 
list of United States ports. In this secondary position the 
Port is not properly providing the transportation services 
so vitally needed by the surrounding port area. New 
England urgently needs an advanced, enterprising, up-to-date, 
and effective port operation at Boston to aid it in the 
struggle for economic stability. It is the object of this 
study to investigate the management possibilities for the 
rebirth of this vital Port. 
Many problems face the Port in the near future. 
Many of these problems will arise from situations which, if 
properly handled, can be turned into competitive advante.ges, 
and thereby provide a needed stimulant for the entire New 
England economy. Thus, the first and most important step 
needed to reju-nate the port of Boston is to provide a 
progressive, vigorous, management with the experience and 
acumen to size up port situations expertly, and with the 
necessary autonomy and authority to carry out decisions and 
recommended plans of action. 
The Port of Boston Commission, which was established 
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in 1953, is somewhat of an improvement over the old Port of 
Boston Authority. However, the establishment of this 
Commission represents only a minor step in the right direction. 
Bold sweeping measures must be taken if the Port is to o ver-
come the many adverse factors that have so e f fectively 
restricted its growth. 'l'he Go vernor's selection of port 
commissioners from a list recommended by the variou s trade 
and professional groups interested in the Port has appar-
ently eliminated much of the politics from the commissioner 
selections. However, the politicians control nearly every 
cent of money that the Commission wishes to expend, and with 
its limited powers the Port of Boston Commission does not 
have the necessary authority to initiate an aggressive plan 
of action for port development and to effectively carry such 
a plan out. 
The effects of the St. Lawrence Seaway, adverse 
frei ght rates, increased trade from the New En g land Trade 
Center, Lab rador iron ore, .possible future New En g l a n d steel 
mills, atomic generated power, the atomic p owered s hip , and 
other f uture developments - these are some of the problems and 
chang ing cond itions that the management of the port of Boston 
must face in the future. Ho w the se situations are handled 
will decide the f uture fate of the port of Boston and will 
have an important effect on the entire New England economy. 
Governor Christian A. Herter in his Second In-
augural Address to the two branches of the Leg islature of 
14 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on January 6, 1955, made 
the following statement: 
••• we should give careful consideration to oft 
repeated suggestions that we here follow the pattern 
established by the New York Port Authority with its 
unified control over construction and operation of such 
diverse enterprises as bridges, tunnels, parkways, air-
ports, docks, and so forth. There are now in use by the 
Commonwealth a variety of methods to manage and finance 
the facilities and systems serving our motor, sea and 
air traffic. A reappraisal is indicated now as the 
Commonwealth moves ahead to meet the traffic needs of 
tomorrow. 
Because I believe nothing exceeds in importance 
an early decision as to how to proceed . in this direction, 
I have established a Revenue Authority Advisory Committee 
to study the possibilities and report to me so that I 
may decide upon recommendations to be made to the general 
court this session •••• To complete its task within a 
limited time it will be necessary for this committee 
to employ engineering and other consultants ••• ·• 
It is not a question of deciding whether or not 
such coordination is possible. We know that it is, 
in greater or less degree. It is my hope that we 
may move in that direction during the forthcoming term 
of the General Court. Methods of accomplishing it are 
far too involved to recommend specific legislation at 
this time without waiting for the results of such a 
study."* 
It is apparent from this statement that the 
Qovernor of the Commonwealth is aware of this problem and 
recognizes the need for a unified control of the port of 
Boston and other related activities through an organiza-
tional structure designed to enable effective administrative 
control over the various facilities mentioned. 
The object of this thesis is to attack this 
~-154, PP• 8,9. 
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problem of the proper administrative structure for the 
port of Boston from an over-all port management viewpoint, 
and to determine what type of organization would best enable 
the effective administration of the Port. 
II. SIGNIFICANCE OR I MPORTANCE 
The port of Boston must initiate a program of 
agressive leadership if it is to regain its position as one 
of the leading ports of the United States. By establish-
ing an active progressive port with frequent ship sailings 
to many parts of the world many of the local trade merchants 
would receive a needed stimulus from the increased trade. 
One u.s. port publicizes that every ship entering the port 
leaves nearly $60,000 in the port in the form of wages, fees, 
purchases, and other expenditures. Thus the trade passing 
through the port of Boston is highly significant to the 
economy of the city of Boston and other local areas. 
The Port is of tremendous importance to the entire 
state of Massachusetts by providing a close facility for 
water transportation for both foreign and domestic goods. 
Massachusetts manufacturers with ready access to an efficient, 
economical port would be provided with a very important asset 
to aid them in their competitive battle \rlth other parts of 
the country. 
New England. as a whole,, would benefit from an active, 
efficient port of Boston for similar reasons. Many new 
16 
industries might be persuaded to locate in New England if an 
open gateway to water commerce could be clearly demonstrated 
by the port of Boston. 
A modern, efficient port at Boston would also be 
highly important to the National Defense by providing a 
ready outlet for war materials and strategic supplies. \Vhen 
one realizes the future potential of the port of Boston, and 
the possible benefits to the entire country as a whole, the 
problem of the effective management of the Port takes on new 
significance, and its solution presents a challenge to the 
entire area. 
III. WORK DONE BY OTHERS 
Studies have been made on the economics of the 
port of Boston for the last fifty years with various proposals 
and recommendations made for aiding the Port. However, 
little has been done from a management viewpoint with the 
overall aim of establishing an organizational structure 
that will permit the management of the Port to operate as 
aggressively and as efficiently as a private business, and 
yet to operate within the realm of the public interest. 
The problem of the port of Boston is a complex one, 
and one that is close to the hearts of many people. However, 
most individuals concerned with the Port are interested in 
t heir own personal aspect only, and it is diff icult to find 
an appraisal of the Port that is honest, free of bias, and 
17 
based on a straight-forward effort to analyze the entire 
correlated Port problem. 
The Report of the 1~pecial Commission Relative 
To The Rights Powers And Duties Of The Port Of Boston 
Authority And The Further Development Of The Port of Boston 
And Certain Related Matters 11indicates study along this line, 
conducted in 1950, with a recommendation by the majority that 
the old Port of Boston Authority and the Mystic Bridge 
Authority be combined into a new body to be called the 
Massachusetts Development Authority. The proposed legis-
lation was never adopted by the State Legislature. 
On J·une 24, 1955, the Governor's Revenue Authority 
Advisory Committee submitted its recommendations for the 
consolidation and financing of certain major transportation 
and traffic facilities in the Greater Boston area under a 
single self-sustaining authority. The report of this 
committee was at best disappointing. Instead of making a 
tharough s tudy of how to proceed in the pattern established 
by the New York Port Authority with its unified control over 
construction and operation of such diverse enterprises as 
bridges, tunnels, parkways, airports, docks and other 
facilities, the committee became occupied with the issue of 
whether to supplement the existing Sumner Tunnel and Mystic 
River Bridge with an additional t wo lane tube or a four lane 
bridge across Boston Harbor. They felt t his was necessary 
in order to determine the financial feasibility of the 
18 
combination. 
The committee recommended that a public corporation 
authority be created to be called the Massachusetts Port 
Authority. The recommended legislation provided for the 
transfer to the Authority of the following facilities: 
the Mystic River Bridge, the Sumner Tunnel, Logan Airport, 
and Hanscom Field at Bedford. It also provided for the later 
acquisition by the proposed Authority of the facilities of 
the Port of Boston Commission by transfer or lease, subject 
to agreements reached by the Authority and the Governor and 
Council and subject to the approval of the General Court. 
In effect this committee recommended the creation 
of a port authority without a portl In discussing the Port 
the report stated: 
The Comraittee feels that insufficient information 
on the movements of imports and exports by type of 
commodities handicaps the development of the full 
potential of the port. Before any sound determination 
as to the port's future can be made, a comprehensive 
economic study is required. Such a study has never 
been made."* 
The committee explained its failure to incorporate the port 
in its proposed merger as follows: 
The committee has not included the port of Boston 
facilities in the initial consolidation. This decision 
was due in part to the $17,868,000 outstanding on the 
port of Boston construction bonds, the payment of which 
could not have been absorbed in the financial plan. 
Still another reason why its acquisition was not 
recommended at this time is that the committee feels 
·:1-155, p. 54. 
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that only by considerable study can the financial 
future of the port be soundly ascertained. 
Thus the committee is recommending the later 
acquisition of the Port Properties sub~ect to agree-
ment and approval by the Legislature."' 
It was indeed disappointing to the many persons 
vitally interested in the port of Boston that, in 1955 
nearly thirty four years after the inauguration of the New 
York Port Authority, and nearly twenty five years after the 
adoption of similar procedures by other major progressive 
ports in the United States, this committee should fail to 
include the port of Boston in the original organization of 
the proposed Authority. 
However, largely through the efforts of persons 
interested in the welfare of the Bort, the State Legislature 
voted to give this proposal further study.l A commission 
was created on September 10, 1955 to investigate this 
problem. The commission membership was composed of three 
members of the Senate, seven members of the House of 
Representatives, and three persons appointed by the Governor, 
and was called the Special Commission On The Massachusetts 
Port Authority. 
The Report of this Commission was submitted on 
January 31, 1956, and it recommended that a public corporation 
authority be established • . The Report . stated: 
*Ibid, p.55. 
l.See Appendix C 
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••• The Massachusetts Port Authority to be created 
is a newly created seperate entity, a new public instru-
mentality, a new political subdivision which will be 
managed by seven members appointed by the Governor, not 
more than four of whom shall be members of the same 
political party, and one of whom shall be a represent-
ative of organized labor.* 
The accompanying legislation provided for the incorporation 
into the proposed authority of the following facilities: 
The Mystic River Bridge. 
The Sumner Tunnel . 
Logan International Airport. 
Hanscom Field. 
State port properities. 
An additional harbor crossing. 
This study will endeavor to present a critical 
analysis of the Port's problems, and to evaluate the ability 
of the proposed Massachusetts Port Authority to create an 
effective port management body that will enable progressive 
port development at Boston. 
IV. METHOD OF APPROACH 
The problem of the management of the p ort of Boston 
will be analyzed by presenting a brief background of the Port 
and a description of the economic considerations that are 
related to the Port's development and growth. A traffic 
analysis will then be made with an estimate of the Port's 
21 
future potential. The facilities of the Port will be 
briefly surveyed to determipe t heir ability to adequately 
handle the Port's future traffic. The major economic 
problems, the anticipated traffic-volume, and the physical 
facilities of the Port to handle such traffic will thus be 
developed, and on the basis of management problems indicated, 
the organizational structure of the Port of Boston Commission 
will be carefully scruntinized, and compared with the manage-
ment organizations at other United States ports. 
In conclusion an effort will be made to develop 
an organizational structure that, if adopted, would more 
adequately enable the management body of the Port to effect-
ively deal with port problems and to put the port of Boston 
on a progressive, self supporting and profitable basis. The 
management organization thus developed will then be utilized 
to evaluate the legislation proposed under House No. 2575 
for the creation of a Massachusetts Port Authority. 
22 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND OF THE PORT 
Boston, Massachusetts, the oldest major port in 
the United States and the natural gateway to New England, 
Northeastern United States, and parts of Canada, has failed 
to maintain the early leadership that it assumed in colonial 
days, and since the end of the Civil War has steadily declined 
in relative importance to many other leading United States 
and Canadian ports. The reasons for Boston's decline are 
numerous and complex. Some of the retarding factors can be 
attributed to the geographical location of the Bort, others 
to external influences outside the port area, and still others 
to internal conditions that lie within the power of the Port 
itself to correct. 
I. DESCRIPTION AND LOCATION 
The port of Boston is situated on the northeastern 
coast of the United States on the shores of Massachusetts. 
The harbor encompasses all the tidewater lying within a line 
from Point Allerton to Deer Island, comprising a water area 
of about 47 square miles. The port has a water frontage of 
approximately 140 miles, seven miles of which has a minimum 
depth at mean low water of 35 feet. Boston has an excellent, 
well-protected natural harbor. It is less than seven miles 
from the open ocean to the center of the important waterfront 
23 
terminal facilities. Three main channels lead from the sea 
to President Roads, a deep water anchorage, and the Main 
Ship Channel leads on into the inner harbor. A forty foot 
channel depth is maintained as far as the Mystic River in 
the inner basin. This fine sheltered harbor was one of the 
major factors contributing to the growth of Boston as the 
main port in the early development of our country. 
II. THE RISE TO PROMINENCE· 
In the early days the average merchant of Boston 
was a bold commercial adventurer. He found that the big 
profits were not in the manufacturing, but in the distribution 
of goods. The risks were high, but he took them in order to 
reap the handsome returns that were obtainable from the sale 
of merchandise in hungry markets. Boston flourished during 
this early period, and although both the Revoluntionary War 
and the War of 1812 caused the port temporary standstills, 
upon their termination it resumed its upward climb. Commerce 
was stimulated during the clipper ship era due to the growing 
wealth and population of a young and vigorous nation, the 
repeal of the Navigation Acts which opened profitable British 
markets to New England merchants, increased passenger traffic 
caused by the large number of immigrants entering the United 
States, an~ the discovery of gold in California, Australia, 
and Africa. Shipping was the explanation of the Port's 
successful competition with other American ports. A large 
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number of ships were owned by Boston merchants who prefered 
to handle their cargoes themselves rather than give the 
profits of distribution to other ports. The Boston merchants 
were able to transport cargoes from all parts of the world 
and this advantage lay at the root of this thriving seaport's 
early success, and its achieving recognition as the leader of 
American ports during this era. 
III. PEAK PROSPERITY AND DECLINE TO PRESENT DAY POSITION 
Prior to the Civil War Boston held the lead as 
the outstanding United States seaport, but as the country 
developed, and the centers of population and commerce 
shifted, Boston found that it was at a locational disadvantage 
when compared to New York and other North Atlantic seaports. 
The Erie Canal was opened in 1825, and greatly accelerated 
the growth of the port of New York by providing a cheap 
economical access to the Great Lakes and the Mid West. All 
roads seemed to lead to New York and it was only a matter of 
time before this thriving port metropolis was to overtake 
and pass Boston, its main port competitor. 
Boston reached the heig ht of its rise as a 
commercial port and trading cent er in the late 1850's and 
at this point its foreign trade began to decline. After 
the Civil War Boston resumed a vigorous pace in trade, but 
the port was unable to re gain its former position. However, 
Boston managed to remain a good second to New York unt il the 
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turn of the Nineteenth Century despite the geographical 
advantage held. by other competing ports such as Philadelphia, 
Baltimore and New Orleans. 
During the first half of the Twentieth Century 
Boston continued to falter in the competitive race of the 
ports of the United States. The Port seemed unable to rid 
itself of the many factors detr imental to its prosperous 
growth. In 1954 Boston ranked twelveth in tonnage in the 
foreign commerce of United States ports. The Port ranked 
eighth in foreign imports and approximately fortieth in 
foreign exports. The rat1o of foreign import tonnage to 
foreign export tonnage was a pproximately 12 to 1 which 
indicates great unbalance in port trade. The inability 
of the port of Boston to furnish a sufficient volume of 
outbound cargo has plagued the port for nearly one hundred 
years and remains an unsolved problem to the present day. 
IV. FACTORS LEADING TO BOSTON'S LOSS OF PORT LEADERSHIP 
There appears to be no one general feature of 
American industri al or commercial growth which accounts for 
the failure of the port of Boston to participate in the 
national growth which other major United States ports have 
enjoyed. The causes are many and varied, and each acted in 
various ways to retard the Port's growth. 
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A. External Factors 
Many of the causes behind the decline of the port 
of Boston appear to be beyond the power of the Port itself 
to correct since they are dependent upon the decision and 
action of those who are beyond the zone of influence which 
the Port can effectively exert. However, all of the factors 
given here for the Port's failure to maintain a proper 
competitive pace could be eliminated, or at least gre a tly 
reduced, with proper corrective action. 
1. Lack of _!! Trunk Line Railroad to the West 
New York developed mainly from its advantageous 
geographical location and commercial access to the main 
industrial areas and the rapidly expanding Mid West. 
Boston's commercial growth, on the other hand, resulted 
mainly from, and was mainly limited to, the development of its 
local New England hinterland, New England exports consisted 
largely of high value low bulk manufactured goods that did 
not have the necessary volume to fill ships, and Boston 
needed the bulk cow~odity exports _of the Mid West to supp ly 
the necessary f ull cargo capacity. Prior to the coming of 
the railroads, Boston did not have easy access to the West 
such as was enjoyed by New York with the Erie Canal. Thus 
the future growth of Boston was highly dependent upon the 
effectiveness with which railroad trunk lines connecting 
with the West were established. 
Boston was the first seaboard city to construct 
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an extended railway system. However, the system did not show 
the necessary development and all railroad startings fell 
short. No trunk line to the West was established that had 
Boston as its main port of interest, and it was here that 
Boston lost a golden opportunity to remain an undisput ed 
second among the ports of the United States. The Boston 
and Worcester and the Western Railway Company which together 
furnished Boston's direct means of c ommunication with the 
West were not able to effect a workable agreement and all 
west bound merchandise had to be transhipped at Albany. * 
Meanwhile, highly efficient rail connections were established 
to New York and the flow of export goods continued in that 
direction. Boston, unable to furnish return cargoes of 
sufficient volume to attract vessels, was at a marked 
disadvantage in all future attempts to induce the flow of 
commerce through the Port. 
Boston is presently served by three railroads. 
The New York, New Haven and Hartford serves as the single 
rail route through southern New England and is the main 
source of rail transportation in southern Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island, and Connecticut. There are two main lines 
to the West - the Boston and Albany division of the New 
York Centra l, which runs from Boston to Albany, and the 
Boston and Maine which has its main line from Boston through 
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* Fitchburg to Troy and Mechanicsville 1 New York. Boston 
has no rail lines west of the Hudson River and as a result 
no western export traffic naturally flows through the Port. 
Boston is dependent upon traffic handed over to local lines 
by carriers whose first interest is to take it to their 
home ports where they make the longest haul and obtain the 
highest earnings. New York 1 besides being served by the 
home roads of its competitors, has three through routes of 
its own to Chicago in addition to two strong roads to Buffalo 
which connect with the numerous lines from there to the West. 
Twelve railroads in all serve this busy port city. 
Railroads at other ports have had to make concerted 
efforts to establish European steamship lines in order to 
have an opportunity to haul export and import traffic for 
the interior. Active solicitation and good service were used 
to induce the flow of traffic to other ports. Unfortunately, 
Boston1 having no trunk line, had no such forces agressively 
seeking business for the Port. Thereby the Port lost 
further in the port race as competition grew keener and 
western shippers were actively persuaded to ship via other 
cr.tanne ls. 
2. Loss of Shipping Ownership 
New England shipbuilders excelled in wooden ship 
?i-183, p.475 
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construction and outdistanced their rivals with their speedy 
Clipper Ships. However, New Englanders were slow to recognize 
the supremacy of the metal steamers, and foreign flag vessels 
dominated much of the foreign trade in the decades following 
the Civil War. Many Boston merchant ship owners transferred 
their activities to New York in order to gain the advantages 
that the sharply rising increase in commerce presented there. 
Thus Boston lost the advantage of having a large group of 
merchant shipowners who were primarily interested in her 
progress and development. 
Having failed to establish a trunk line rail 
connection with the West with the resulting inability to 
obtain export cargoes, with population and market centers 
shifting further from New England, and having the dis-
advantage of a hinterland supplying goods of high value 
but low in bulk, Boston ente~ed the twentieth century in 
a rather precarlous position. However, the interacting 
chain of events that followed produced a almost impenetrable 
barrier against the efforts of local interests to maintain 
a free flow of trade through the Port. 
3. Railroad Freight Differential 
The most significant retarding factor to port 
growth under which Boston bas struggled over the last fifty 
years, as far as western freight traffic is concerned, is the 
lower export and import rates to a so called differential 
territory, originally given to Philadelphia and Baltimore 
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and later extended to Norfolk, Newport News, Portland, 
Montreal, Saint John, Halifax, and other ports. The Gulf 
ports, especially New Orleans, were then assigned inla.nd 
rates lower than any of the differential North Atlantic 
ports, with the result that Boston has been severely hampered 
in its efforts to compete for the exports and imports of the 
West. 
In its period of early development the port of 
Boston enjoyed a marked advantage for its closer ocean 
distance to many European ports. This shorter distance 
and resulting reduced time to many northern European ports 
was reflected in lower ocean freight rates from Boston to 
Europe than the more south~rn ports such as Philadelphia 
and Baltimore were allowed. Thus when Boston had railroad 
freight rates from interior points equal to those of the 
southern ports, western export trade flowed to Boston 
because of the lower through rate to Europe. 
However, in the 1870's, Baltimore and Philadelphia 
railroad interests strongly agitated for lower railroad rates 
to inland points which they claimed were naturally tributary 
to their ports. In 1877, aft~r several severe rate wars, 
a freight rate di f ferential from many inland points was 
established in their favor. The differential was calculated 
to offset the lower ocean rate to Europe that the northern 
ports like B?ston enjoyed and to make the through rate to 
Europe equal. The competitive West was defined as all 
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territory west of Buffalo and Pittsburg. On all traff ic 
originating in this territory, Baltimore was allowed to 
have an export rate three cents per one hundred pounds, 
sixty cents per ton, lower than New York and Boston, and 
Philadelphia was allowed a rate two cents per one hundred 
pounds or forty cents per ton lower than the New York and 
Boston rate. 
The New York port railroads fought this decision, 
but were overruled in 1882 when a commission consisting of 
three competent and disinterested persons did not find 
sufficient justification to warrant a change in rates. 
However, their decision contained the following statement: 
We do not assUme that the rates which are 
just today will be jtist indefinitely. They have 
become established by .the force of circumstances 
and they ought to give way if future circumstances 
shall .be such as ·to render it right and proper. 
They constitute a temporary arrangement only; 
equitable, as we think for the present, but which 
may become inequitable before . the lapse of any 
considerable time. ·whenever · they shall be found 
to operate unfairly, and to give a forced or un-
natural direction to trade, and whenever it shall 
appear that they tend to deprive any one of the 
seaports affected by them of the proportion of 
business that would naturally come to it under the 
operation of normal competition, the want of equity 
i n the rates will appear, and it .will be right to 
modify, or perhaps, abolish them.* 
The commission also stated that lower rates to Baltimore 
and Philadelphia were justified on the cost and distance 
principle, but that the leading justification was on the 
~~ p.73 
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basis of competition. The arbitration commission stated 
further that the through rates from Chicago to Liverpool 
could not be higher via Baltimore and Philadelphia than 
via New York and Boston, otherwise no traffic would move 
through these southern ports.* 
~he Interstate Commerce Commission was established 
in 1887, and subsequent decisions have been rendered by this 
body which have traditionally favored the elimination of the 
rate advantage that the northern ports enjoyed during their 
early development. During the following years various liti-
gation took place with subsequent changing of differentials 
on various items. In 1905 a decision was rendered fixing the 
differential on ex Lake grain for export at the previously 
mentioned differential level to Central Territory points 
and one-half cent per one hundred pounds from Buffalo. 
The rate situation was still unsettled and 
imports became an important feature of the problem when 
in 1907 the North Atlantic ports began to feel the competition 
of the Gulf lines on imports for shipment to the Middle West. 
Boston had been able to maintain a profitable flow of traffic 
through the Port during this period due to the low rates 
which the Boston rail carriers maintained on imports in 
order to attract the business •. However, by the Interstate 
Co~merce Cmnmission decision of 1912 Boston was put on the 
same basis as the New York import scale via ~standard lines" 
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which meant that the New York trunk lines, upon which 
Boston standard lines are dependent for their Western 
connections, could not carry imports from this part at a 
lower scale than that which pertains to New York. This 
decision erected a serious obstruction to the movement 
of western imports through Boston by taking from the port 
the service of its standard routes to the West at low 
rates. The only main low rate route left was that 
utilizing the Rutland railroad north through Vermont and 
northern New York. The Rutland is reached by the Boston 
and Albany at Chatham and the Boston and Maine at Bellows 
Falls. This is the route for which Boston was largely 
dependent for the carriage of western imports during the 
years that followed, but it was a longer more round about 
route than the more direct standard line routes which 
previously had been used. 
Other differential routes west were the Boston 
and Maine - Canadian National routes which connected at 
White River Junctlon; and the Boston and Maine - Canadian 
Pacific routes which connected at Newport, Vermont. However, 
little freight moved over these roads because the foreign 
solicitors for the Canadian National and Canadian Pacific 
railroads had no incentive to seek business via Boston 
when each of these railroads had a summer and a winter port 
of its own. This condition exposed Boston to severe 
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* competition in its northern hint erland. 
The port freight rate differentials remained 
basically unchanged from 1912 until 1951 when Boston was 
able to obtain an equal rate on ex Lake grain for export 
from Buffalo. Changes in rates over the years have always 
been adjusted to reflect the differential. However, a 
change took place in 1916 which was to make these differ-
entials take on added significance as the main factor in 
the decline of the port of Boston. 
4. Ocean Rates 
During World War I the United States Shipping 
Board authorized the equalization of ocean freight rates 
for North and South Atlantic ports. Prior to the war the 
oeean differential between various North Atlantic ports 
had narrowed considerably anyway, and this action was 
taken in order to make way for the sudden rerouting of 
vessels necessary to reduce port conjestion. These equalized 
ocean rates were later extended to include all Gulf ports. 
With the ocean freight rates equal from all North Atlant:tc 
ports, and with inland rates lower to Baltimore and Phila-
delphia, it is evident that the through rate from interior 
points to foreign destinations is lower via Baltimore 
and Philadelphia than via the more northern ports. 
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Therefore, traffic flowed to these southern outlets. 
In peace_ time the ocean rates for foreign 
exports and imports are set by United States and foreign 
flag ship operators organized into groups called con-
ferences, which are presently under the jurisdiction of 
the United States Maritime Commission. The different 
conferences operate within "ranges" of ports. The North 
Atlantic Range extends from Portland, Maine to Hampton 
Roads, Virginia, the South Atlantic Range runs from Hampton 
Roads to the southern tip of Florida, and the Gulf Range 
covers the Gulf of Mexi co ports. Each range contains 
numerous conferences which are organized according to the 
trade. After World War I the shipping conferences a greed 
to continue the policy of equal ocean rates for the various 
ranges, and in t his manner the ocean distance rate advantage 
that Boston held as a natural locational benefit for over 
150 years was permanently eliminated. Thus, although Boston 
i s approximately 1,685 miles closer to Liverpool than New 
Orleans, the ocean frei ght bill is the same from either port. 
Boston is about 1,740 miles shorter in distance to Calcutta 
than is New Orleans, but the ocean freight charges are equal. 
Boston is over 500 miles closer to Buenos Aires, yet the 
ocean frei ght charges are again equal. 
It would appear that the various conferences 
in the North Atlantic range could reduce their rates to 
Europe and other selected destinations because their 
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profit margin is much higher than that of Gulf operators 
who have three or four days longer steaming time to reach 
many of the same destinations. In 1948 many of the leading 
North Atlantic Steamship Companies discussed the possibility 
of reduced ocean rates to offset the rail rate differential 
advantage held by the Gulf and South Atlantic ports. These 
northern operators felt that a rate war might ensue as any 
rate reduction they might make would immediately be equalled 
by their southern competitors.* 
Thus Boston has been unable to obtain outbound 
bulk cargoes. These unfavorable rates practically eliminated 
western export and import shipments and diverted much 
United States grain to other ports, with the resulting loss 
of bottom cargo available at Boston to load ships to a 
paying capacity. The majority of steamers sailing from 
Boston to foreign destinations were operated by steamship 
companies with lines running to the same destinations from 
differential ports. The difference in operating costs from 
Europe to Boston or Philadelphia or Baltimore was not great, 
and it was easier and less costly to lengthen the ocean haul 
in order to reduce the overland transportation charges. Under 
these conditions steamships from Europe with imports for New 
England industries made Boston their first stop in the 
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United States, discharged New England cargoes, and then 
proceeded south to New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore 
where discharging was completed, and export cargoes loaded 
for foreign destinations. 
5. Bottom Cargo Loss ~ Curtailed Shipping 
The main type of "bottom cargo" available to the 
port of Boston is bulk grain and grain products from the 
West, Northwest, and Canada. This bulk commodity is des-
perately needed at Boston in order to provide the necessary 
pay load for vessels calling here. However, with the 
establishment of the differential rates to inland points 
a large amount of the grain shipments were diverted from 
Boston and New York and went instead to Montreal, Phila-
delphia, Baltimore, New Orleans, and other Gulf ports. Also 
during this period Canadian government policies were 
established to encourage the shipment of Canadian grain 
through Canadian porta which greatly reduced the flow of 
Canadian grain through Boston. 
Vessels unable to load paying cargoes diverted 
to other ports making Boston merely a port of call for 
inbound shipments. The resulting infrequency of vessel 
service caused additional cargoes that would normally flow 
through the port to be diverted to New York or other ports 
to gain the advantage of more frequent sailings. Due to 
this withdrawal of shipping Boston could offer no sailings 
to many points in the world that were readily obtainable 
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at New York or other ports. Unfavorable passenger train 
rates to Boston and infrequent sailings caused the passenger 
trade to divert elsewhere with a corresponding loss in Port 
trade. Many immigrants still landed here, however, and 
Boston became a one way passenger port. Boston was rapidly 
losing this battle for port commerce as New York gained 
momentum and moved steadily forward. New York, with its 
network of services, its perfected trade agencies and 
excellent rail connections to the West, was in a good 
position to handle the exports of u.s. manufacturers, which 
gradually came to replace the shipments of food stuffs and 
raw products, and secured a firm grasp on the majority of 
ocean trade. 
6. Non Compensating Services at New York 
New York, the port of Boston's major competitor, 
has enjoyed an era of tremendous expansion while over the 
same period its northern neighbor, Boston, has declined 
almost to the point where it serves only the local area 
for imported products. However, the growth of New York 
was not entirely due to its locational advantage, and as 
one looks back over past decades it becomes clear that 
had Boston taken the necessary action fifty years ago, it 
too could have shared in the tremendous growth that New 
York enjoyed. 
New York employs an extensive lighterage system 
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where barges are loaded with cargoes and towed to or from 
the carrying vessel. For handling capacity, flexibility, 
adaptability, ease 'of expansion, accessibility to ocean 
terminals, and convenience offered to shippers, the New 
York lighterage system performs a service that no belt line 
railroad could do. Lighterage is included in the through 
rail rate to New York for all points beyond a zone of one 
hundred miles inland from the Hudson River. This system is 
very costly to the railroads, but its operation in con-
junction with an extensive car float service and floating 
grain elevators permits New York ocean terminals to be 
located on what is actually an island. The early influence 
of the Erie Canal, where export freight was alre ady aboard 
barges, and the sharp competition of the railroads brought 
about the employment of a lighterage delivery system that 
has turned a natural disadvantage into a coo1mercial benefit 
of very high degree. A pier or waterfront facility con-
structed anywhere in New York Harbor is immediately accessible 
to all railroads through their lighters. 
In addition to providing ready connections from 
any of the port railroads to any ship at any pier in the 
harbor, the New York lighterage system provides for an 
allowance to stevedores by taking delivery of the lighterage 
freight from the end of ship's tackle, and thereby enabling 
a substantial reduction in the stevedoring rate at New York. 
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This saving is particula rly advantageous on large volumes 
of import cargo such as woodpulp and sisal and encourages 
the concentration of such traffic at New York. 
In addition to free lighterage there are various 
terminal and other services performed free at New York that 
have to be paid for at Boston. These include such items as 
free split delivery of carload shipments in connection 
with lighterage delivery to vessels, allowances for trucking 
delivery in lieu of lighterage, and allowances for certain 
services performed in lieu of lighterage such as the trans-
:fer or vegetable oils by tank barge. These i terns when added 
to the natural flow of traffic to New York constitute a 
very formidable case in explaining why so much traffic has 
bypassed the port of Boston in the last fifty years. 
7. World War II Effect on Domestic Trade 
High operating costs and the lack of vessels 
adaptable to coastwise and intercoastal service have con-
stituted major obstacles to the restoration of an ocean 
trade that provided nearly sixty percent of Boston's general 
cargo freight prior to the war. During World War II the 
government's requisitioning and routing of ships disrupted 
service out of the Port. Many coastwise and intercoastal 
services were done away with and water-borne cargoes there-
after carried by rail or truck. Most of the coastwise fleet 
was sunk during the war, and in the post war period the keen 
43 
competition of rail and motor carriers and increased 
stevedoring and other terminal costs borne by the steam-
ship companies have discouraged new postwar investment in 
the construction of ships suitable for the reestablishment 
of this trade. The port of Boston handled 1,707,933 tons 
of general cargo in 1939, from the coastal trade. This 
figure had been reduced to 139,559 tons in 1953. The 
restoration of this coastal service would be a costly 
venture and the probable returns have lacked the assurance 
necessary to attract sufficient capital. 
The intercoastal trade had six companies in 1939 
which maintained thirteen sailings per month and handled 
587,000 tons of cargo, most of which was eastbound freight. 
In 1954 there were three such companies which maintained 
only about one half as many sailings. Total intercoastal 
tonnage in 1953 was 337,628 tons with the eastbound movement 
still predominant. 
B. Internal Factors 
Among the many reasons for Boston's inability to 
remain a front runner in the United States port race are 
those adverse factors that clearly were within the power and 
jurisdiction of local government and port interests to 
eliminate. Thomas Jefferson once said, "Never fear the 
want of business. A man who qualifies himself well for his 
calling never fails of employment." This saying is particularly 
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applicable to the port or Boston, because had the Port 
qualiried itselr well for its calling, namely the free 
flow or commerce through the port and the rapid and 
efficient interchange of freight between ocean carriers 
and land carriers, it is highly probable that many of 
the detrimental external factors could much more easily 
have been overcome. 
1. Poor Coordination Between Ocean Terminals 
Boston has labored under a -poor ocean terminal 
freight interchange system ror many years. Edwin J. Clapp 
made a detailed study of this situation in 1915 and 
recommended either the construction of a neutrally operated 
belt line railroad or the installation of a car rloat and 
lighterage system to racilitate the speedy and efficient 
interchange of traffic between the various ocean terminals. 
His conclusions indicated that the latter system would be 
the cheaper and more feasible method. However, his pro-
posals went unheeded and little improvement has been made 
in the system since that time. 
Me Elwee states the following rule as the rirst 
law of a port, "There must be physical connection between 
every pier and every railroad and every warehouse with a 
* uniform system of charges." 
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Boston has violated this rule for nearly one hundred years. 
In Boston for many years the railroads have treated the 
piers as an extension of the railroad. No steamship is 
berthed at the terminal of more than one railroad, and all 
traffic via other roads is penalized by imposing high 
switching charges which are absorbed by the railroads in 
varying amounts, only in certain cases, according to the 
revenue accruing to the road which has the line haul. 
Although there are no wharfage charges on the freight when 
moved by railroad, to a large degree this practice limits 
the area from which a ship can draw cargo to the hinterland 
served by one railroad system, and penalizes traffic from 
local points which originates on other roads. The vessels, 
which are often under exclusive contract with the railroad 
operating a particular pier, cannot solicit cargo from 
another pier because of the high switching charges which 
in many cases prove prohibitive. For many years no dockage 
was charged at the railroad operated piers for the contract 
carriers. Wharfage charges varied t~~oughout the port which 
created an unfavorable condition and made it difficult for 
shippers to compute freight charges. 1 · 
Lightered freight is assessed one half wharfage at 
1. Through the efforts of the Port of Boston 
Commission an agreement was reached in 1955 establishing 
a uniform system of wharfage charges. 
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Boston, and this practice hampers greater use of this 
service to reduce port bottlenecks. For many years the 
awb~ard and costly interchange of frei ght between terminals 
and non-uniform terminal cl~rges have constituted a definite 
barrier to the fr.ee flow of commerce through the port of 
Boston. 
2. Pier Facilities 
The unfavorable balance of trade in the first 
half of the twentieth century caused a definite neg lect of 
waterfront terminal facil i ties at Boston. The three Boston 
railroads which owned and operated the majority of the ocean 
terminals allowed these facilities to beccme run down, 
unsafe, and inefficient. For many years the port of Boston 
suf fered from the lack of adequate ocean terminals. During 
the interval from 1913, when Com~onwealth Pier No. 5 was 
bui lt by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, until August 
1950, when Hoosac Pier No. 1 was built by the Port of Boston 
Authority, little private construction took place. However, 
the Federal Government built the Boston Army Base in 1918, 
and Castle Island Terminal in 1942. The lack of proper ocean 
terminal facilities is indicative of the inability of the 
local railroads to make the capital expenditures that are 
necessary to induce traffic to flow through the port. 
3. Warehouses 
The warehous i ng facilities a t Boston are good, 
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and adequate storage space has generally been available. 
At present thirty-nine warehouses serve traders exclusive 
of those used solely by their owners. However, many of the 
warehouses are located some distance from the terminal 
facilities and expensive transportation charges are often 
incurred. Few of the warehouses are so located as to be 
readily accessible to the terminal transit sheds and to 
permit the maximum use of warehousing for storage in transit, 
as well as storage for merchandising and financing. 
4. Waterfront Zonipg 
Many of the buildings that are in immediate 
proximity to the piers and transit sheds in Boston are not 
used in conjunction with waterfront activities. Many non-
related businesses are occupying space here that could be 
used to the greater advantage of the Port should new 
facilities be constructed.. The waterfront area lacks a 
concentration of those industries and business activities 
which will best contribute to the maximum use of the Port. 
In many port cities local or state governments 
own as high as 100 percent of the waterfrontage. In Boston, 
however, government ownership has been negligible and little 
control over waterfront areas has been effected. Waterfront 
zoning has been badly needed in Boston for many years, and 
the absence of this necessary regulation has resulted in the 
improper use of waterfront property which could be adding 
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to the ocean borne traffic at the port of Boston. 
5. Poor Traffic Solicitation 
The lack of trunk line railroads with Boston as 
their port of main interest has been a serious prob lem to 
the port of Boston. Few of the Boston railroads and steam-
ship companies and agents have exerted the agressive search 
for business that has been necessary in the past in order 
to attract a sufficient volume of business to the port. 
Nearly forty years ago Clapp wrote: 
Western shippers talk of New England roads as 
a great terminal yard, complacently switching domestic 
traffic which is bound to come to New England anyway, 
and indifferent to the export business, highly cqm-
petitive and moved at lower than domestic rates.?.~ 
In many instances this condition is in existence today as 
one of the reasons for the low export volum.e passing thru 
Boston. 
The Port of Boston Authority attempted to aid in 
the solicitation of port traffic as one of its major programs 
of accomplislwent when it was established in 1945. However, 
the efforts of this body were not too successful and the 
port of Boston is still without agressive solicitation which 
is a vital factor in the present day competitive port race. 
6. Labor, ! Serious Problem 
Lack of a belt line railroad, slow and inefficient 
.,~5, p .121 
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methods and high charges on switching frei ght between 
ocean terminals, poor terminal facilities and poorly 
located warehouses, run down and inefficient terminal 
facilities, no central control over the waterfront and 
lack of waterfront zoning, and numerous other restrictive 
conditions these created almost an insurmountable 
bottleneck to the free flow of trade at the port of Boston. 
However, as if these conditions were not enough, Boston 
developed a reputation for the posses sion of a highly skilled 
but antagonistic labor force which demanded more men per 
gang to unload a given cargo than other ports, was known 
to work ships for the maximum earnings obtainable, and tied 
up vessels and cargoes with walkouts and strikes whenever 
provoked. The story of a crude rubber cargo obnoxious to 
work is a typical example: The longshoremen demanded double 
pay to unload such a cargo and during arbitration a committee 
of longshoremen and employers examined the situation and 
voted that double pay was not justified. However, the long-
shoremen, who agreed to abide by the decision, still refused 
to unload the ship without double pay and the vessel pro-
ceeded to New York where it was unloaded without fUrther 
trouble. As a result, however, shipments of crude rubber 
J)E-
through Boston were greatly reduced. 
Regular shipments of lepidolite ore, a type of 
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mica which is very dusty, were lost to the port because 
the longshoremen demanded double pay. This product was then 
regularly unloaded at Philadelphia, One Worcester manu-
facturer bypassed Boston in fa vor of Providence, Rhode 
Island for shipments of pig iron because he feared labor 
trouble in Boston even though he had never experienced any. 
When questioned on the subject of penalty cargoes, a vice 
president of the I.L.A. stated in 1953 that labor in other 
porta "hasn 1 t progressed" to the point where 1 t can demand 
extra pay. In this way Boston became known as a labor 
"trouble port'' and many cargo diversions to other ports 
resulted as steamship operators are extremely hesitant to 
M-
send vessels into a port where holdup may occur. ~ 
From 1935 to 1951 no formal labor contract was 
negotiated between labor and shipping interests in the port 
of Boston. In October 1951 progress in the achievement of 
more peaceful labor relations was made with the signing of 
an a greement between the International Longshoreman's 
Association and the Boston Shipping Association. This agree-
ment conformed to that in effect at the port of New York, 
and although hostility and lack of cooperation between labor 
and management has not been entirely eliminated, better 
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relations have resulted. More recently arbitration has 
been submitted to Father Powers of Boston, and the Port 
has enjoyed one of its longest periods in many years 
without serious labor strife. 
7. Boston Loses New England-Trade 
From a competitive angle it appears that port 
costs at Boston are higher than those at many other ports, 
and this condition is a material detriment to efforts to 
attract commerce to the Port. New York, on the other hand, 
with its free lighterage and other non-compensatory services, 
quick delivery of freight to any point in the harbor, car 
floats, and floating grain elevators, achieved the reputation 
for being a low cost port for vessels and cargoes. Adding 
lower costs to more frequent sailings, New York was able to 
attract nearly 90 percent of the New England export trade 
by 1939, and approximately 40 to 50 percent of the New 
England import trade. Thus Boston lost the battle to hold 
its trade even on its front doorstep. H. Fugl-Meyer, the 
Danish free port expert summed up this situation in 1935 
as follows: 
The remarkable lack of merchants specializing 
in an international sphere of action can be explained 
in different ways. The proximity of New York is not 
sufficient reason. From countless examples it can 
be proved that a smaller city can live and thrive and 
offer good conditions to its business community even 
though a large city be close by; but when a city like 
Boston is unable to offer suff iciently tolerable 
conditions for the inward and outward flow of goods, 
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this flow is naturally diverted into other channels. 
This is undoubtedly what is happening at present in 
Boston. Railway and free or non-compensatory rates 
and terminal charges are favoring New York to such 
an extent that the population of the hinterland of 
Boston prefers to ship iks good from, and to receive 
its goods via, New York. ~ 
8. Lack of ~ Central Governing Power 
Boston had little commerce at the close of World 
War II. The revival since the war has been slow, and 
although many efforts have been made to aid the Port most 
of them have been too little and too late. Boston, the 
center of the country's le arning and a leader in business 
training, railed over the years to heed the advice of the 
port experts, and did not provide the necessary self-
governing body with the required power and autonomy to 
successfully combat the many problems that faced the Port. 
The valiant efforts of a few outstanding individuals have 
not been sufficient to overcome the many adverse port trade 
factors, the political influences, the loss of public 
interest, and the actions of selfish individuals. An or-
ganization is desperately needed that will enable the necessary 
action to be taken in order to attract a sufficient volume 
of business that would provide a successful and profitable 
port operation. 
*147, p.l8 
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CHAPTER III 
TRAFFIC ANALYSIS 
I. THE USE OF COMMODITY TRADE STATISTICS 
Commodity trade statistics reveal much valuable 
information about port development and the nature and volume 
of traffic passing through a given port. However, it is 
difficult to find a truly common basis for comparison between 
various ports and from one period of time to another for a 
given port. For example, if percentage of total trade is 
used as a base for comparison, the figures do not indicate 
variations in absolute volume of trade from one time interval 
to another. Also, close comparisons between ports mainly 
handling bulk commodities and ports handling large amounts 
of general cargo are difficult to analyze for significant 
information. Conclusions drawn from data for different 
periods of time are also difficult to substantiate because of 
the numerous external factors which influence the barometer 
of port trade. 
A port is a gateway, and the tonnage passing through 
this gateway appears to be the most widely employed common 
denominator made use of in recent years to compare port 
activity. However, many misconceptions from the improper 
use of tonnage figures frequently result. For example, general 
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cargo, which is the main contributor to port activity, may be 
definitely on the decline, while perhaps crude petroleum is 
on the increase. The petroleum adds little to total port 
activity in comparison to general cargo items tecause petroleum 
is handled at specially designed private facilities where it 
is pumped into storage tanks. However, the increase in petro-
leum tonnage may be more than enough to offset the decrease 
in general cargo tonnage, and the port total tonnage figures 
would indicate an increase in tonnage, while in reality the 
port was experiencing a decrease in trade. 
The misconceptions and difficulties that arise in 
determining a common base for comparison of port statistics 
is very clearly illustrated in Tables IX and X. Table IX 
indicates a decrease in foreign export dollar value fer the 
port of Boston from the year 1952 to the year 1953 of 11 ~er­
cent. Export tonnage figures 0n the other hand, as given in 
Table X, indicate a 22 percent decrease for the Port for the 
same period. Thus, in this case, there is a 100 percent 
variation between the percent of decrease of port trade when 
it is derived from the dollar value base and when it is 
derived from the tonnage base. This indicates the wide 
variations in conclusions that can be made from an analysis 
of port statistics if all aspects of the traffic and the 
commodity and trade statistics are not carefully considered 
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and included in any deductions drawn from the statistical 
study. 
Many port authorities, in their efforts to portray 
a profitable active enterprise with an ever increasing 
volume of trade, have been guilty of many abuses of trade 
statistics in their press releases and other communications 
to the public. Perhaps total tonnage of the port has de-
creased, but the dollar value of goods has increased. Usually 
press releases and other publicity will then concentrate on 
the dollar value of goods for that period and will exclude or 
omit other factors. Another common practice is for the port 
promotion agencies to select one commodity or one trade 
classification that has shown an increase, and concentrate 
on this item even though total trade through the port may be 
experiencing a marked decrease. Practices of this type, 
although apparently considered good positive salesmanship by 
those responsible for the promotion of ports, tend to dis-
credit their information releases and to cause a general 
distrust of port statistics by many of the various port 
traders. 
There are many figures and methods of analysis 
which must be combined to give the true picture of the traffic 
pattern through a given port, and the facts behind the fignres 
should be injected into the analysis and evaluation rather 
than basing conclusions on numerical indications alone. Thus 
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the limitations of the various tables and charts presented 
herein in an endeavor to portray the traffic picture at the 
port of Boston should be fully recognized. 
II. PORT OF BOSTON CO~~ERCE 
The three main sources of information available in 
a traffic study of the port of Boston are the Port of Boston 
Commission, the u.s. Department of Commerce Bureau of Foreign 
and Domestic Commerce, and the Corps of Engineers U.S. Army. 
Information from all three of these agencies has been utilized 
in this study of the port of Boston, as well as data collected 
from other origins. Often data collected from the different 
sources does not agree as to exact quantities, because of 
different sampling techniques, different methods of collecting 
data, different classifications, etc. As long as the data 
has varied within reason, minor differences in quantities have 
been overlooked in this study, and an effort has been made 
to utilize the figures only for important characteristics and 
significant trends. 
Trade statistics used are in tonnage figures or in 
dollar value of goods. Port trade has been broken down into 
five general classifications generally corresponding to those 
used by the Corps of Engineers U.S. Army in its collection 
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of Commercial Statistics For Waterborne Commerce Of The United 
States. The five classifications are as follows: foreign 
imports, foreign exports, coastwise receipts, coastwise shipments, 
and local. 1 A sixth classification is that of Total Port 
Trade, which is the combined total of the first five classifi-
cations. 
A. Foreign Commerce 
1. Foreign Imports 
Boston's imports have risen fairly steadily since 
World War II when they reached a twentieth century low in 
1943 of 357,035 tons. By 1950 this figure had reached a peak 
of 5,299,222 tons, which was the highest tonna ge figure reached 
in the last thirty years. At this point, however, the increase 
leveled off and in recent years import tonnage has experienced 
a slight decline. 
Foreign import tonnage comprised approximately 
26 percent of the total port trade for the year 1953. 2 
Petroleum and petroleum products made up over 64 percent of 
the import tonnage, and sugar ranked second with 9 percent. 
Other leading imports for the year 1953 were gypsum or 
plaster rock, wood pulp, and wool. Table II lists the 20 
leading commodities for the years 1951, 1952, and 1953. 
1. Local represents a combination of the Corps of 
Engineers classifications of Local and Intraport and pertains 
to cargo movements within the local port area. 
2. See Table VI 
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TABLE I 
FOREIGN COMMER CE OF' u.s. PORTS 
FOR THE YEAR 1954 
(shipping weights in millions of pounds) 
Position Export Import 
1. New York, N.Y. 14,280.6 56,283.0 
2. Baltimore, Md. 8,114.6 29,865.2 
3. Philadelphia, Pa. 4,293.4 30,898.8 
4. Norfolk, Va. 17,378.1 4,227.5 
5. New Orleans, La. 9,523.8 7,100.6 
6. Portland, Me . 244.9 16,296 .2 
7. Paulsboro, N.J. 342.5 14,151.8 
8. New Port News, Va. 13,299.4 1,100.2 
9. Mobile, Ala. 1,872.5 10,781.1 
10. Houston, Texas 7,930.2 4,099 .9 
11. Marcus Hook, Pa. 324.2 9' 543.2 
12. Boston, Mass. 721.3 8,931.9 
13. Los Angeles, Calif. 4,489.9 3,246.9 
14. Baton Rouge , La. 2,045.0 3,973.4 
15. Tampa, Fla. 4,475.0 1,236.5 
16. Corpus Christi, Texas 1,727.4 3,332.5 
17. Long Beach, Calif. 3,851.9 1,028.3 
18. Galveston, Texas 4,364.2 507.9 
19. Savannah, Ga. 709.6 3,035.1 
20. RiclLmond, Calif. 1,118.0 2,469.3 
21. San Francisco, Calif. 1,842.0 1,538.1 
22. Charleston, S.C.- 426.6 2,261.8 
23. Port Arthur, Texas 2,326.4 
-------
24. 'l'acoma, Washington 1,211.6 1,068.3 
25. Seattle, Washington 1,115.9 897.8 
Source: u. s. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census 
Monthly Summary Reports FT 985 for Year 1 9 54. 
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Total 
70,565.6 
37,979.8 
35,192.2 
21,605.6 
16,624.4 
16,541.1 
14,494.3 
14,399.6 
12,653.6 
12,030.1 
9,867.4 
9,653.2 
7,736.8 
6,018.4 
5,711.5 
5,059.9 
4, 880 .2 
4,872.1 
3,744.7 
3,587.3 
3,380.1 
2,688.4 
2 ,326.4 
2,279.9 
2,013.7 
TABLE II 
PORT OF BOSTON I MPORTS 
(Short Tons) 
Rank Commodity 1953 1952 
~---· 
·rot a l Imports 4,972,908 4,958,366 
1. Petroleum pro ducts 3' 142' 887 3,421,542 
2. Sugar 507,119 452,334 
3. Gypsum 203,995 192,688 
4. Wood pulp 137,247 76,2 27 
5. Wool( all grades) 122,547 143,905 
6. Lumber 92' 401 22,209 
7. Molasses 70' 449 63,149 
8. Iron ore 62,136 64,994 
9. Iron & Steel pro ducts 51,967 43,296 
10. Iron, pig 49,794 8,732 
11. Coal, anthracite 33,577 31,648 
12. Rubber, crude 33,392 24,752 
13. Pineapple, canned 30,503 11,445 
14. Co f fee 30,158 33,950 
15. Latex 26,809 7' 761. 
16. Hides,skins & pelts 24,606 25,379 
17. SiB a l 20,988 29' 752 
18. Cocoa - b eans 19,410 24,001 
19. Extract 
-
tanning 18,983 8 ,921 
20. Bauxite or e 14,068 9,452 
SOURCE: Port of Boston Commission J:;'irst Annual Report 
Pag e 19. 
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19 51 
5,300,466 
3,359,734 
458,011 
217,849 
118,371 
227,887 
27,466 
81,131 
145,481 
95,090 
54,528 
27,802 
22,065 
23,464 
38,210 
11, 276 
33,328 
20,753 
28,226 
21,103 
9,443 
TABLE III 
PRINCIPAL POR':P OF BOSTON E::X.JlQ HTS 
(Short Tons) 
1953 1952 19 51 
-----------------
TOTAL EXP ORTS 309 ,851 
Grain 144, 271 w 
(5,051,170} 
Petroleum 0 
Machinery 9 ,477 
Textiles 10,697 
Non-met allic minerals 6,144 
Paper and paper products 4,143 
Fertilizer 3,354 
Chemicals 3,905 
Coal tar products 180 
Woodpulp 1,695 
Flour 16,486 
Iron & Steel (Fabricated) 3,967 
Lumber & Wood Manufactures 927 
Rubber manufactures 5,059 
Newsprint 560 
Leather & Leather manufactures3,07l 
Animal products, inedible 2,941 
Hides & Skins, raw 1,569 
Animal oils & fats 309 
Clays & earths 734 
Animal fodders & feeds 0 
Glass & glass products 121 
420,438 
235,536 " 
( 9 '016, 89 5 )' 
2,747 
11,103 
6,054 
9,498 
7,836 
1,680 
5, 223 
0 
5,773 
2,017 
5,546 
6'77 
3,066 
6,168 
1,390 
1,687 
1,294 
1,115 
1,081 
20 
0 
-l~ Figures in paren theses show number of bushels. 
SOURCE: Port of Boston Commission First Annual Report 
Pag e 22 . 
436,720 
250,909 " 
( 8 ,006 ,1561' 
18,800 
17,137 
14,860 
12,052 
10,219 
9,664 
12,554 
1,328 
13,661 
10,007 
2,444 
10,927 
2,080 
1,376 
1,923 
1,061 
0 
0 
1,279 
1,017 
1,087 
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Boston ranked fifth among United States ports in 
import tonnage and third in value of imports for the year 
1953. 1 For that year the Port of Boston's imports represented 
4.01 percent of total United States import tonnage and 5.81 
percent of total United States import value. 
Thus the port of Boston with its heavily populated 
and industrialized hinterland handles imports from foreign 
countries which are mainly raw materials and food for con-
sumption by local industries and local populations. Few of 
the imported goods are marked for interior destinations, and 
the port finds itself serving only a limited region for the 
entrance of foreign imports. 
2. Foreign Exports 
Foreign exports passing through the port of Boston 
have remained consistently low in the second quarter of the 
Twentieth Century and have ranged mainly from 200,000 to 
500,000 tons. In 1943 a peak of 916,103 tons was reached 
with war time exports. 
Foreign exports comprised only 1.3 percent of 
total port trade in 1953. The principal export commodity 
for that year was grain, which comprised 49.5 percent of the 
porVs export tonnage. Other leading export commodities for 
l.See Table VII 
63 
r ABLE IV 
TOTAL TONNAGE OF THE PORT OF' BOSTON 
1905 - 1954 
(Tons of 2 ,000 pounds) 
Ye ar Total Tons Year Total Tons 
1 9 54 17,580 ,131 1 929 1 9 ,065,050 
1953 17,803,354 1 928 17,266, 162 
1952 19, 237, 945 1 927 16,599, 103 
1951 18,976,880 1 926 15,784,102 
1950 18,194,438 1925 15,209 ,620 
1949 15,363,529 1924 13,185,884 
1948 18,317,356 1923 15, 217, 663 
1947 18 ,502,902 1922 1 3 , 993,646 
1946 15,008 ,334 19 21 9,752,841 
1945 12,850,522 1920 9,272,186 
1944 10,743, 017 1919 8,957,738 
1943 8,731 ,046 1918 8, 178,015 
1942 10,431,179 1917 7,204,961 
1941 18,826,770 191 6 8, 189,080 
1940 19,018,305 1915 8 ,146,783 
1939 17,842,212 1 91 4 9,883,546 
19 38 15,881,487 1913 10' 203 ,171 
1937 18,390,390 1912 9,345,934 
1936 17, 214,140 1911 8,832,960 
1935 16,384 ,958 1910 8 ,948,322 
1934 16,028 , 848 1 909 9 , 285 , 623 
1933 15, 378, 133 1908 8 ,756,543 
1932 14,012,172 1907 9 ' 884 ,50 4 
1 931 16,882,153 1906 9,248,444 
1930 15,689,362 1905 9,262,922 
SOURCE : Commercial Statisti c s Water-Borne Commerce of the 
United States. For the c alendar years 1 905-1953. 
Annual Reports of t h e Chief of Engineers Part 2 
Dept . of t he Army, Office of the Chief of Engineers; 
and data from the Port of Boston Commission monthly 
statistical sheets . 
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the year 1953 were Department of Defense controlled cargoes, 
textiles, machinery and equipment, and non-metalic minerals. 
Grain, the principal export tonnage cargo, is a 
very uncertain commodity and experiences great fluxuations 
from month to month and from year to year.l From zero bushels 
in 1937 export grain fluxuated up and do\vn in subsequent 
years and equaled 5,051,170 bushels in 1953. Grain exports 
have not shown any noticeable improvement since the rate on 
ex-lake grain from Buffalo was equalized in 1951. In fact 
the number of bushels exported through Boston decreased from 
approximately eight million bushels in 1951 to approximately 
two million bushels in 1954. However, this decrease in itself 
is not necessarily significant because of the many factors 
in addition to rail rates which determine the movement of 
grain. European agriculture has been steadily recovering 
since World War II and the United States grain exports in 
general have correspondingly decreased. Port allocation of 
United States Government grain is controlled by the United 
Stat es Department of Agriculture in Washington, D.C., and is 
heavily influenced in conjunction with customers desires 
by the Commodity Credit Corporation with headquarters in 
Chicago. Since the port of Boston did not maintain 
l.See Charts 7 and 8 
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representatives in either of these cities during this period, 
some of the decline in grain shipments can reasonably be 
attributed to the lack of proper solicitation. 
Boston has been termed a "winter port" for grain 
shipments. However, Chart 8 indicates that grain movement 
from June 1952 to December 1954 was very erratic, with the 
largest shipments for 1953 occuring in the month of August. 
In July of 1955 a single movement of approximately 785,000 
bushels of barley was loaded at Boston on a large tanker 
vessel. This one grain shipment equalled approximately 40 per-
cent of the total grain shipments made in the previous year 
of 1954. This single large grain shipment illustrates that 
many of the grain shipments through the Port are full cargo 
shipments that go abroad in chartered or tramp vessels and do 
not provide bottom cargo for the general cargo carriers. 
If soliciting offices were reestablished in strate-
gically located cities, it appears probable that grain ship-
ments from Buffalo would increase. However, many of the port 
experts predict that the Saint Lawrence Seaway will have a 
detrimental effect on the grain trade at Boston with a corre-
sponding reduction in the port of Boston's exports. 
Boston ranked forty-fourth in foreign export tonnage 
and twentieth in export dollar value among United States ports 
for the year 1953. For that year the Port's export tonnage 
was less than two tenths of one percent of the total exports 
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TABLE V 
PORT OF BOSTON 
Foreign and Domestic Commerce 
1925 - 1954 
Foreign Domestic 
Coastwise Coastwise 
Ye~ Imports Export Receipts Shipments Local Total 
1925 2,586,065 338,779 9,884,019 1,303,672 1,097,085 15,209,620 
1926 2,904,579 314,990 10,624,466 1,163,657 776,348 15,784,040 
1927 2,662,184 292,452 11,321,279 1,456,806 866,382 16,599,103 
1928 2,964,876 403,486 10,796,626 1,938,351 1,162,803 17,266,142 
1929 3,261,301 303,120 12,742,708 1,712,057 1,045,864 19,065,050 
1930 2,915,152 263,461 10,374,812 1, 226' 499 909,438 15,689,362 
1931 2,460,148 230,539 11,736' 551 1,554,009 819,727 16,800,974 
1932 2,009,88 1 209,419 9,786,479 1,097,124 1,150' 852 14,253,755 
1933 1,822,960 166,090 11,270,474 987,102 1,316,667 15' 563,293 
1934 1,836,399 254,169 11,128,878 1,232,865 1,018,943 15,471,254 
1935 2,693,223 330,090 11,273,356 1, 209,300 878,989 16,384,958 
1936 2,734,507 312,410 11,387,556 1,305,453 1,474,214 17,214,140 
1937 2,678,094 473,070 12,613,682 1,179,420 1,446,121 18,390,390 
1938 1,798,064 321,445 11,594,091 997,954 1,169,213 15,880,767 
1939 2,169,610 428,999 12,824,967 1,118,266 1,300,370 17,842,212 
1940 2,280,851 455,374 13,131,699 1,624,240 1,526,141 19,018,305 
1941 2,725,124 654,249 12,503,447 1,566,164 1,377,786 18,826,770 
1942 808,228 687,929 6,478,250 656 ,062 1,800,710 10,431,179 
1943 357,035 916,103 5,455,598 321,604 1,420,706 8,471,046 
1944 524,266 411,469 7,688,896 206,766 1,911,620 10,743,017 
1945 1,742,911 565,121 7,857,322 324,697 2,360,489 12,850,522 
1946 2,819,722 428,950 9,674,099 513,917 1,571,646 15,008,334 
1947 3,252,695 538,625 11,432,869 715~009 2,563,704 18,502,902 
1948 2,833,989 319,722 12,691,170 810,401 1,662,018 18,317,356 
1949 3,448,810 433,419 10,054,948 64 5,957 1,308,885 15,892,021 
1950 5,299,222 238,534 11 ,098,628 1,001,968 1,802,545 19,446,891 
1951 5,100,926 382,029 11,703,942 979,523 1,638,394 19,804,814 
1952 4,849,735 336,189 11,595,422 1,143,945 2,035,837 19,961,128 
1953 4,756,747 234,147 10,993,829 817,694 1,273,843 18,076,260 
1954 4,6 23,216 431,517 10,976,576 600,505 948,317 17,580,131 
SOURCE: Commercial Statistics 
\lv'ater Borne Corrunerce of the United States for Calendar 
years 1925 - 19 54. Dep t.-of the Army, and t he Port of 
Boston Commission month ly st a tistica l s he ets for 1954. 
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of the United States, and dollar value was less than seven 
tenths of one percent of the United States total. 
The large percentage of New England manufacturers 
exporting through ports~her than Boston is illustrated in 
Chart 3. New York claims the lions share of New England 
exports, with Boston handling only 11.5 percent of the export 
value of the New England manufacturers responding to a 
questionaire in 1948.* This clearly indicates that Boston 
fails to attract export cargoes from a large majority of 
manufacturers in the Port's local hinterland. These cargoes 
if attracted could greatly aid in developing port activity. 
3. Total Foreign Commerce 
The Port of Boston ranked twelveth in tonnage in 
the foreign trade of United States ports for the year 1953. 
Total foreign trade made up 27.7 percent of the tonnage 
passing through Boston for that year. The marked unbalance 
in Boston's foreign trade is brought into sharp focus by 
Chart 5 which clearly shows the large gap between imports and 
exports. This chart is somewhat exagerated, however, due to 
the presence of petroleum which weights heavily on import 
tonnage but has little effect in the ability of general 
cargo carriers to obtain both inbound and outbound cargoes 
*117 
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thru Boston. If petroleum is removed from import tonnage, 
the ratio of imports to exports is approximately seven to 
one for the year 1953. This ratio emphasizes a serious unbal-
ance in the port of Boston's foreign trade, but is more 
realistic than the twelve to one ratio usually quoted, and 
perhaps indicates that the problem is not completely 
unsolvable. 
B. Domestic Commerce 
1. Coastwise Receipts 
Coastwise receipts comprise more tonnage passing 
through the port of Boston than any other classification. 
In 1953 this category comprised a greater tonnage than all 
other classifications combined, and made up 60.7 percent of 
the total port trade. For the last thirty years coastwise 
receipts have fluxuated between nine million and thirteen 
million tons, with eleven million tons being the average for 
recent years. The tonnage for 1953 was 10,993,829 tons. 
In 1953 petroleum and petroleum products and coal 
made up 94 percent of the Coastwise Receipts for Boston. 
Sagar, lumber, sulfur, phosphate, and sand and gravel com-
prised 3.4 percent, while paper and manufactures, and dried 
and canned fruits and fruit juices ranked next in order. A 
study of the coastwise receipts reveals the failure of this 
classification to produce much general cargo for the Port, 
71 
72 
TABLE VI 
1fil ATERBORNE TONNAGE AND 'I'RAFF'I C OF 'I' HE 
PORT OF BOSTON FOR THE YEAR 19 53 
Type of 
Traffic 
Foreign 
Impor ts 
F'oreign 
Exports 
Coastwise 
1953 
Tonnage 
(short tons) 
4 ,756,747 
234,147 
Receip ts 10,993,829 
Coastwise 
Shipments 817,694 
% of total Principle Commoditie s 
traffic 
% of 
Imports 
1953 
26.4 
1.3 
60.7 
4.5 
( 1 ) 
( 2) 
(3) 
( 4) 
( 5) 
( 6) 
( 1) 
( 2) 
Petroleum and 
Petroleum products 
Sugar 
Gypsum or plaster 
rock 
Wood pulp 
Wool, urrmanufactured 
All others 
Grain 
Dept. of Defense 
Controlled carg oes 
Textiles 
64.4 
9.0 
4.3 
2.9 
2.3 
17.1 
100.0 
% of 
Exports 
49.5 
10.6 
4.6 
4.2 
2.6 
( 3) 
(4) 
( 5) 
( 6) 
Machinery & Equipment 
Non-me tallic miner a ls 
All others 28 .5 
100.0 
% of 
Receipts 
( 1) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
( 4) 
( 5) 
( 6) 
Petroleum & 
Petroleum Products 
Coal 
Sugar,Lumber,Sulfur, 
Phosphate & sand and 
gravel 
Paper & manf. not 
elsewhere clas s . 
Fruits dried & canned, 
fruit juices 
All others 
72.6 
21.4 
3.4 
1.0 
.9 
.7 
(1) Petroleum & 
100.0 
% of 
Shipments 
Petroleum Products 
(2) Paper & manf. not 
elsewhere classified 
(3) Chemicals, Chern. prod. 
(4) Coal tar produc ts 
(5) Machinery 
(6) All others 
3 .. 0 
2.8 
1.9 
.9 
21.9 
100.0 
Type of 
Traffic 
Local & 
TABLE VI 
(continued) 
WATERBORNE TONNAGE AND TRAFFIC OB' 'rHE 
PORT OF BOSTON FOR THE YEAR 1953 
1953 % of total Princi£le Commodities 
'I'onnage traffic 
(short tons) 1953 
Instraport 1, 273,843 7.1 ( 1) Petroleum & 
Petroleum produc ts 
( 2) Waste material not 
elsewhere classif ied 
( 3) Fish 
(4) Sand & Gravel 
( 5 ) Paper and IVIanf. not 
elsewhere clas sified 
( 6) All othe rs 
TOTALS 18,076,260 100.0 
SOURCE: Commercial Statistics 
WATER BORNE COIVIMERCE OF THE UNI TED STATES. Part 1 
Department of the Army-Corps of Engineers 1953 and; 
Port of Boston Commission data. 
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% of 
Local & 
Instra:2ort 
70.0 
14.4 
6.0 
5.0 
2.6 
2.0 
100.0 
and portrays the port of Boston mainly as a large coal and 
oil receiving center. 
2. Coastwise Shipments 
Coastwise shipments dwindled sharply during World 
War II and never regained their prewar position. This 
classification produced much general cargo in the prewar 
period and greatly helped in boosting port trade. Coastwise 
shipments in 1953 comprised 4.5 percent of total port tonnage 
as compared to 13.7 percent in 1925. Petroleum and petroleum 
products also dominate this category of port trade and in 
1953 made up 69.5 percent of all coastwise shipments. Other 
leading classifications of coastwise shipments are paper, 
manufactures, chemicals and chemical products, coal tar 
products and machinery. Any substantial increase in coast-
wise shipments for the port of Boston in the forseeable 
future is hi~hly improbable due to the keen competition 
from land carriers, the lack of cargo vessels of suitable 
design and construction for efficient operation in the coast-
wise trade, and the large capital outlay required for the 
construction of vessels that would be suitable for this trade. 
3. Local 
Local traffic comprises the last category of port 
trade classified according to origin and destination to be 
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TABLE VII 
PORT OF BOSTON'S RATITK I N WATER-BORNE FOREIGN 'rRADE 
1948 - 1953 
EXPORTS I MPORTS 
Total Dry Tankers Total Dry Tankers 
Exports Cargo Cargo Import Car go Carg o 
Rank Rank Rank Rank - Rank Rank 
Tonnage 
1 9 48 44 35 29 5 6 6 
1949 36 35 20 5 6 5 
1950 43 39 35 5 6 5 
1951 45 38 31 4 5 4 
1952 57 47 38 t::. 7 3 v 
1953 44 48 39 5 7 3 
Dollar 
Value 
1948 12 11 41 4 3 6 
1949 13 12 21 4 3 7 
1 950 14 13 34 2 2 5 
1951 14 13 35 2 2 3 1952 22 18 37 3 3 5 
1953 20 20 37 3 4 5 
Source: u.s. Department of Commerce. Boston Fie ld Office 
Bulletin. November 5, 1954. 
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TABLE VIII 
BOS'rON 1 S SHARE I N WATER-BORNE FOREIGN TRADE 
1948 - 1953 
( Perc entag es of u.s. Totals) 
EXPOWrS I MPORTS 
---
To tal Dry Tankers Total Dry Tankers 
Ex12orts Cargo Cargo Im12orts Cargo _Cargo 
Tonnage 
1948 0.34 0 .37 0.13 4 .18 3.52 4.99 
1949 0.47 0.45 0.57 4.42 3 .17 5.70 
1950 0.32 0 . 36 0.06 5.48 3.92 6. 92 
1951 0.29 0.31 0.13 5.05 3.44 6.65 
19 52 0.20 0.23 0.02 4 .51 2 .76 6 .06 
19 53 0.19 0.23 4 .01 2 . 82 5.11 
Value 
1948 0.80 0.80 0.03 7.38 7.70 3 . 96 
1949 0.87 0.88 0.51 6.97 7.04 4 .35 
1950 0.90 0.93 0 .08 8.65 8 .98 5.41 
1951 0.75 0.78 0.13 9.96 10.47 4 . 67 
19 52 0.63 0. 6 5 0.03 6.21 6 . 39 4 . 46 
19 53 0.64 0.67 5.81 5.98 4.17 
Source: u.s. Depart ment of Commerce , Boston Fie l d Office Bulletin 
Novemb er 5, 1954. 
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discussed, and represents cargo shipments within the confines 
of the local port area. This category has ranged in tonnage 
from 750,000 tons to 2,500,000 tons over the course of the 
past thirty years, and is mainly comprised of petroleum 
and petroleum products and fish. In 1953 local traffic 
equalled 1,273,843 tons and made up 7.1 percent of total 
port tonnage for that year. Petroleum and petroleum products 
made up 70 percent of local and intraport tonna ge , waste 
materials 14.4 percent, fish 6.0 percent and sand and gravel 
5.0 percent. Local traffic represents another trade classi-
fication that is mainly comprised of the movement of bulk 
commodities, and this significant fact greatly reduces the 
importance of this classification as a contributor to port 
activity. 
4. Total Domestic Commerce 
Domestic commerce equaled 13,085,366 tons and 
comprised 72.3 percent of all the tonnage passing through 
the port of Boston in 1953. Of this amount 11,794,186 tons 
or 90.1 percent was comprised of petroleum and coal. Again 
a predominant one way traffic pattern is clearly shown, with 
a large unbalance of inbound over outbound cargoes, the ratio 
for 1953 being 13 to 1. The domestic trade at Boston has 
suffered severely from truck and rail competition since World 
War II. Only in the movement of bulk goods, which water 
78 
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TABLE -IX 
VALUE OF UNITED STATES EXPORTS AND IMPORTS ON DRY CARGO 
AND TANKER VESSELS THROUGH 10 PRINCIPAL ATLANT IC SEABOARD PORTS 
FOR THE YEARS 1952 AND 1953 
(Value in Millions of Dollars) 
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TOTAL DRY CARGO VESSELS '-rANKER VESSELS 
% 
1953 1952 Change 1953 1952 Change 1953 1952 Chan~ 
Baltimore 
Boston 
Charleston 
Marcus Hook 
New York (1) 
Newport News 
Norfolk 
Paulsboro 
Philadelphia 
Savannah 
Total 
All Others 
Atlantic 
Ports 
Baltimore 
Boston 
Charleston 
Marcus Hook 
New York (1) 
Newport News 
Norfolk 
Paulsboro 
Philadelphia 
Savannah-
Total 
All Others 
Atlantic 
432 
51 
78 
3 
3,257 
285 
230 
8 
237 
37 
4,618 
201 
456 
57 
78 
7 
3,640 
297 
223 
11 
264 
29 
5 ,062 
224 
4,819 5,286 
477 
482 
54 
66 
3,910 
50 
98 
88 
484 
53 
5,762 
322 
411 
506 
68 
50 
3,954 
33 
103 
88 
460 
55 
5,728 
310 
EXPORTS 
- 5 427 
-11 51 
78 
-57 -l:-
-11 3,227 
- 4 285 
+ 3. 230 
-27 4 
-10 229 
f28 36 
- 9 4,567 
-10 199 
- 9 4,766 
I MPORTS 
1-16 450 
- 5 449 
-21 45 
+32 
- 1 
+52 
- 5 
+ 5 
- 4 
1- 1 
+ 4 
3,668 
50 
85 
2 
341 
44 
5,134 
257 
~P~or~t~s~------~6~,~0~8~4 __ 6~,~0~3~8~~+_ 1 5,391 
456 
57 
78 
3,606 
297 
223 
9 
253 
27 
5,006 
222 
5,228 
386 
472 
59 
3,720 
32 
85 
5 
325 
45 
5,129 
241 
5,370 
- 6 
-11 
-11 
- 4 
+ 3 
-56 
- 9 
ofo33 
- 9 
-10 
- 9 
+17 
- 5 
-24 
- 1 
1"56 
-60 
+ 5 
- 2 
+ 7 
" ., .. 
{1) Incl udes Newark, N.J., and Perth Amboy, N.J. 
4 
" .... 
3 
30 
3 
8 
48 
5 
53 
* 
7 
34 
2 
11 
2 
56 
1 
57 
27 25 
33 35 
9 9 
66 50 
242 233 
13 18 
8 6 83 
143 134 
9 10 
628 597 
66 70 
694 667 
~~ Less t h an $ 50,000 or less t han 0.5 perc ent. 
NO_'E : To tals represent sums of unrounded fi gures, hence may vary 
from the sums of the rounded amounts. 
Source: U.S. Dep art ment of Commerce Boston Fi eld Office Bulletin, 
October 29, 1954 . 
- 57 
- 12 
... 50 
- 27 
- 14 
+400 
7 
-4 8 
6 
+ 32 
+ 1.: 
- 28 
+ 4 
+ 7 
- 10 
+ 5 
6 
+ 4 
carriers move most economically, has Boston been able to 
resist the diversion of domestic commerce to other channels 
of transportation. 
c. Total Port Trade 
The total tonnage for the Port of Boston has ranged 
mainly from nine to nineteen million tons over the last half 
century. Since 1925 the Port of Boston has realized little 
tonnage increase, and has seen much of its general cargo 
tonnage decreasing and being replaced by petreleum and other 
bulk commodities. During this same period, ports such as 
New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and New Orleans have main-
tained both total tonnage and general cargo tonnage increases. 1 
Boston has reached a point where the port is mainly serving 
only the local New England hinterland in inbound trade. 
Total inward movement of cargoes {foreign imports 
and domestic receipts) for the year 1953 represented 
approximately 87.1 percent of the total port trade. The 
ratio of total inbound cargo to total outbound cargo for 
that year was approximately fifteen to one and emphasizes the 
marked unbalance in port trade. 2 Boston has been unable to 
attract western exports to aid in stabilizing this lop-sided · 
condition. 
l.See Charts 2 and 6 
2.As previously mentioned, this ratio is somewhat 
distorted due to the large percentage of inbound tonnage made 
up by petroleum. See Chart 11. 
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TABLE X 
SHIPPING . EIGHT OF UNITED S~!:'ATES EXPORTS AND I MPOHT 0 ON DRY CARGO 
AND 'rANKER VESSELS THROUGH 10 P I NCIPAL ATLAN~~IC S ''ABOARD PO TS 
F' OR 'rHE YiARS 19 52 A1TD 1953 
(Shipping Weight in Thousands of Long Tons) 
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TOT L D Y CAr'tGO VBSSELS •r ANKER VES · :!:LS 
% % 
_______ _ ___ 19 5·3 _;L ~52 Chang e 1 9 53 19 52 Chang e 19 53 19 52 Chan ge 
Baltimore--- ·-4 , 3oo 
Bo s ton 142 
Charleston 1 48 
Marcus Ho ok 68 
New York (l) 4 , 849 
Newport News 5 , 895 
Norfolk 6 , 062 
Paulsb oro 80 
Ph iladel phia 1, 202 
Sav annah 1 62 
To tal 22 , 908 
All Others 1, 3 45 
At l ant ic 
5 , 874 
186 
431 
203 
5, 916 
10, 742 
9 , 928 
1 22 
2 ,566 
218 
36 , 186 
1,599 
EXPORTS 
- 27 
- 24 
- 66 
- 67 
-18 
- 45 
-39 
- 34 
- 53 
- 26 
- 37 
-16 
4 , 277 
1 42 
146 
3 
4 , 51 5 
5 , 89 5 
6 , 062 
38 
1,171 
1 59 
22 , 408 
1,190 
5 , 8'74 
184 
431 
3 
5 , 434 
10 , '7 41 
9 , 928 
'73 
2 , 489 
1 51 
35 , 308 
1, 551 
Ports 24 , 253 37 ,785 - 35 23 , 598 36 , 859 
Baltimore 
Boston 
Charles ton 
:Mar cus Hook 
New York (l) 
Ne wport News 
Norfolk 
Paulsboro 
Phi l ade l phia 
Sav annah 
Total 
Al l Other s 
At lanti c 
Ports 
1 4 , 667 
4,253 
1,176 
3 ,762 
25 ,128 
494 
2 ,093 
5 , 776 
1 2 , 392 
1, 463 
71, 204 
7 , 880 
13 ,135 
4 , 325 
1,127 
2 , 88'7 
24 , 231 
3 23 
2 , 422 
5 , 533 
10, 9 69 
1,518 
66 , 470 
7,080 
I MPORTS 
~12 1 2 ,168 
·- 2 1, 444 
+· 4 450 
+30 
+ 4 
+53 
-14 
+ 4 
+13 
- 4 
+ 7 
+ll 
8 , 39 7 
493 
9 26 
1 2 
3 , 283 
74'7 
27 ' 920 
2 , 56 5 
10, 652 
1, 241 
373 
7, 902 
289 
840 
1 2 
2 , 58 1 
696 
24 , 586 
2 ,049 
'7 9 , 084 73, 550 + 8 30 , 485 26 , 635 
(l) Includes Newark , N. J ., a n d Perth Amboy, N. J . 
- 27 
- 23 
- 66 
-17 
- 45 
- 39 
- 48 
- 53 
+ 5 
- 37 
- 23 
- 36 
3 
66 200 
334 481 
1 .. ~( 
42 49 
31 77 
3 67 
503 8 '76 
1 52 51 
- 67 
- 31 
- 14 
- 60 
- 96 
- 43 
+198 
655 927 - 29 
+14 2 , 498 2 , 483 + l 
+16 2 ,809 3 , 084 - 9 
+21 7 26 754 - 4 
3 ,762 2 , 887 +30 
+ 6 16, 7 31 16, 329 + 2 
+71 "* 34 
+10 1, 168 1, 582 - 26 
- - 5 , '764 5,521 + 4 
+27 9 ,109 8,388 + 9 
+ '7 7 16 823 -13 
+1 4 43,283 41., 885 + 3 
+25 5 , 31 5 5,030 + 6 
+1 4 482 98 46, 915 + 4 
~~ Les s than 500 long tons or le ss t han 0.5 perc ent 
NO'rE : Total s represent sums of unrounded fi g ures , hence may vary 
fr om t h e sums of the r ounded amounts. 
SOURCE : U. s . Department of Commerce Bo s ton }• ie ld Offi c e Bull e tin , 
October 29 , 1 9 54 . 
A marked decrease in the number of steamship lines 
and ship sailings handling general cargo has accompanied the 
drop in general cargo tonnage. Boston seemed to be almost 
helpless in combatting this diversion of trade to other ports, 
as both the passenger trade and the general cargo business 
flowed in other channels and passed through other port gate-
ways. Although over eighty steamship lines carry cargoes to 
and from over fifty countries and territories from the port 
of Boston, the number of sailings to many points is often 
undependable or indefinite due to the dependence on the 
availability of a sufficient volume of cargo. Boston provides 
poor service to Brazil and many other South American countries 
since ships load first in Boston and then complete loading in 
Philadelphia, Baltimore and New York. Ships could not pres-
ently make Boston the last stateside call because Boston is 
unable to provide the necessary volume of cargo to fill empty 
cargo space aboard a departing vessel, and thereby provide the 
necessary pay load. 
This study of the traffic pattern has led to the 
conclusion that the road back for the port of Boston lies 
mainly in foreign cargoes traveling to and from western and 
central United States. This deduction is contrary to that 
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advanced by some students of the Port,- but was reached 
after careful consideration of many factors. Boston's main 
avenue for domestic general cargo development s eems to lie 
in the intercoastal trade and in trade with offshore 
territories such as Puerto Rico. In the se areas the truck 
and train competition can be combatted advantageously. 
However, these regions are limited in their ability to provide 
adequate tonnage of the amount required for the development 
of the port of Boston. It would appear necessary, then, to 
turn to foreign trade to provide the needed volume. 
Under the current threat of communism, one of the 
strongest ties the anti-communist countries have to offer is 
the exchange of goods between free world countries. Hundreds 
of millions of people in the free world are striving to raise 
their standard of living. To prevent the inroads of Communism, 
t he United States is aiding many countries in improving the 
plight of their peoples. In the not too distant future as 
the world's living standard is raised, a greater and greater 
demand for the exchange of United States manufactures for 
raw materials will thereby be created. As time progresses, 
*117, P.2. Mr. Sullivan advances the theory in this 
study that "The success of the Port of Boston requires a 
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larger volume of general cargo in its domestic business. Other-
wise Port facilities will not be used fully and it will be 
increasingly difficult to justify the capital outlays necessary 
to maintain the Port and attract ships." 
the United States finds itself forced more and more to trade 
with foreign countries. President Eisenhower has recently 
requested the Congress to authorize a long range foreign 
aid program. Foreign trade goes hand in hand with this aid 
program, which gives strong indications of increased foreign 
trade in future years. The port of Boston must prepare 
itself to participate in this increasing volume of foreign 
trade by insuring that the ·Port provides an open gateway for 
the free flow of commerce, and thereby attains inbound and 
outbound cargoes of sufficient volume to maintain an active, 
efficient, and profitable port operation. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE DESIGN, OPERATION, CONTROL, AND FUTURE PLANNING 
OF FACILITIES 
For many years various claims have been made about 
the terminal facilities at the port of Boston. They have 
been termed "grossly inadequate" by critics of the Port, 
and "ultra modern" by those inclined to take a more favor-
able view. Si~ce port facilities will be one of the major 
problems of any future port management body at Boston, they 
will be investigated here to determine their adequacy, and to 
determine what effect they have on the Port's commerce. Some 
principles of terminal design will be discussed briefly to 
form a basis upon which to evaluate the Port's facilities. 
Facilities at several other United States ports will be sur-
veyed to ascertain how this problem is handled in other areas, 
and to determine what control over port facilities is exer-
cised by the management bodies at other ports. 
I. THE ROLL OF FACILITIES 
The term "facilities" is often used to cover the 
various kinds of devices used in the assembling and handling 
of cargo for trans-shipment and storage. Facilities are the 
implements through which port management works to make cargo 
flow more quickly and efficiently through the confines of a 
8 8 
port. Although the mere possession of modern well designed 
facilities does not guarantee to attract trade through a 
given port, most authorities agree that an important factor 
in the ability of a port to appeal to a particular type of 
cargo is the number, type, and suitability of terminal 
facilities which are available to accommodate trade. Shippers 
often determine the availability of cargo at a given port 
by giving preference to ports where terminal facilities are 
especially profitably adaptable to the particular cargo 
shipped. Before facilities became the determining factor, 
however, the geographical convenience and favorable freight 
rate of a given port to a particular cargo must be established. 
Then the roll of facilities comes into play, because once 
the first two conditions have been fullfilled, the cargo will 
* tend to flow in the direction in whi ch it can best be handled. 
A large portion of cargo vessel operating costs are 
made up of port expenses. Recent studies have indicated that 
port facilities and the operations connected with them com-
prise from one-third to one~half of the operating costs and 
about one-half of the time of the ships. Thus as efforts are 
made to achieve a quicker turnaround of vessels and lower 
port costs, facilities assume an ever increasing roll in 
importance to both shippers and ship operators. 
On port facilities one eminent authority has stated 
~1-14, p.27 
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the following: 
There should be equal, universal, and un-
restricted movement between the facilities of a 
port. Free movement is needed between any pier 
and any railroad serving the port, and warehouses 
should be readily accessible. A port should be 
a unit comprised of a combinat i on of smoothly 
functioning facilities that work harmoniously to 
provide a rapid and efficient interchange of cargo 
at the port. To this end a public port authority 
is able to render much valuable assistance.* 
' The task of p~rt management to provide these conditions is 
a complex and difficult one, and requires jurisdiction and 
control over a wide range of facilities. 
II. THE DESIGN OF TERMI NAL FACILITIES 
Before examining the terminal facilities at Boston, 
the elements of design will be discussed. Port facilities 
should be a workable compromise of economic and engineering 
requirements. The "engineer-economist"· is a relatively new 
profession that has emerged from the management requirements 
of port development, and he is especially concerned with the 
*'?f development of facilities. The problems are neither all 
engineering, nor all economic. They are an intergration of 
the two with the primary accent falling on the organization 
required to achieve the right solution. That is why this 
study does not fall under the category of' "engineering" or of 
"economics", but is more properly placed under the heading 
of "management". This latter term implies the organizational 
?H3, P• 166 
90 
structure whereby the policies formula ted to deal with the 
problems discussed in this thesis will be effectively ad-
ministered. 
Some of the more important aspects of facility 
design that must be considered by any port management group 
will be discussed. 
A. Major Factors Influencing Design 
The ship operator engaged in transporting general 
cargo gives very close scrutiny to the various attributes 
of his terminal facilities. The main characteri stics con-
sidered are berthing space, wharf apron, transit shed, rail 
and motor access, supporting transportation, and storage 
facilities. These important characteristics were defined by 
the Port Development Section, Research Division, u. S. 
Maritime Commission in September 1946 as follows: * 
Berthing Space. Adequate space to accommodate 
the length and draft of a vessel would require a berth 
600 feet long with an initial dredged depth of 36 feet 
MLW . The width of dock or slip required between piers 
(if pier system is used) would be at least 325 feet 
for single and 420 feet for multiple berths. 
Wharf Apron. Sufficient ships i de space to facil-
itate direct transfer of cargo between ship's hold and 
rail cars, trucks and wheeled materials handling equip-
ment would require an apron 49 feet wide, flush with 
the shed floor and having a smooth hard surface. 
Transit Shed. In order to meet insurance under-
writers requirements and facilitate traffic flow the 
transit shed would be fireproof, free from interior 
column interference, with 10 foot candles of illumin-
ation and would have a smooth floor to facilitate t he 
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use of mechanical equipment. The structure would 
be single story, 500 feet long by 200 feet wide, 
having 20 feet vertical clearance and fitted with 
disappearing doors 20 feet wide by 15 feet high in 
alternate panels. In the case of a shore wharf, 
the rear of the shed would have a length of the 
shed adjacent to a depressed, paved, loading area. 
There would be at least two tracks parallel to this 
rear platform to permit direct transfer to cars on 
the same level. 
Rail and Motor Access. Adequate rail and 
motor access to sheds including three apron tracks 
and two platform tracks having ample crossovers 
would be available. Careful control of paved 
surfaces of track work expansion joints, sills . 
and drainage devices would obviate unevenness in 
the shed and apron decks. The location and grades 
of access ramps would be controlled to permit most 
efficient utilization of materials handling equip-
ment. All areas adjacent to wharf decks would be 
adequately paved. 
Supporting Transportation and Storage Facil-
ities. Adequate adjoining transit rail yards and 
motor storage areas, adjacent warehouses, supporting 
open storage, motor parks and motor service facil-
ities with controlled motor traffic flow would be 
made an integral part of the terminal layout and 
equipment. 
In years past one of the greatest difficulties 
encountered in ship operation at the port of Boston was 
the antiquated condition of many of the pier facilities. 
For the most part they have not been modernized to keep pace 
with the improvements and modifications in the average size 
and design of ships. The pier facilities have generally 
not kept up with the growth of the trucking indus.try and 
industrial roads that have replaced the old drayage system 
for which so many of the Boston piers were designed. In 
addition, many of the Port's piers were built prior to the 
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use of present day materials handling equipment and are 
not readily adaptable to its most efficient use. 
Piers at the port of Boston may be grouped 
according to the following types: (1) finger or quay, 
(2) covered or uncovered, and (3) general or specialized. 
The finger pier is a long, narrow structure jutting out 
into the water perpendicular to the shoreline so that 
both sides are generally available to berth ships. The 
finger pier type of construction enables a given length 
of waterfront to yield the maximum number of berths and is 
the most common in Boston harbor where easily developed 
waterfront is at a premium. The quay or marginal wharf 
is constructed parallel to the shore line so that only one 
side is available to berth ships. It is used where there 
is no shortage of easily developed waterfront area or 
where the channel adjacent to the pier is too restricted 
to permit the use of a finger pier. Whether the finger 
pier type or marginal wharf type of pier is utilized, depends 
upon the economic geography of a given port, and the con-
ditions existing at a particular site under consideration. 
One noted authority on port pier construction has stated 
that there is no essential advantage in either type so 
far as modern design is concerned. 
The usual pier facility is the transit shed of 
*173, p.615-l 
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one or two floors. The uncovered pier facility is used 
where a large storage area is desired (as in the case of 
some berths at Castle Island terminal) or where cargo is 
moved directly to and from rail car or truck. As 
differentiated from a general cargo pier, a specialized 
terminal is one designed to handle a specific commodity 
such as grain, iron ore, or oil. 
B. Design of General Cargo Facilities. 
Private industry generally owns and operates the 
bulk cargo handling facilities and specialized terminals 
at the port of Boston. The principal problem in the 
development of the Port, so far as port management is con-
cerned, is the development of modern facilities for handling 
general cargo. It is in the general cargo terminal that 
the port administration has its main task in keeping abreast 
of the changes in inland transportation, changes in materials 
handling equipment, changes in the size and character of 
vessels, and changes in the methods of trade. 
1. Modern Design Requirements. 
The requirements which determine the standards of 
modern design for the general cargo terminal are constantly 
changing, and those responsible for maintaining modern up 
to date facilities must be continually on the alert for new 
methods, trends and developments that will affect the 
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facilities of a port. 
The growth of motor truck transportation. Only 
' a quarter of a century ago the motor truck was not a major 
factor in the transportation system at Boston. In modern 
times, however, it is more important than the railroad in 
many ways. The motor truck is now carrying upwards of 60 
percent of the ocean-borne cargo to and from piers at 
1 Boston for both short and long haul transportation. It is 
still increasing as a factor in the land transportation of 
freight having overseas sources or deliveries. Railroad 
freight, on the other hand, seems to be decreasing in 
relative importance in respect to the marine terminals of 
the port. 
In the finger-pier type of terminal the size of 
the terminal must be increased because it is necessary to 
provide an unobstructed roadway for trucks to enter and 
leave the pier in addition to cargo and working space. If 
the pier is of the marginal wharf type, loading platforms 
must be provided on the shore side of the transit shed. 
Sufficent room and proper traffic control must be furnished 
for the waiting lines of trucks approaching the pier to 
load or unload cargo. The space required for these waiting 
trucks is greatly reduced, if the pier can provide for 
their re.pid loading and discharging. 
1. Boston Port Commission 
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The increased amounts of motor truck cargo, with-
out corresponding general cargo increase, has resulted in 
a deduction in the percentage of cargo transported by rail 
with corresponding reduction in the need for elaborate rail 
facilities at the terminal. Rail facilities are still very 
important, but rail transportation is no longer the pre-
. dominant factor in the design of a marine terminal for general 
cargo. In addition, the decreased use of rail is accompanied 
by a decreased amount of direct transfer of cargoes from 
rail to vessel. This puts cargoes once moved in this fashion 
into the tr~nsit shed, and adds still further to the re-
quired amount of covered pier space. 
Changes in materials handling equipment. The in-
creased use of labor saving devices in the handling of general 
cargo has had an important effect upon pier design. The 
fork lift truck, small mobile cranes, belt conveyors, tractor 
trailers, and other types of cargo handling equipment have 
completely changed the entire system of handling general 
cargo. With the use of fork lift trucks cargo can be assembled 
on pallets (a wooden platform) and carried in ton loads from 
the wharf apron to the place of temporary storage in the 
transit shed. Cargo can be arrayed in rows as high as 20 
feet utilizing the fork lift truck, whereas a few years ago 
it could be stacked only as high as men could reach. This 
developrnent requires that increased overhead clearance, 
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increased allowable floor loads, smooth floor surfaces, 
continuous aisles, and sufficient width of wharf aprons 
be included in the considerations of general cargo 
terminal design. 
Ship construction advances. The changes that 
have taken place in ship construction in recent years have 
also brought about changes in general cargo terminal design. 
The vessel berthing area alongside the wharf should be of 
suffici.ent length to take the full length of the vessel with 
ample maneuvering room left over. The transit shed must be 
of sufficient area to provide for the loading and unloading 
of the ship's cargo. The average general cargo vessel 
operating in foreign trade is up to 50 percent longer and 
carries twice the cargo of the vessel of the early Nineteen 
Hundreds. These ships have also doubled their speed. The 
result is that the accent falls more and more on quicker 
turnanound at ports in order for port operation to keep pace 
with the more efficient operation of the ships while at sea. 
The transition in methods of trade. Changes in the 
methods of trade are a very important design consideration 
for modern terminal facilities at the port of Boston. A 
marked change in world trade practices has been brought about 
by the trans-Atlantic cable, the world-wide radio network, 
and the increased speed of ships. These changes have affected 
the facilities needed for handling foreign cargoes. The 
ease with which merchandise can be ordered from any part of 
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the world with assurance of delivery within a short period 
of time has enabled merchants to depend less on stoclc 
supplies to supply customers. They are no longer forced 
to maintain the large inventories of previous years to 
insure the ability to deliver goods as ordered. Tlus 
transition in the conduct of foreign trade has affected 
waterfront facilities by reducing the requirements for ware-
house space and by increasing the heterogeneity of the cargo 
on the pier. The procedure whereby many tradesmen order a 
small volume of a large number of items creates a condition 
in which a vessel is loaded with a wide variety of articles. 
The range of items is much greater for a given tonnage than 
was typical in the early part of the century. Additional 
space must be provided in the transit shed to permit the 
sorting, stacking, and assembling of these shipments. This 
requires an increase in transit shed space requirements 
over previous years on a per ton of carg o basis in addition 
to the other factors mentioned. 
2. Principles of Des i gn. 
Some of the fundamental principles of design 
are as follows: 
Safety a primary consideration. Safety is good 
business and pays off to any management in higher employee 
morale, less time lost, and increased efficiency under an 
atmosphere of safe working conditions. This concept 
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encompasses safety to cargo and structures as well as 
safety to labor. A port facility would best be a fire 
proof structure with firewalls and a sprinkler system. 
A smooth reinforced concrete slab deck permits tbe oper-
ation of mobile mechanical equipment on the transit shed 
floor, on the wharf apron, ·and on the loading platform. 
Vertical roof supports within the shed should be kept to 
a minimum and properly located as to provide minimum 
interference with operating equipment. Transit shed doors 
should be of the overhead type of suf f icient height and 
width to accommodate cargo moving equipment. They should 
be located at frequent intervals to enable the quick and 
efficient handling of cargo with a minimum of movemen~ 
Wharf aprons and loading platforms should be of the 
necessary dimensions to enable use of materials handling 
equipment and other devices which contribute to a rapid, 
efficient and safe transfer of cargo. 
Adaptabiliti• The general cargo which flows 
through a port is often made up of a diversity of items, 
and it is very important that the terminal facilities be 
flexible enough to permit their adaptability to the 
different cargoes handled. This adaptability is accom-
plished by providing sufficient space within the transit 
shed, ample rail and truck loading platforms, apron tracks 
to enable use of open freight cars and the possible use 
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gantry cranes, and adjoining open wharf space where 
feasible. 
Rate of cargo handligg. The rapidity with 
which cargo is handled at the terminal will depend upon 
the number of handlings necessary, the directness of 
cargo movement between land carrier and the vessel, the 
rate of transfer between land carrier and loading platform, 
between loading platform and the point of temporary storage 
in the transit shed, between the transit shed and the wharf 
apron, between the wharf apron and the ship's hatch, and 
from the ship's hatch to the point of storage in the ship's 
hold. The Port of New York Authority in its estimate of 
90,000 square feet as the total gross area requirement per 
ship berth for a full ship load allows one-half of this 
figure or 45,000 square feet for working aisles, truck 
roadways, and loading platforms. This space allocation 
includes provisions for thirty truck berths each forty feet 
by twelve feet for loading and unloading. This space 
allowance enables the land carrier-loading platform oper-
ation to be carried out with a minimum of delay, and also 
enables a rapid platform to transit shed storage point oper-
ation and a rapid transit shed to wharf apron operation. 
The liberal aisle space allowance permits the effective 
use of small mobile cranes, fork lift trucks, tractor 
* trailers, and other shed equipment. Wharf aprons of 
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sufficient width often enable the direct transfer of 
cargo between vessel_ and land carrier, which results in 
more rapid handling than is possible through the transit 
shed. This practice, nowever, often complicates the 
schedule of loading, requires open freight cars, and is 
not always feasible. 
Traffic cross currents should be reduced to a 
minimum throughout the entire terminal. This is accom-
plished by eliminating column supports and by making proper 
provision for truck movement within the shed when it is 
required. These practices speed up movement within the 
shed and make for more efficient and rapid operations. 
Ships loading gear is generally used to hoist 
cargo aboard a vessel in Boston, but this can often be 
supplemented with gantry cranes which are particularly 
adaptable to heavy lifts and some bulky cargoes. The 
gantry cranes are often used on marginal or quay wharfs. 
This type of construction usually consists of solid fill 
behind a bulkhead, and the wharf apron generally has a 
larger working area than the finger pier type of con-
st;ruc tion and is able to withstand heavier working loads. 
Port management can often aid in attaining quicker storing 
operations aboard vessels by investigating, and where 
feasible recommending, the use of conveyor belts, roll 
conveyors and other devices that can be used for more rapid 
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placement of cargo within the ship's hold. 
The general cargo tenninal must be designed to 
facilitate the rapid two way movement of goods. By 
striving and excelling in this aim, a port will gain a 
plus factor in this aspect of port operation which will . 
aid it greatly in attracting cargo. 
Efficient but economical design. The principles 
of economy are very important in the design of general 
cargo terminal facilities. In the last analysis the cost 
of cargo handling at a port is paid for by the shipper, 
and an inefficient operation often cuts into the revenue of 
the ship operator. It is very necessary, therefore, that 
the port of Boston make its cargo handling operations compare 
favorably with other ports in terms of costs. Facilities 
must be designed for efficient operation, and yet economy 
requires that only a reasonable expenditure of funds be 
allowed. A port should strive to make its facilities 
modern, safe, adaptable, and able to handle cargo at a rapid 
rate. However, a very definite balance of costs must be 
maintained, and the expenditures for new facilities should 
be based on both engineering and financial considerations. 
It is here that port management must combine the engineering 
requirements of good design with the economic considerations 
of cost to achieve the right facility at the right time 
and at the right price, that will enable efficient and 
economical terminal facility operation. 
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III.. MAJOR PORT TERMINAL FACILITIES AT BOSTON 
The port of Boston has approximately 259 piers 
or wharves which provide 158,646 linear feet or about thirty 
miles of berthing area measured along the sides and ends 
of piers and along bulkheads or shore wharves. A large 
number are served by railroad connections. The water depths 
at these terminals range up to a maximum of forty feet at 
mean low water. 
The piers in Boston Harbor are generally classi-
fied into four groups as follows: those served by the New 
York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad in South Boston, those 
along Atlantic Avenue in Boston proper served by the Union 
Freight Railroad, those served by the Boston and Main Rail-
road in Charlestown, and those served by the New York Central 
Railroad Boston and klbany District in East Boston. * Most 
of the main piers have track connections and facilities for 
direct transfer of cargo between cars and ships. 
A. South Boston Terminals 
1. The Army Base. 
The Army Base consists of a structure 4,151 feet 
in length that was constructed by the United States Govern-
ment at a cost of approximately $28,000,000. The cost of 
the buildings represent $25,000,000 . of this amount. The 
storage warehouse is about one-third of a mile in length, 
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126 feet in width, is eight stories high, and has a total 
floor area of approximately 1,651,000 square feet. The 
wharf transit shed is 1,638 feet in length, 100 feet in 
width, is two stories high, and has a floor area of 
360,000 square feet. Two additional pier transit sheds 
each 924 feet long, 100 feet wide, and three stories high, 
provide additonal floor storage area of 580,000 square feet. 
The wharf transit shed and pier transit sheds are of steel 
and concrete construction and offer excellent storage space. 
The Army Base has modern cargo handling equipment 
which includes electric hoists, large capacity elevators, 
electric winches, and other devices. This facility provides 
berthing area for nine vessels. Railroad tracks run the 
entire length of the termipal which enable direct transfer 
of cargo between ships and freight cars when desired • 
. The foundation of this structure was very badly 
in need of repair, and in 1954 the abandonment of this 
facility was under serious consideration by the Army. 
Legislation was enacted, however, to repair the foundation 
with Federal and State funds, and to lease the structure 
to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The repairs will cost 
the Federal Government approximately $10,000,000; while the 
State will expend $1,200,000. 
2. Castle Island Terminal. 
The Castle Island terminal was constructed by the 
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Federal Government in 1942· and is located across Reserved 
Channel south of the Army Base. This facility ~s a mar-
ginal wharf frontage of 4,200 feet and provides berthing 
space for seven ships. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
acquired this terminal from the Federal Government in 1953 
and has leased it for operation to ~he Luckenback Steamship 
Company. A large section of this tern1inal consists of open 
storage space which is utilized for lumber. 
The Port of Boston Commission has detailed plans 
on methods of development for this area. The first stage 
deals with necessary repairs to the pier structure, new 
transit shed construction, revision and addition of track 
facilities, and new access roads. The existing transit 
shed No. 1 is of permanent construction and of acceptable 
layout except for the unusually wide wharf apron, which is 
approximately 100 feet in width. The proposed construction 
includes an addition to the transit shed which will be 
sixty feet wide by 840 feet long. This will reduce the 
wharf apron to a width of forty feet, and will add over 
50,000 square feet of area to the shed to make a total of 
about 218,000 square feet. 
The present transit shed No. 2 is a poorly con-
structed temporary structure. It is proposed to tear this 
structure down and to construct of non-combustable material 
a smaller transit shed of proper design to be built at the 
westerly end of the existing shed. The proposed facility 
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is to be approximately 500 feet long and 180 feet wide, and 
will equal an area of approximately 90,000 square feet. 
Tracks on the wharf apron will be relocated, and a new 
service trackage installation will be made where necessary. 
New roads will also be constructed where needed to enable 
stage number one of the development plan to be completed. 
The layout of all roads and tracks, however, will coordinate 
with future construction plans. 
The area at the east end of the terminal is to be 
designated to open storage use for bulk cargoes such as 
lumber etc. and will require little or no change in existing 
facilities. Plans for further development of the Castle 
Island Terminal propose the construction of two additional 
transit sheds 500 feet long by 180 feet wide, and the 
development of nearly 1,000,000 square feet of area for 
lease to industrial, warehousing and trucking fin1s whose 
activities will be connected with the adjoining terminal 
facilities. Such a development would aid in stimulating 
activity through the Port and would also provide an 
additional source of port revenue. The estimated cost of 
the initial step of the Castle Island construction plan is 
$ 1,200,000o 
3o Commonwealth Pier No. 5. 
This finger pier built by the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts in 1913, is 1,200 feet long, 400 feet wide, 
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and has a twenty foot wharf apron on each side. The shed 
on the pier is 1,167 feet long, 360 feet wide, two stories 
high, and bas a floor area of 600,000 square feet. Part of 
the second floor was built to accomodate passenger traffic. 
Six railroad tracks run the entire leng th of t he pier , four 
being depressed tracks within the s he d, and one on each 
wharf apron outside. The pier has eight large frei g ht and 
passenger elevato:r's. Presently, pls.ns are underway to 
conduct alterations to the first floor of the transit shed 
to provide better facilities for carg o transfer between 
transit shed and motor truck, the predominant cargo carri.er 
at this terminal. An appropriation of $1,800,000 has been 
made by the State for this purpose, and construction is 
expected to cow~ence in the suw~er of 1956. 
4. Northern Avenue Development. 
A Development Plan has been formulated for a 
new terminal and industrial center on Northern Avenue, 
South Boston. This program provides for the rep lacement 
of existing wharves, a passenger and carg o terminal, a 
relocation of service rail facilities, parking areas, two 
transit sheds, and a large industrial center building with 
provision for a world trade mart. The program will be 
developed in successive stages and will cost an estima ted 
$ 1 4 ,300,000. 
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B. Atlantic Avenue Waterfront 
The piers along Atlantic Avenue, which was once 
the main section of the Port, are completely outdated and 
now serve but little commerce. These piers occupy one of 
the choicest locations in the entire port of Boston, and 
should future port traffic require their use, a large 
financial investment would be required to remodernize and 
to refurbish them for present day use. 
C. Charlestown Terminals 
1. Mystic Pier No. 1. 
Mystic Pier No. 1 was completed in August, 1952 
and was designed to handle all types of freighters. Cargo 
is handled by ships' cranes and storage battery trucks. 
Freight can be removed from the pier either by rail or 
truck. The transit shed is 418 feet wide and 588 feet long, 
and provides a working storage area of about 225,000 square 
feet. Clear height is twenty feet. There is a wharf apron 
twenty feet wide at the east end of the pier and twenty-
five feet wide on both the north and south sides of the pier. 
One of the design problems for this facility was 
to provide for the storage battery trucks to operate in all 
parts of the floor without interference from the depressed 
trackwell. This was solved by installing a hydraulic-lift 
platform which spans the three center tracks. When in a 
raised position the lift enables the storage battery trucks 
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to pass freely from one side of the shed to another. When 
the platform is in a lowered posit i on, frei ght trains can 
operate normally on the tracks. 
Mystic Pier No. 1 is owned by the Comm onwealth 
of Massachusetts and is leased to The Mystic Terminal Com-
pany, the marine subsidiary of the Boston a nd Ma ine Rail-
road. 
2. Hoosac Pier No. 1. 
Hoosac Pier No. 1 was substantially comple ted in 
August of 1950 and has had its general cargo handling 
equipment in constant operation since. It is operated by 
the Boston and Maine Railroad under long term lease. This 
large three berth cargo terminal took nearly three years 
to build at a cost of $5,000 1 000. It is a skew-type finger 
pier with a fireproof sub-structure and a fire resistant 
transit shed, which has a floor area of bi t imunious concrete 
of approximately 193,000 square fe e t. There is also a 
battery charging build ing ; the supporting Hoosac grain 
elevator, which has a storage capacity of one million bushels; 
a new shiploading grain gallery and appurtenances with a 
capacity of 30,000 bushels per hour; and a Goverruuent scale 
at the terminal entrance for weighing of commodities as 
required by United States Customs. This terminal is enclosed 
with a chain link fence, which provides proper security for 
the cargo and equipment within. The transit shed has flush 
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tracks for shipside loading on the side berths, with a 
double track in a depressed well along the center of the 
shed. Truck docks and loading platforms are located on 
the shore side of the building at tail gate height. A 
power driven winch for the safe operation of grain spouts 
and an elevator vaccum cleaning system are major improve-
ments which have been added to this facility. 
3. Coal Discharging Plant Mystic River. 
The Coal Discharging Plant is a bulk handling 
plant equipped with four towers of modern construction for 
unloading coal, ore, sulphur nitrates, or other bulk 
commodities direct from ship to cars. The facility is 
operated by the Mystic Coal Dock Incorporated. 
4. Wiggins Terminals Incorporated. 
The Wiggins Terminal has a covered pier shed 
800 feet long and 145 feet wide with a pier for deep water 
cargo ships that has a minirnU:.m depth of thirty feet at 
mean low water. Warehouses of fireproof construction 
adjacent to the pier shed have a capacity of 600,000 
square feet of floor space. This facility has rail service 
and is completely mechanized. 
D. East Boston Terminals 
1. East Boston Pier No. 1 and Adiacent Piers. 
East Boston Pier No. 1 was completed late in 1954 
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and is one of the most modern general cargo terminals in 
the United States. The pier is 600 feet long and 3 90 feet 
wide, with twenty-five feet wide working aprons on the 
side berths and twenty foot aprons on the outboard end. 
The transit shed has twenty-foot overhead clearance, and 
covers an area of approximately 196,000 square feet. 
There are four sets of tracks, one flush with the deck on 
each side apron, and two depressed in a well at the center 
of t he shed. The side berths have pipi ng arrangements 
for the transfer of bulk liquid cargo from ship to tank 
cars, ramps for vehicular access into the shed, off ices, 
warm rooms, and truck docks at the inshore end of the 
building . A chain link fence has been constructed around 
the entire property to provide the necessary secur i ty for 
cargo and terminal equipment. The outstanding feature of 
this terminal facility is that the working area of the 
transit shed is entirely without interior columns, which 
provides a maximum of non-interference with car go handling 
opera tions within the shed. A smooth concrete deck facil-
itates the use of motor trailers and fork-l~ft trucks for 
cargo handling. This facility is leased to the New York 
Central Railroad on a long term lease by the Port of Boston 
Commission. 
Additional piers adjacent to Pier No. 1 are 
East Boston Piers Nos. 3, 4, and 5, which are also owned by 
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the Port of Boston Commission and are leased to the New 
York Central Railroad. Pier No. 3 is an outdated wooden 
structure 610 feet long, 240 feet wide, and has ten feet 
wide working aprons. Pier No. 4 is also a wooden structure 
and is 780 feet long, 240 feet wide and has ten feet wide 
aprons. Pier No. 5 is an open facility with a smooth 
bituminous concrete surface. This pier serves heavy lift 
cargoes to or from freight cars. 
2. The National Dock and Storage Warehouse 
Company Terminal. 
The National Dock and Storage Warehouse facility 
has a total storage floor area of approximately 750,000 
square feet. There are fifty warehouses, either fireproof 
or sprinkler-equipped, with electrically operated hoists 
and modern materials handling equipment. There are also 
berths for ships and transit sheds alongside which provide 
accommodations for storage purposes or for transfering 
cargo for interchange between land and sea carriers. These 
facilities are old and outdated, and do not meet the re-
quirements of modern design. 
IV. CARGO HANDLING AT BOSTON 
Closely aligned with the terminal facilities of 
a port is the cargo handling operation. It is in the 
handling of cargo that the facilities of a port are utilized. 
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Efficient cargo handling depends upon the organizational 
personnel experienced in the assembly and sub-assembly of 
cargoes, cargo handling personnel, and the proper equip-
ment and facilities to perform the job. It is the task 
of the port management to see that the proper personnel, 
facilities, and equipment are provided. 
The handling of cargo at the port of Boston falls 
mainly under the category of stevedoring activities. This 
deals with the actual handling of cargo between the pier 
facility and the hold of the ship. Usually ship operators 
at Boston employ stevedoring companies who specialize in 
cargo handling, and maintain supplies of cargo handling 
equipment. 
The individual longshoreman plays a major role in 
the cargo handling operation, and the longshoremen at Boston 
1. have the reputation of being especially skilled. 
Ship's gear is the main hoisting equipment used 
for cargo loading at Boston. Mobile cranes and floating 
derricks are availabie when heavy lifts are required. The 
use of conveyors, tractor trailers, mobile cranes, and fork 
lift trucks aid in speeding up the cargo transfer operation. 
The cargo transfer operation at Boston appears to 
be an efficient one. However, it seems that a management 
1. The labor problem at Boston arising from 
longshoremen's operations will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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group which designed facilities for particular types of 
operations and which took a definite interest in how they 
were operated, could effect changes which could increase 
the efficiency of the interchange operations. This would 
require a constant review of the methods used at each pier 
for each type of cargo by experts who would have the "know 
how" to suggest changes that would give Boston a plus factor 
in the cargo handling operation. 
V. MAJOR SUPPORTI NG FACILITIES AT BOSTON 
The main supporting facilities at Boston consist 
of water-front rail facilities, marginal highways, bridges 
and tunnels, warehouses, grain elevators, industrial sites 
for waterfront industries, and nearby airports whose facil-
ities supplement those of the Port. 
A. Waterfront Rail Facilities 
The waterfront rail facilities at Boston have been 
previously outlined. Boston's piers are served by three 
railroads, the New York Central, The Boston and Maine, and 
the New York, New Haven, and Hartford. The Union Freight 
Railroads serves piers along Atlantic Avenue. The operating 
methods of these railroads and their system of freight inter-
change and terminal control has been mentioned as one of the 
leading factors in the decline of the Port. 
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B. Marginal Highways 
The marginal highways and streets along the 
waterfront at Boston are usually maintained by the City. 
In ·many eases these roads are overly conjested, narrow, 
and inadequate. The highway program currently underway 
by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts will relieve water-
front streets of much traffic, and will greatly aid in 
the solution of this problem. 
c. Bridges ~ Tunnels 
Since approximately 60 per cent of the general 
cargo passing through the port of Boston is hauled by motor 
truck, the availability of quick access from the piers to 
main highways out of the City is of primary importance to 
the leadership of the Port. The Summer Tunnel, owned and 
operated by the city of Boston, and The Mystic River Bridge, 
owned and operated by the Mystic River Bridge Authority, 
a public corpora tion, are two such facilities whose exist-
ence contributes in a large measure to the operation of the 
Port. 
The Mystic River Bridge and the Summer Tunnel are 
presently competing facilities since each tends to attract 
traffic from the other. The construction of a third facili~ 
accross Boston Harbor is presently under consideration. This 
additional crossing will greatly aid in reducing traffic 
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conjestion in the port area, but will have a decided effect 
on the traffic pattern of the two existing structures. The 
consolidation of these facilities under one governing group 
that will act in the best interests of the port appears to 
be highly desirable. 
D. Warehouses 
The warehouses at Boston are numerous and provide 
a large storage area for merchandise. Over 34 large ware-
houses located along the waterfront and in the city enable 
a wide choice in the selection of these facilities. Some 
of these warehouses, however, are not in close enough 
proximity to the waterfront to permit efficient storage in 
connection with the port operat~on. 
E. Grain Elevators 
The storage capacity for grain at Boston is 
decidedly limited. The Hoosac grain elevator in Charlestown 
and the New York .Central elevator in East Boston provide 
storage for less than ,2,000,000 bushels of grain. This 
compares with 15,000,000 bushels of storage capacity for 
several other East Coast ports. The Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts has acquired both of these facilities in the 
last few years and has expended substantial sums to improve 
their operation. They are presently under long term lease 
to their former railroad owners. The recently refurbished 
facilities at the Boston grain elevators enable loading at 
117 
the rate of 30,000 bushels per hour. This compares to 
the loa ding facilities at some United States ports of 
60,000 bushels per hour. 
F. Industrial Sites 
Vl/aterfront industries at Boston have not always 
been able to locate at strategic locations. This con-
dition has been due to the lack of waterfront zoning and 
control which allowed many areas of the waterfront to be 
occupied by tenants which did not contribute to port 
activity. The present high tax rate at Boston also has 
be en a major deterrent to new industries locating within 
1. 
the city limits. 
The Port of Boston Commission presently owns 
approximately 500 acres of property at Commonwe a lth Flats 
and in other areas of the waterfront. However, this 
represents only a small portion of the tota l available 
waterfront area and a large segment remains which cannot 
be effectively developed and controlled. 
G. Logan International Airport, 
A Supplementarx Facilitv 
The location of the airport at Boston is unique 
in its proximity to the piers and wharves of the Port and 
the heart of the City. Few cities in the United States 
can boast of a major airfield that is locate d only a mile 
1. See Table No. XI 
118 
from the downtown section of the city. This physical 
closeness and striking similarity of many problems, in-
dicates the confluence of management policies and decisions 
that the operation of the Port and Airport require. 
Logan International Airport is presently under 
the jurisdiction of the State Airport Management Board, 
an agency of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. This 
agency, like the Port of Boston Commission, is forced to 
depend upon the State Legislature for its financial backing, 
since its net income is not sufficient to meet the interest 
payments on its outstanding bonds. 
Although little freight and few passengers are 
exchanged between port and airport facilities at Boston, 
both are dependent upon good access highways, modern 
facilities, and promotional activities. There is much 
common ground in the many aspects of their administration. 
VI. OPERATION !ND CONTROL OF FACILITIES AT BOSTON 
There is no one central governing agency which 
has the authority to regulate and control both the primary 
and supporting facilities at the port of Boston. The Port 
of Boston Commission, a State agency, can exercise but 
little control over supporting facilities, and these facil-
ities are mainly operated on an individual basis by private 
and public bodies without the coordinating influence of 
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one central governing group. 
Connwealth Pier No. 5 is the only pier that is 
owned by the State and operated by the Port of Boston 
Commission. In recent years the Commonwealth has purchased 
the Mystic and Hoosac Terminal facilities of the Boston 
and Maine Railroad, and the East Boston facilities of the 
New York Central Railroad. These facilities have been 
rebuilt; improved, and modernized at public expense, and 
then leased to the original railroad owners for long terms. 
This practice had the effect of providing new pier facil-
ities at locations where the railroads were unable or un-
willing to provide the necessary improvements. However, 
a good opportunity to force the railroads to cease practices 
which hamper the free flow of commerce through the Port 
was not made use of. The Commonwealth now finds itself 
the owner of these facilities, but unable to effectively 
control their operation. Under long-term lease the rail-
roads still operate the facilities and are able to continue 
many of the mal-practices which have plagued the port for 
almost a century. 
The Port of Boston Commission is able to exert 
control over facilities which it owns. However, since it 
owns such a small part of the waterfront and its facilities 
and practically no supporting facilities, the Commission 
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does not have jurisdiction of sufficient scope to enable 
it to administer the program which is required for the pro-
per operation and regulation of facilities throughout the 
entire Port area. The commission has no real teeth with 
which to effect changes in faulty operating methods of the 
various Port facility operators. The original legislation 
lis~some of the Commission's duties as follows: 
The Port of Boston Commission, ••• shall from 
time to time investigate any and all matters re-
lating to the port of Boston, particularly with 
reference to overseas terminals, belt line con-
nections, condition and location of piers, and 
channels, switching, floatage, lighterage, rates, 
rules, regulations, and practices, dockage, wharf-
age, waterfront labor congitions, grain elevator 
and warehouse facilities.* 
However, the Commission can only reco~nend changes in its 
annual report to the Legislature. It has no authority 
itself to act on its findings. The Port of Boston Com-
mission does not have the necessary control over the 
facilities of the Port to provide the coordination between 
facilities that is necessary to enable the Port to function 
as an open gateway to trade. 
VII. OPERATION AND CONTROL OF FACILITIES AT OTHER PORTS 
The operation and control of terminal and sup-
porting facilities at other United States ports is very 
important to this study. It is highly probable that some 
.)H30, Section 1 
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of the methods used elsewhere to solve similar problems 
can be modified to suit conditions at Boston. 
A. Terminal Facilities 
The control of the waterfront land area and 
facilities for general cargo handling has gradually be-
come accepted in the United States as necessary for the 
effective operation of a port administration. A survey 
made of sixty-one port authorities in the United States 
in 1951, revealed that fifty-three of the port adminis-
trations have the construction of facilities as a primary 
* duty. Twenty-eight of these bodies operated such facilities. 
B. ~ Line Railroads 
The construction of publicly owned pier facilities 
made it desirable for the public to own the switch con-
nections in order to provide railroad service to the piers. 
Thus as the amount of public owned fac i lities grew as com-
pared to railroad owned facilities, and port authorities 
were created, more attention was directed to the connect-
ing facilities near the waterfront. 
In order to gain better coordination of water-
front terminal operations, many port administrations assumed 
the operation of their port's belt line railroad. The aim 
of this service was to provide equal access to all piers, 
* Boston is included in this fi gure. See Appendix 
l22 
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TABLE XI 
OWNERSHIP OF PIERS, WHARVES AND DOCKS FOR PORT CITIES 
1951 
Port City 
Populatio~ 
Category 
Boston, Mass. 
Tampa, Fla. 
Miami,Fla. 
J~cksonville,Fla. 
Oakland, Calif. 
Milwaukee, Wis. 
San Diego, Calif. 
Los Angeles,Calif. 
Portland, Ore. 
Port Arthur, Tex. 
Baltimore, Md. 
New York, N.Y. 
Philadelphia, Pa. 
San Francisco,Calif. 
Norfolk, Va. 
Charleston, s.c. 
Seattle, Wash. 
Mobile, Ala. 
Houston, Tex. 
Newport News, Va. 
Toledo, Ohio 
New Orleans, La. 
Savannah, Ga. 
Corpus Christi,Tex. 
Portland, Me. 
Galveston, Tex. 
Stockton, Calif. 
Pensacola, Fla. 
Longview, . Wash. 
Gulfport, Miss. 
I 
II 
II 
II 
II 
I 
II 
I 
II 
III 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
III 
II 
II 
I 
III 
II 
I 
II 
II 
III 
III 
III 
III 
III 
III 
%Privately 
Owned 
85.5 
89.5 
82.2 
91.4 
52.2 
84.1 
56.1 
24.0 
79.9 
90.0 
84.1 
39.9 
79.2 
2.0 
89.5 
74.2 
67.6 
75.9 
75.0 
78.9 
85.7 
35.2 
94.0 
46.7 
89.7 
26.4 
47.1 
83.3 
66.7 
o.o 
%Go verrunent 
Owned 
14.5 
10.5 
17.8 
8.6 
47.8 
15.9 
43.9 
76.0 
20.1 
10.0 
15.9 
60.1 
20.8 
98.0 
10.4 
25.8 
32.4 
24.1 
25.0 
21.1 
14.3 
64.8 
6.0 
53.3 
10.3 
73.6 
52.9 
16.7 
33.3 
100.0 
Adjusted 
Tax Rate 
~ 56.80 
55.17 
50.41 
44.23 
37.05 
31.92 
31.80 
30.86 
30.60 
30.60 
28.92 
28.90 
28.75 
28.30 
27.00 
25.80 
22.37 
21.30 
17.50 
13.00 
11.90 
Not Available 
Not Available 
Not Available 
Not Available 
Not Available 
Not Available 
Not Available 
Not Available 
Not Available 
!category I: over 500,000; II: 100,000-500,000; III: less than 
100,000. 
Source: A Survey of United States Ports by George Fox Mott. 
Arco Publishing Company Inc. New York,N.Y. Copyright 
1951. p.54. 
and equal service to all railroads without discrimin-
ation. Belt lines are owned and operated by tbe central 
port authority in Charleston, Galveston, Mobile and 
San Francisco. In New Orleans and several other United 
States ports, the city operates the terminal railroad 
apart from the port administration. In some ports the 
railroads serving the port have combined to form an associ-
ation where the operation of the belt line rotates between 
the participating carriers. In other ports a terminal 
company owns and operates the belt line. 
In the United States approximately twenty-one 
waterfront railroads are owned by port governing bodies. 
Ten of this group are operated by the port administrations, 
and six are operated by a railroad terminal association or 
by an individual railroad on a contract basis. Some of the 
larger belt lines, which are over 100 miles in length, are 
at the ports of Houston, Los Angeles and New Orleans. 
New Orleans, the crescent city located approxi-
mately ninety miles up the Mississippi River from open ocean, 
has a unique operation which illustrates what a port city 
can do for itself to aid its progress. In New Orleans the 
State of Louisiana owns and controls the waterfront. The 
belt line railroad, however, is owned and operated by the 
City itself. The Public Belt Railroad Commission composed 
of seventeen members administers this facility. The Mayor 
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of New Orleans is the acting president of the Commission 
and the other sixteen members have staggered terms of 
sixteen years. Two members are appointed every two years. 
Five members are chosen from the general citizenship of the 
city, and the remainder from the recommendations of various 
business organizations and trade groups interested in the 
Port. The aim in establishing this unpaid Commission was 
to create a governing body that was free of political 
1. 
domination and control. This belt line railroad was begun 
in 1904, with an initial city appropriation of approximately 
$500,000. The Commission has consistently "plowed back" 
earnings into expansion and improvement programs, and in 
1951 the estimated net worth of this facility was approxi-
mately $6,000,000. 
Generally in the United States it appears that 
where port managements own and operate the waterfront rail-
roads a separate department is generally set up to handle 
this facility, and the department head reports directly to 
* the port manager. 
C. Marginal Highways 
Most port administrations do not have control 
over marginal and access highways along the waterfront. The 
1. The present Advisory Council to the Port of 
Boston Commission has a membership plan that is somewhat 
similar. 
~:-8 ' p. 120 
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engineering department of the port adminstra tions, however, 
coordinate the port planning with the planning of the city, 
county, and state highway departments. This joint program 
of highway planning helps the port administration to insure 
that adequate highway access will be available to its quays 
and piers. 
D. Ferries, Bridges, and Tunnels 
The port authorities of some ports operate such 
activities as ferries, bridges, and tunnels. The Port of 
New York Authority owns and operates the interstate bridges 
and tunnels in New York harbor that run between New York and 
New Jersey. The New York City Department of Marine and 
Aviati on runs several ferries in New York harbor. Similarly, 
the Delaware River Port Authority has control over inter-
state bridges and future tunnels. 
E. Warehouses 
Some port administrations in the United States 
have assumed the ownership and operation of wa terfront 
warehouse facilities in order to insure a proper supply of 
storage space for goods and cargoes. The ports of Beaumont, 
Texas, and Pennsacola, Florida own and operate 11 inter1or 11 
warehouses that are not located direc tly on the waterfront. 
This is an exception to the rule, however, and most public 
port authorities limit their storage facility activity to 
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warehouses and transit sheds that are located close to the 
waterfront. 
F. Industrial Sites 
In many ports the port administra tion has con-
trol over industrial site locations. However, sometimes 
the area under the jurisdiction of the port authority may 
be only a small part of the total harbor area available. 
Professor Fair's study of sixty-one port authorities in tr~ 
United States indicates that forty-five of this group were 
1. 
empowered to own and develop industrial sites. Many port 
administrations are given wide powers to enable the develop-
ment of this very important aspect of port industrial 
support. 
G. Foreign Trade Zon~ 
Foreign trade zones are also operated and con-
trolled by port administrations. The five foreign trade 
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zones in the United States are located at New York, New Orleans, 
Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. There is not a 
sufficient flow of export commerce utilizing foreign materials 
to enable a large number of these zones to be established 
in the United States, and the establishment of such a zone 
at a part icular port requires extensive investigation and 
careful consideration by the governing bodies of the port. 
1. See Appendix D 
TABLE XII 
PORTS I N WHI CH AUTHORITIES OWN 50 PERCENT 
OR MORE OF I MPROVED WATERFRONT IN 1951 
Own 100% 
Albany 
Beaumont 
Brownsville 
Gulfport 
Los Angeles 
Port Everglades 
Brunswick 
Vancouver 
Own 75 to 
99% 
Charleston 
Fort Pierce 
Lake Charles 
San Diego 
Texas City 
Galveston 
Corpus Christi 
Long Beach 
Monroe 
San Francisco 
Stockton 
Own 50 to 
74% 
Honolulu 
Mobile 
New Orleans 
Raymond, 
Wash. 
Redwood City 
Richmond 
New York City 
Seattle 
Own 30 to 
so% 
St. Paul 
Source: Port Administration in the United States by 
MarVin L. Fair, Cambridge,Maryland Copywright 
1954, p. 103 Cornell Maritime Press. 
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The earning record of several of the foreign trade zones 
in the United States has not come up to original expectlons. 
The foreign trade zone at New York is owned by 
the City and leased to a private corporation. This cor-
poration operates under the jurisdiction of the Department 
of Marine and Aviation of the City of New York, and has 
authority to act as an agent for the City in transactions 
with the Federal Government. 
H. Airports 
There are approximately ten port administrations 
in the United States which exercise active control over 
airports. The inclusion of airports under the port ad-
rninistration entails far more than an organizational problem, 
because airports require extensive financial outlays for 
expansion and improvement as well as ports. However, there 
appears to be much cormnon ground to support the intergration 
of the two operations. The management bodies of the 
following ports exercise control over airports: Astoria, 
Oregon; Charleston, South Carolina; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; 
New York, New York; Norfolk, Virginia;, Oakland, California; 
Port Angeles, Washington; Portland, Oregon; San Diego, 
California; and Seattle, Washington:1f-
~·8' p. 32 
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TABLE XIII 
PORT AUTHORITIES AUTHORIZED TO EXERCISE 
CONTROL OVER AIRPORTS IN 1951 
Cit:x Airport Port Authority: 
Astoria, Oregon Port of Astoria 
Delaware River Port Authority* 
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Camden, New Jersey 
Charleston, So. Carolina 
Chicago, Illinois 
Milwaukee, Wis. 
So. Carolina State Ports Authority 
Bureau of Rivers & Harbors 
New York City 
New York City 
Norfolk, Va. 
Oakland, Calif. 
Port Angeles, Wash. 
Portland, Ore. 
Raymond, Wash. 
San Diego, Calif. 
Savannah, Georgia 
Seattle, Wash. 
St. Louis, Missouri 
Board of Harbor Commissioners 
The Port of New York Authority 
Dept. of Marine & Aviation*~ 
Norfolk Port Authority 
Port of Oakland 
Port of Port Angeles 
The Commission of Public Docks 
Port of Willapa Harbor 
Port of San Diego 
Georgia Ports Authoritr~ 
Port of Seattle 
Bi-State Development Agency 
* Does not perform function, but has legal power to do so. 
~ However, the Department of Marine and Aviation of New York 
City has jurisdiction over private airports. 
Source: ~ Administration in the United States by 
Marvin L. Fair, Cambridge, Maryland Copywright 
1954, p.l33. Cornell Maritime Press 
I. Expansion of Port Management Control 
The tendency for port administrative bodies to 
extend the limits of their jurisdiction to encompass more 
than waterfront pier facilities was brought about by the 
growing competition among ports. Larger cargo vessels and 
higher standards of service in foreign trade have tended to 
attract general cargo to the ports which could provide the 
re~uired service. For a particular port to attract the 
business, this meant up to date modern terminal facilities 
with adequate supporting and auxiliary facilities that would 
provide an unrestricted and rapid interchange of cargo at 
the port at a cost competitive with rival ports. 
Port administrations came to recognize the con-
nection between the operation of the waterfront, the growth 
of industry and trade, and the development of the flow of 
transportation of all types in the port area. Port manage-
ment became interested in bridges, ferries, and tunnels in 
order to provide ready access from one part of the harbor 
to another, and to insure that the harbor channel was kept 
free of obstructions and conjestion. Ownership of waterfront 
rail facilities was assumed in order to provide service to 
all piers of a port. It was further found that the adminis-
tration of airport operation could be successfully inter-
grated with the administration of port operation. The 
income derived from the operation of toll bridges and tunnels 
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was found to be an important source of revenue with which 
to finance the additional expansion and development of all 
aspects of the port operation. Progressive ports have 
moved ahead to provide the proper type of port facilities 
required to attract the volume of tonnage necessary for 
profitable port operation under modern day trade practices. 
VIII. PLANNING OF FACILITIES 
A. Port Planning 
A plan for port facilities most logically begins 
with a realistic estimate of the ports potential trade. The 
position and characteristis of competing ports is then care -
fully studied to determine what percent of the available 
cargo market is passing through each competitor. A long 
range plan based on the trade estimate is then developed. 
The planning must be sufficient in scope to en-
compass future harbor improvements, future general cargo 
terminals, and terminal facilities for handling special and 
bulk cargoes. Special handling equipment such as heavy lift 
cranes and other unloading equipment should be provided for. 
Grain elevators and grain loading equipment should also be 
included in this long range plan. Rail supporting facilities, 
motor truck access to waterfront facilities, and waterfront 
industries should also be incorporated into the program. 
Thus an overall plan is formule.ted that embodies all the 
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various aspects of the port operation. Each facility fits 
into this overall plan of development according to its 
urgency and importance. In this manner a comprehensive 
schedule of growth is prepared that enables the entire port 
area to move progressively ahead on a sound basis. 
It is very important that trus port plan be in-
tegrated with the planning of city, county and state govern-
ments in order to insure a harmonious and well coordinated 
program. 
B. Planning at Boston 
1. The Master Plan. 
The Port of Boston Authroity was established by 
the Massachusetts Legislature in 1945 and had among its 
powers the authority necessary to develop waterfront facil-
ities. The Authority was authorized the expenditure of 
$25,000,000 for this purpose. Careful study of port facil-
ities at Boston and conferences with interested groups re-
sulted in the formation of a "Master Plan" for port develop-
ment. This plan covered a ten year period and was restudied 
every year on the basis of current day development. An 
endeavor was made to keep in view the possibilities of long 
range development, and to coordinate these future projects 
with the immediate needs of the Port. 
The Master Plan concerned itself mainly with 
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five major projects located strategically in the Port which 
are as follows: 
1. Hoosa.c Pier No. 1, which was completed 
in August 1950 and is now in operation. 
2. Mystic Pier No. 1, which was completed 
in August 1952 and is now in operation. 
3. East Boston Pier No 1, which was completed 
in la.te 1954 and is now in operation. 
4. The first-stage development of the Castle 
Island Terminal. 
5. The proposed Northern Avenue Development. 
Three of the five major steps have been completed in this 
comprehensive plan for facility development. However, funds 
have been limited and have not been forthcoming from the 
Legislature to enable the Master Plan to be developed as 
originally scheduled. Also other projects of a more urgent 
nature have arisen which have taken precedence over the Master 
Plan. The Boston Army Base, which was about to be abandoned 
by the Federal Government, required extensive repairs. The 
Federal Government allocated $10,000,000 to this construction, 
and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts $1,200,000. The 
modernization of Commonwealth pier No. 5 to better provide 
for motor truck traffic was considered to be an important 
project, and $1,800,000 was allocated for this purpose. Work 
on this project has not yet got under way, but construction 
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is ex pected to begin in the near future. 
The port of Boston bas endeavored to develop its 
terminal facilities in accordance with the best principles 
of modern design. The facilities completed represent some 
of the finest of their type on the East Coast. However, 
funds have not been provided to enable the completion of 
the Master Plan as formulated and the port does not yet have 
a completely rounded set of modern facilities. 
The abolished Port of Boston Authority and the 
present Port of Boston Commission have confined their devel-
opment of facilities to waterfront facilities only, and 
little progress has been made in the regulation of the oper-
ating methods of both terminal operation and the operators 
of supporting facilities. New facilities constructed have 
been leased back to the original owners to continue in the 
old pattern of operation. No attempt has been made to control 
waterfront rail facilities. It ~ppears that the port of 
Boston is in dire need of a managerial body that not only 
can complete the Master Plan, but also can extend its control 
to the supporting facilities of the Port. This administrative 
body must be given the necessary authority to eliminate 
poor practices that binder the free flow of commerce through 
the facilities of the Port. 
N5 
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CHAPTER V 
FUTURE PROBLEMS AND DEVELOPlflliNTS 
Before investigating the possible organizational 
structures of a proposed governing body for the port of 
Boston, some of the future problems that face the port will 
be discussed. Previous chapters have disclosed many of the 
reasons for the decline of the Port, the traffic pattern 
has been analyzed, and the problem of facilities invest-
igated. The future management of the Port will have a wide 
variety of situations of diverse nature to deal with in 
coming years, that will require expert handling if the Port 
is to be successful in its efforts to attract more trade. 
I. PORT OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS 
A. Outbound Cargoes 
One of the major problems that faces Boston in 
the years ahead is that of obtaining a closer balance be-
tween inbound and outbound trade. This problem has gone 
unsolved for nearly a century, and its solution is one of 
the major challenges that faces the future management of 
the Port. The ever-present problem of procuring out-bound 
cargoes will continue to plague the Port until it is 
successfully overcome. 
1. Western Rail Connections. 
It has been previously pointed out that the lack 
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of adequate western rail connections has proved to be a 
major stumbling block to the Port. It appears that the 
main hope of the Port in overcoming this obstacle lies in 
a proposed merger between the Boston and Maine and one of 
several other railroads which could provide the necessary 
connections to the West. 
B. A Beltline Railroad 
The lack of a belt line railroad and adequate 
inter-terminal switching constitutes a serious obstruction 
to the future development of the Port. In order to provide 
a free and unrestricted flow of cargo to all piers, any 
future Port management must give serious consideration to 
the possible ownership and operation of a belt line rail 
facility. 
c. faterfront Industrial Sites. 
The lack of sufficient supporting industry on 
and about the waterfront also poses a problem for future 
Port management. Since the area presently controlled by the 
Port of Boston Commission is only a small part of the total 
waterfront area available, large financial expenditures 
would be required to acquire sufficient waterfront areas to 
enable effective development. 
1. Waterfront Zoning. 
The proper zoning of waterfront areas for the 
encouragement of waterfront industries would be a major step 
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towards increasing port industrial support at Boston. By 
working in conjunction with city and State agencies to 
accomplish this end, an agg!'essi ve management group could 
do much towards making the harbor land areas more contri-
butary to the Port. 
2. Tax Rates. 
Port city tax rates are difficult to analyze for 
significant and definite conclusions, and no attempt will be 
made in this study to evaluate the significance of the city 
of Boston's tax rate as compared to similar port cities. 
Port management must concern itself with attracting water-
front industries and shipping companies, however, and it is 
in this area that taxes become a definite factor for con-
sideration. 
What is equitable in the way of taxes for water-
front property such as piers, wharves, docks, and warehouses 
is difficult to establish, whether the property is publicly 
or privately owned. Also the effect that taxes have had in 
attracting industry to a particular port city is difficult 
to determine, since lower fixed costs are not always the 
controlling element in the location of industry. The "service" 
factors of a particular port may outweigh "cost" considerations 
to the advantage of the port.* \Vhether they are controll-
ing or not, it is reasonable to conclude that taxes do 
-:n4, p. 47. 
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constitute a major factor for consideration in industrial 
and port location. The port of ·Boston has the highest tax 
rate of comparable ports in the United States, and a rate 
nearly twice the national average.l Future Port management 
must strive in conjunction with other groups to insure an 
equitable tax rate and a high service factor at Boston in 
order to insure that the Port will be sufficiently attractive 
to waterfront and supporting industries. 
II. LABOR 
The labor problem at Boston can play a very 
important role in the future development of the Port if it 
is properly handled. In Boston the longshoremen work for 
many different steamship companies, since neither no one 
company nor no single hiring boss for the stevedoring 
companies is usually able to provide the men with forty hours 
of straight time work. They may equal forty hours, however, 
with overtime. This causes the practice known as "jumping", 
which occurs when a ship is near the completion of its 
loading or unloading and has only a few hours of work re-
maining. The longshoremen will often leave the ship to go 
and 11 shapen2 for another vessel with more work. This leaves 
l.See Table 
2.The "shape" is a group of longshoremen from which 
the men are chosen to work a shift• All the 11 card 11 men are 
chosen first, and then the 11 wags 1 are selected. 
the first ship stranded for labor and is an extremely 
poor Port practice. It appears that a regulation would be 
in order to require a longshoreman to finish working one 
ship before being hired for another. 
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The "scalawags" or "wags" are non-union longshore-
men who are hired when no union men are available. Since 
the number of union men is strictly limited, the "wags" 
fill in many times. In a great many cases the "wags" are 
as highly skilled as the union or "card 11 men, since this 
employment is their principal livelihood. However, very 
often they are slow and inexperienced, and produce a poor 
stowage which reflects to the discredit of the Port. Since 
the "wags" get only the "leavings", there is a high turnover 
in this group with many of the skilled personnel going into 
occupations of a more stable nature. However, it is defin-
itely to the advantage of the union men to keep the union 
membership small, because in this way they are assured that 
the number of jobs will cover them adequately. 
It appears that there is considerable room for 
improvement in the longshoremen operation. Forty hours of 
work should be provided for these men, and they in turn 
should keep faith with the steamship and stevedoring comp-
anies. A strong central port management could aid this 
situation in the future by negotiating peaceful settlements 
between the longshoremen and the ship operators to enable 
the elimination of poor practices and to assure equity to each.· 
. I 
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The Port of Boston of the future must have a 11plus 11 labor 
factor in order to successfully compete with other ports. 
III. FREIGHT RATES 
The railroad freight rates that have been detri-
mental to the port of Boston for so many years are generally 
still in effect. i~ The future management of the Port must 
strive to have these rates reduced to equal the rates of 
Philadelphia, Baltimore, and ~ther favored ports. The task 
is a long and difficult one, but encouragement can be taken 
from the success achieved in the Great Lakes grain case. The 
co-operation of interested railroads and a skilled staff of 
experts will be required to carry this fight to ultimate 
victory with the elimination of unfair rate advantages held 
by more southern ports. 
IV. IRON ORE 
Closely connected with the problem of freight 
rates is the future prospect of making an iron ore transfer 
operation at the port of Boston. In recent years a large 
amount of import iron ore from Venezuela and Labrador has 
entered the United States. The Ports of Philadelphia and 
Baltimore have obtained the majority of government ore 
cargoes for two reasons: 
*46, p.l. 
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1. They are closer to the ore using centers at 
Pittsburgh and Youngstown. 
2. They both have a much lower rate of p arity 
for shipment of ore than Boston.* 
Boston has been unable to participate in obtaining 
a share of the new import ore cargoes mainly because of the 
discriminatory freight rates which favor Baltimore and 
Philadelphia. "Import ore is a very low-grade commodity 
and will not move in volume against a disadvantageous 
differential rail rate. rt-Jr;} The Boston and Maine Railroad 
has stated that it will build a modern, high-speed ore un-
loading dock at Boston if parity rates are permitted. The 
plan is to construct the facility at the Mystic Wharves in 
Charlestown in three stages as needed. The first stage 
would provide unloading capacity of approximately 2,000,000 
tons per year and would cost approximately $ 6,000,000 ... *"** 
Boston hopes to effect the removal of the rail 
differential through the principle of diffusing traffic 
through the various ports by allowing competitive through 
rates. This principle was reaffirmed in recent years by 
the United States Supreme Court, the District Court of 
Massachusetts, and the Interstate Commerce Commission in the 
* 79, p.l2. 
-lHi-158, p. 24 
·;}-lH"Ibid, p. 23. 
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Great Lakes grain case.* In February, 1953, the railroads 
serving Boston acted on this principle and published rates 
on . iron ore from the port of Boston to Midwest steel producing 
areas equal to rates in effect from Baltimore to those areas. 
Similar action was taken by the railroads serving New York 
and Philadelphia. The Baltimore rai lroads retaliated with 
a twenty cent per ton reduction in their rates, and the 
I.c.c. suspended operation of all of the proposed new schedules. 
In the I.C.C. decisions that followed, Philadelphia was 
allowed the Baltimore rate, while the differential was re-
affirmed for Boston and New York. 
This case is still under protest, and has not 
been definitely decided to this date. The obtaining of iron 
ore cargoes at Boston would be an important addition to the 
commerce of the Port. The future Port management ·must be 
charged to continue to strive for the removal of rates which 
prevent the Port from obtaining this trade. 
V. THE SAINT LAWRENCE SEAWAY 
On May 13, 1954 President Eisenhower affixed his 
signature to the Willey-Dondero Seaway Act authorizing United 
States participation with Canada in the construction of the 
Saint Lawrence Seaway. This culminated the efforts of 
Seaway interests which have been exerted for over thir~y 
years to obtain approval of this project. The Seaway has 
*34, p.9. 
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been portrayed over the years as a highway to success by 
proponents, and as a road to economic ruin by those opposing 
the project. It has also been predicted that the seaway 
will ruin New England railroads and seriously curtail traffic 
at the port of Boston. For these reasons port interests at 
Boston have staunchly opposed the project since its inception. 
The Seaway, which is now under construction, will 
start operations sometime in 1960. The effects that the 
project will produce upon commerce at Boston presents one 
of the major problems of the future for the management of 
the Port. Shall the Port construct new facilities if its 
trade will be lost to Seaway ports after 1960? On the other 
hand, how can the Port attract trade when increased and 
modernized facilities are needed? This is the d}lemma with 
which the port management is faced. 
The Saint Lawrence Seaway Project is made up of 
the following two main categories: a power generating 
facility, and a navigational development. In the early 
stages of the P!Oject investigation it was believed that 
New England might benefit from the large supply of low cost 
power to be created. However, more recent studies have 
indicated that of the 700,000 kilowatts available for u.s. 
consumption, only a small surplus quantity would be avail-
able for distribution to New England. By 1963 it is pre-
dicted that this initial surplus will be absorbed by industries 
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in the local New York state area.* 
The navdgational project presents a situation , 
that is considerably more difficult to analyze for indi-
cations of future developments. Some of the more out-
standing features of t h is undertaking are as follows: 
1. The Seaway will be open only about eight 
months a year. This is expected to have a retarding 
influence upon the shipment of many commodities. Firms 
may not be willing to set up the necessary foreign trade 
facilities for such limited operation. The Seaway will be 
best adapted to bulk commodities that can be easily stored 
at ocean ports. 
2. The Seaway will have a twenty-seven foot 
limiting channel depth. This will tend to prevent larger 
vessels from using this channel. Smaller vessels of approxi-
mately twenty-three feet in draft will be able to use the 
Seaway, but will carry less cargo. However, cargoes may be 
interchanged with larger vessels at Montreal. Many Great 
Lakes ports do not at present have twenty-seven foot harbor 
depths. 
3. The Seaway will have limited capacity. It has 
been estimated that the Seaway can handle approximately 
45,000,000 tons of cargo. *{r Of this figure 19,300,000 tons 
i~ll8, p.ll. 
*~1-127, p. 248. 
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passed through the Welland Canal in 1953.* This indicates a 
tonnage increase of approximately 30,000,000 tons when 
larger vessels are used. Since 20,000,000 of these tons are 
expected to be iron ore,*~~ the additional cargo carrying 
capacity of the canal is limited to 10,000,000 tons. 
4. The Seaway will be self-supporting through 
the imposition of tolls. This indicates that a cost per 
ton of cargo will be imposed to cover operating expenses, 
interest and amortization of the facility. 
It appears that the effects that the Saint Lawrence 
Seaway will produce upon channels of trade will not take 
place rapidly. Many supplementary and auxiliary projects . 
must be completed before the full potential of this new 
waterway will be realized. The first commodity affected at 
Boston will most likely be grain, which will no longer need 
to be transshipped at Buffalo. However, as previously dis-
cussed, the movement of grain is subject to many diverse 
elements and proper solicitation may yet insure Boston of 
an adequate movement of this commodity. 
Boston may realize the increased domestic trade 
which Seaway proponents have predicted. The outlook for this 
development appears doubtful, however , On the other hand, 
perhaps foreign trade will be increased through the 
*191, p.3 
~P~l27, p.248. 
stimulation provided by the Seaway. Many states wh i ch 
previously have adhered to isolat ionist policies will now 
be exposed to foreign commerce. This could lead to a new 
outlook on foreign trade by these states, which in turn 
could lead to legislation stimulating over all United States 
foreign trade. 
The St. Lawrence Seaway apparently will hurt 
the port of Boston most serverely by depriving the Port of 
future trade potential rather than by the volume of present 
commerce that .it will divert. However, goods will still 
flow to those ports which can provide the proper se~ vice at 
a competitive cost. Thus the St. Lawrence Seaway presents 
a challenge to the port of Boston. A challenge to seek out 
new channels of trade, and to provide so efficient a c ar go 
interchange operation at Boston that shippers could not 
e.fford to overlook the advantages of such a port. 
VI. WORLD TRADE CENTER 
One of the brighter prospects in the future for 
the port of Boston is the establishment of a New England 
World Trade Center in Boston. Following an inspection 
visit to New Orleans by approximat ely thirty business and 
civic leaders, a committee was appoin ted by the Mayor of 
Boston in 1953 to investigate the feasibility of establish-
ing such a regional agency. The formation of a central 
group to promote New England 's products and services had 
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been considered necessary for many years to stimulate 
further New England trade. The promotion and the generation 
of commerce through the port of Boston is also expected to 
be one of the activities of the proposed trade center. In 
this area, the trade center will work very closely with the 
governing body of the Port. 
The Trade Center is to be fashioned after the 
very successful International House and International Trade 
Mart in New Orleans. It will furnish both promotion and 
service facilities and will provide a "trade mart 11 where 
New. England products can be displayed to the world. 
New England industries will be aided by the center 
thr0ugh the contacts that can be established between local firms 
and foreign buyers and channels of trade. The World Trade 
Development Department will supply up to date information 
to interested manufacturers on foreign import and export 
regulations, currency restrictions, markets, and trade pros-
pects. A World Trade Library will be maintained and steno-
graphers and translators will be made available. The center 
is expected to act as a clearing house for information and 
ideas which will sell New England products to the markets 
of the world. It will provide an initial point of contact 
for foreign visitors entering New England, and will co-
ordinate its activities closely with the u.s. Department of 
Commerce and the Department of State in all matters of 
liaison with visitors from foreign countries and the promotion 
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of trade. The Trade Center is designed to be one of New 
England's strongest assets in the highly competitive struggle 
to build markets for American goods and services abroad. 
The World Trade Center will be financed by 
business and industrial firms, financial institutions, 
shipping companies, and other institutions throughout New 
England which have a major interest in developing the 
commerce of New England. There are several categories of 
membership available to firms and individuals. Founder 
memberships, consist of those firms and individuals who 
subcribe one thousand dollars or more to the capital fund 
of the organization. There are six annual membership 
classifications: Sustaining, active, associate, junior, 
domestic non-resident, and foreign non-resident. The initial 
goal of the organization is to obtain a membership of 2,500, 
with at least 500 founder members. 
The Boston World Trade Center intends to move ahead 
with an agressive constructive approach to sell New England, 
first to New England, and then to sell it to the world at 
large. This organization should contribute greatly to the 
efforts of the port of Boston management to promote trade. 
VII. ATOMIC ENERGY 
The development of low cost power has been a 
major problem to New England industries since their needs 
exceeded the supplies generated from the numerous streams 
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in the area many years ago. Many industries have left 
N.ew England for more southern states to obtain low cost 
power as well as cheaper wage rates. 
The establishment of an atomic power plant in 
New England stimulates a new outlook for the industrial 
development of this area.* Although low cost atomic 
generated power may not be a reality for another decade, 
this phenomenal development promises to overcome one of 
New England's inherent problems, the lack of a local fuel 
supply. The port of Boston may see many new industries 
locating within the hinterland of the Port in future years 
to reap the benefits of this low cost power. These industries 
should in turn stimulate Port trade. 
The port of Boston faces a challenge in the future 
to deal properly with the many problems and developments 
that lie ahead. This chapter has served to emphasize the 
need for a future port management with a workable organization 
and a staff of personnel of the highest caliber obtainable. 
~~104, p. 23. 
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CHAPTER VI 
PORT ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 
Previous chapters of this study have briefly 
traced the decline of the port of Boston, sketched the 
traffic pattern, discussed the complex problem of facilities, 
and outlined some of the future problems and developments. 
It is the object 0f this chapter to develop an organizational 
structure of permanent character through which these problems 
can be effectively dealt with over the course of many future 
years. 
I. PAST PORT GOVERNING BODIES 
The port of Boston has had numerous development 
and regulatory agencies through the course of years. Un-
fortunately, the ·Fort has never been able to establish a 
development and governing group of a continuing and long-
lasting nature with sufficient flexibility to enable it to 
effectively deal with the problems of changing times. 
A. The First Port Authority 
In 1742 a 11Fellowship 11 club was organized at 
Boston by several master mariners. This organization grew 
rapidly, and soon showed its value to both mariners and the 
port. In 1754 this organization was incorporated as the 
Boston Marine Society by Governor Shirley and was invested 
with a silver seal engraved by Nathaniel Hurd, the celebrated 
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silversmith of that day. At this time the organization 
boasted one-hundred members and considerable financial 
dealings. 
The first activities of the Boston Marine Society 
were chiefly charitable, but the organization soon came to 
be the recognized authority in dealing with the maritime 
affairs and the problems of the Port. The society also 
came to represent other ports in Massachusetts, and could be 
called the father of all future port authorities at Boston. 
Throughout the years this organization was very influential 
in securing harbor improvements and lighthouse construction 
and in regulating commerce. The organization is still in 
existence to this day.* 
B. Other Governing Bodies 
The first State measure for the expansion and 
improvement of port facilities occured in 1835 when a survey 
of Boston Harbor was authorized. In 1839 the lines on 
private property in the harbor areas were fixed. From 1846 
to 1848 a group was appointed to examine and report on the 
advisability of filling the extensive flats at South Boston. 
In 1850 the first body for harbor improvement work was 
created, and was called the "Commission on Boston Harbor 
and the Back Bay.n In 1854 a group called the "Commission 
' 
on Mystic River, Boston Harbo_r, and Dorchester Bay 11 was 
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formed. In 1862 the "Commission on Harbors and Flats 11 
was appointed which had statewide supervision. From 1866 
to 1877 several changes took place. F'i ve Harbor Commissioners 
were appointed, but this agency was superceded by a similar 
board consisting of three members, which was shortly com-
bined with a board of three land commissioners and called 
the "Commissioners on Public Lands and Agents of Common-
wealth l:t,lats. 11 In 1879 three "Harbor and Land Commissioners" 
were appointed and continued to function until 1916 when a 
"Commission on Waterways and Public Lands" was created for 
improvement work. However, in 1911 five "Directors of the 
Port of Boston 11 were appointed. In 1914 this group was 
changed to three members, and in 1916 it relinquished its 
duties to the above mentioned "Commission on Waterways and 
Public Lands 11 • In 1919 this latter agency was incorporated 
into the newly created "Massachusetts Department of Public 
Works 11 which was charged to maintain and extend the effic-
iency of the port of Boston.* 
c. The Boston Port Authority 
In 1929 with Boston losing rapidly in the port 
race it became apparent that the Bort needed action in many 
fields that were not properly within the scope of the Depart-
ment of Public Works. Therefore, the 11Boston Port Authority" 
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was established. This board consisted of an unpaid group 
of five members. Chapter 229 of the Acts of the Legislature 
of Massachusetts for the year 1929 called "An Act Establish-
ing A Board To Be Known As The Boston Port Authority, Pre-
scribing Its Duties and Defining the Port of Boston." 
Section two stated the authority under which this board, 
together with the city of Boston, acted for intervention and 
participation in cases affecting the Port before the I.C.C. 
and other agencies. The board was charged to investigate 
other matters concerning the Port and to report annually to 
the Governor, the General Court, and the Mayor. 
The Boston Port Authority continued in existence 
for approximately sixteen years, supported only by city 
appropriations, and witnessed a drastic curtailment of traffic 
at the port of Boston. The board of five unpaid members 
with only a small clerical staff found itself facing a full 
time job. Its powers in essence were only advisory, and it 
had neither the funds nor the personnel to perform the port 
management functions that were so desperately needed. 
D. The Port of Boston Authority 
At the close of World War II a new effort was 
exerted by port of Boston interests to revive the sagging 
seaport. In 1945 the "Port of Boston Authority 11 was estab-
lished and brought a new concept of port administration to 
Boston. Under the enabling legislation the non-paid authority 
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board of five members, which was appointed by the Governor 
with the advice and consent of the Council, was authorized 
to engage a port director and a staff of professional port 
personnel to administer the affairs of the Port. The 
following is stated in part by the act: 
Said Authority shall have an office in the city of 
Boston and shall, in addition to a director, employ, 
within the limits of the amounts appropriated therefore, 
such experts, counsel, clerks, engineers, assistants 
and other employees as it may deem necessary, and, 
subject to appropriation, may incur such other expenses, 
including the expense for advertising and publicizing 
the port of Boston as it may deem necessary.* 
Thus in 1945, nineteen years after its main competitor, the 
port of New York, had established a full time paid director 
with a professional staff to · assist him, Boston took similar 
action.l 
The Port of Boston Authority was authorized to pre-
pare plans and estimates of the cost of acquiring needed pier 
facilities, and of the construction of such new facilities 
as it determined were necessary. However, these plans had to 
be submitted to the General Court for consideration, and 
actually the authority was merely advising the General Court 
of needed improvements. Thus the Port Authority's proposed 
actions were submitted to the complex and time ,.consuming 
l.Although the New York Port Authority was estab-
lished in 1921 the office of Executive Director was not 
established until 1926. 
*129, Section 55. 
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system of legislative approval. Considerable debate often 
resulted from the proposals, and the Port Authority became 
known as a 11poli tical football 11 • 
In spite of the many obstacles that hindered 
efficient operation, this state agency was able to accomplish 
many of its objectives. The Authority was authorized to 
lease many of the facilities which came under its juris-
diction for a period not to exceed twenty years. Warehouses 
and industrial locations were authorized a longer period, 
providing provisions were made for rental readjustment every 
twenty years. On construction projects to be financed by a 
State bond issue, the Authority was required to obtain a 
written contract, approved by the Governor, with a respons-
ible party for the lease of the property at a rate sufficient 
to amortize 60 percent of the project cost over a period of 
twenty years. Under these provisions several of the agencies 
facilities were leased, and the construction of Hoosac Pier 
No. 1 and Mystic Pier No. 1 was completed. 
The Port. of. Boston Authority prepared the "Master 
Plan" for an orderly development of the fort and made con-
siderable progress in the development of facilities. However, 
the inefficiencies of operation as a state agency prevented 
the attainment of the accomplishments thought possible at the 
time of its establishment. The position of port director, a 
key position in the Port picture, changed hands several times 
as the high caliber men chosen for the post became discouraged 
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with the political aspects of the job. Although a major 
improvement over past port governing bodies at Boston, the 
Port of Boston Authority was too restricted in its operations 
by political controls t o enable this organization to over-
come the large gap that existed between Boston and other 
competing ports. 
II. THE PORT OF BOSTON COMMISSION 
On July 1, 1953 the present Port of Boston 
Commission was established.* The enabling legislation 
authorized a new unpaid five man governing board which in 
turn appointed a new port director. The main difference 
between the present commission and the old Port of Boston 
Authority is in the creation of a port advisory council and 
in the method of filling vacancies on the commission. 
The Advisory Council to the Port of Boston Commission 
is made up of the following members: 
••• the mayor of the city of Boston and twenty 
other members, each of Whom represents one of the 
following organization s: Associated Industries of 
Massachusetts, Boston Clearing House, The Boston Grain 
and Flour Exchange, Inc., Greater Boston Chamber of 
Commerce, Maritime Association, Massachusetts Federation 
of Labor, Massachusetts Fisheries Association, Inc., 
Massachusetts State C.I.O. Council, Massachusetts 
Warehousemen's Association, New England Council, New 
England Export Club, Inc., New England Shippers Advisory 
Board, New England Shoe and Leather Association, New 
England Territory Railroads, New England Wholesale 
Lumber Association Inc. and The Propeller Club of the 
*130. 
United States, Port of Boston Incorporated. 
Appointment to the advisory council of a member 
of each organization so represented shall be made by 
the appropriate governing body of said organization, 
and notice of such appointment shall be given to the 
chairman of the Port of Boston Commission. Each 
member of the advisory council shall be a resident of 
the commonwealth.* 
The Advisory Council was enjoined to review the 
activities of the Port of Boston Commission and to interest 
itself in ways and means of advancing the int erest.s of the 
port of Boston. It was authorized to require the Port 
Director and other Commission officals to appear at its 
meetings, and was authorized access to the Commission's 
records. The Council was directed to report its activities 
and accomplishments to the Governor and General Court once 
a year, and was allowed to include in this report any recom-
mendations for legislation that it considered were in the best 
interests of the port of Boston. 
When a vacancy occurs on the five member Port of 
Boston Commission, each of the organizations represented on 
the Advisory Council is authorized to submit the names of not 
more than three people to fill the opening. These names are 
certified by the remaining members of the Commission, and 
from this list the Governor may select a candidate for the 
vacant position. 
The creation of the Port of Boston Commission and 
*130, Section 53A 
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the Advisory Council does not appear to have been a change 
of sufficient scope to solve the problems of the port of 
Boston. The Advisory Council should be able to aid the 
Port by making its operating problems more readily under-
standable to the wide range of memberships of the represented 
organizations. However, the effectiveness of these organ-
izations to deal with port problems under the existing 
legislation was summed up by the Special Commission on the 
Massachusetts Port Authority as follows: 
But the business and executive ability represented 
in these groups is powerless to act in important areas 
largely because responsibility for management is divided 
among several state agencies and the Legislature; because 
funds for development and for operations are inadequate, 
delayed or uncertain; and because necessary state re-
strictions of necessity make management inflexible and 
inelastic and powerless to cope with the day-by-day 
situations which arise in the conduct of a competitive 
business enterprise. The absence of a realistic trade 
promotion and solicitation program is grim evidence of 
our failure.?" · 
The inability of a state agency staffed with civil service 
personnel to cope with port problems in the competitive 
business-like manner required remains unchanged. 
Since its establishment in 1953 the Port of Boston 
Commission has had little success in generating any large 
amounts of port trade. Many of the Port's internal problems 
have gone completely unattacked, and a sharp curtailment of 
funds has prevented the use of outside trade solicitation 
-l}l56, p.22. 
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agents until early in 1956. The efforts of the individual 
members of the Port Commission and its professional manage-
ment staff have not been in vain, however, and progress has 
been made in attacking discriminatory freight rates, in 
obtaining satisfactory labor relations, in obtaining additional 
facilities, and in proceeding with the plans for the con-
struction of new facilities and for the improvement of exist-
ing facilities. The Port Director and the members of the 
Commission have appeared at many public functions in the 
last two years, and have greatly enhanced the prestige of 
the Port. Nevertheless, with the shadow of the Saint Lawre~e 
Seaway being cast over all East Coast ports, and with ~ess­
ive action being vigorously exerted by t hose ports expecting 
to be affected, the limited managerial action allowed under 
existing legislation is no longer tolerable. The port of 
Boston must strive to rid itself of unnecessary restrictive 
controls before it is swallowed up in the part competitive 
struggle of coming years. 
III. PORT ADMI NISTRATION AT OTHER U.S. PORTS 
In order to develop a framework for an organ-
izational structure for the port of Boston, the organization 
of other u.s. ports will be investigated. 
A. The Port of New York Authority 
Since the Port of New York Authority is the most 
famous and probably the most 'successful of all port auth-
orities in the United States it will be examined separately 
in order to accentuate some of the factors of its success. 
1. Early History and Financing 
The Port of New York Authority was established 
by the legislatures of New York and New Jersey in the Compact 
of 1921 to aid in obtaining improved co-ordination of the 
terminal, transportation and other commercial facilities 
at the port of New York. The Authority was entrusted with 
port planning, and the protection of commercial interests 
of the Port District, as well as being authorized to pur-
chase, construct, lease, and operate any terminal facility 
within the area of the Port. The Authority was enjoined to 
initiate a development program as rapidly as was economically 
practicable, and the numerous major facilities in existence 
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or under construction today is ample evidence that the 
organization has performed as directed. The Authority has 
control over interstate tunnels, bridges, railroad freight 
terminals, motor truck terminals, marine terminals, and airports. 
In the early days of its establishment the 
Authority found that it was forced to establish a credit 
base before it was able to undertake the financing of the 
large construction projects necessary to unify the Port 
District. In most instances a considerable period of time 
was necessary after the projects were placed in operation 
to allow the earning power to reach a self-supporting basis.l 
This meant that the facilities had to be of a long life and 
had to provide a long range demand for use. In order to 
induce financing, the states of New York and New Jersey loaned 
a fixed sum, not to exceed 25 percent of the cost of each 
project, and agreed to accept a second lien on revenues as 
security. The Port Authority was authorized to issue bonds 
for the balance of the cost, and the bond holders were allowed 
a first lien on the entire earnings of the project. An 
arrangement of this sort was new in the United States at 
that time, but it proved to be the solution of the problem 
of providing risk capital, and enabled the Authority to market 
its first issue of bonds at an interest cost of 4.76 percent.2 
In the early years of its project financing the 
following amounts were loaned by the two states for 
construction projects: 
1925 - $ 4,000,000 for Arthur Kill bridges. 
$20,000,000 Bond issue in 1926. 
1926 - $10,000,000 for George Washington Bridge. 
$30,000,000 Bond issue in 1929. 
1927 - $ 4,000,000 for Bayonne Bridge. 
$12,000,000 Bond issue in 1928. 
l.In 1923 the War Department refused to accept 
$1,000,000 of the Authoritys 30-year, 4% bonds for a govern-
ment-owned spur railroad in Hoboken. 
2.This issue consisted of $14,000,000 of 4t% 
twenty year serials callable in ten years. 
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Each of the original bridge issues was secured by a pledge 
of revenues only from the facility which it was intended 
to finance, and such large sinking and reserve funds were 
required that the possibility of one project aiding another 
was very unlikely.* 
In 1930 the Authority was able to issue its own 
bonds without state loans, when competition was eliminated, 
and it was made the sole body authorized to construct inter-
state crossings in the Port District. A refunding plan was 
initiated by the Authority in 1935 and was completed in 1941, 
which provided for the consolidation of its existing debt 
into a single type of obligation, General and Refunding Bonds. 
$250,607,000 General and Refunding Bonds were sold or ex-
changed voluntarily which were a first charge on the entire 
net revenues of the projects of the Port Authority financed 
by these bonds. The interest cost was 3.74 percent on the 
first issue of forty year term bonds in 1935, and this 
dropped to 2.91 percent on a final thirty-five year term 
issue at the end of 1940. In 1945 the authority issued 
forty year bonds at 1.53 percent interest cost and in 1946 
a forty year term issue at 1.36 percent interest cost. At 
that time this latter interest rate was believed to be the 
lowest long term interest rate ever secured in the United 
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States by an issuer of revenue bonds.* 
The facilities constructed by the Port Authority 
not only paid their own way, but surpluses were developed. 
The General Reserve Fund was kept up to the full statutory 
requirement of 10 percent of all bonds outstanding, and the 
Special Reserve Fund was also built up which permitted a 
more rapid retirement of debt. The primary Authority bonds 
after the refunding were the General and Refunding Bonds, 
which had first lien on the collective net revenues of the 
facilities for which they had been issued, and had additional 
backing by the General Reserve and Special Reserve Funds. 
The General Reserve Fund, moreover, with its excellent means 
of replenishment from the surpluses of established facilities, 
was also available for the protectj_on of all new bonds for 
which it was pledged. In this manner the Port Authority, by 
utilizing General Reserve Fund Bonds for financing additional 
projects, was able to offer the security of large and depend-
able reserves as well as the e_arning power of the projects . 
themselves. ~H~ 
2. Modern Day Operations 
Today the Port of New York Authority is a great 
~c-2, p.l9. 
~Hc-2, P• 20. 
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and powerful organization. It maintains three large bridges 
and two tunnels for vehicular traffic. In addition it owns 
and operates a union inland railroad freight terminal, a 
grain terminal and piers, two union truck terminals, and a 
union bus terminal. It operates three airports, and has 
ownership of a fourth for which it plans future development. 
The Authority has developed many marine facilities at the 
port of New York and presently operates extensive facilities 
at Port Newark under long term lease. These projects have 
been constructed both for the relief of intolerable traffic 
conditions, as well as for the strengthening of the Port's 
competitive commercial position. They all fall within that 
category for which it is particularly useful for the Authority 
to undertake; that is, those projects which do not have 
sufficient prospects of immediate financial return to attract 
private capital, but with the aid of immunities and other 
benefits of the public corporation authority, hold good pro-
spects of becoming self-supporting in future years. 
By January 1, 1948 the authority had issued a total 
of $537,851,260 of its obligations.l At this time $70,496,817 
in obligations had been retired from project income. The Port 
- of New York Authority, indeed, has set a fine example for 
l.About half of this amount represents direct fin-
ancing of capital projects. Refunding operations account for 
the balance. 
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students of port development to analyze. 
3. Organization and Management 
The Port of New York Authority is a public corp-
oration, and as such it operates outside the structure of 
ordinary government agencies. It has i~munity from taxation 
and from various other restrictions which private industry 
is subject to. However, it is able to operate efficiently 
like a private business operation, free from the political 
controls and changing policies which ordinary governmental 
agencies are exposed to. The authority has its own income, 
from self-supporting projects, and is not dependent . upon 
the State Legislatures for funds. It is able to control its 
own finances and to budget its spending on the projections 
of future income. 
The Authority operates under a board of twelve 
unpaid commissioners whose functions are similar to those 
of a board of directors of a private corporation. This 
group determines policies, authorizes plans and financial 
appropriations, and appoints the Executive Director and 
General Counsel of the Authority. The chairman of the board 
is designated the executive head of the Authority, and he 
represents the board in its relations with public and pri-
vate officals and agencies, and works closely with the ap-
pointed administrative head of the Authority, the Executive 
Director. The members of the board have mainly been 
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business and professional men of outstanding caliber. There 
have been several bankers, three former Governors, and 
several former U.S. Senators on the board. 
The Executive Director is the administrative 
head of the Port Authority and is in charge of all the 
numerous activities of the Authority. The administrative 
staff reports to him, and he communicates the boards desires 
to his staff for action. Since the establishment of this 
post, the Port Authority has had only two Executive Directors, 
which is a fine indication of the stability of this office. 
The Port Authority has exerted considerable effort 
in developing a non-political, competent, career staff of 
unusual ability. It is not a member of the civil service 
system, but maintains its own merit system for employees. 
Its employees are members of the New York State Retirement 
System, however. With the high caliber of personnel develop-
ed under these conditions, the Port of New York Authority 
has been able to move progressively ahead and to produce 
some of the development wonders of modern times. 
B. Organization At Other Ports 
In his study of the organizational structure of 
sixty-one port authorities in the United States Professor 
Fair classified the organization of port governing a gencies 
as follows: 
••• (1) the government departmental agency, local 
or state, which may be either the executive or commission 
~1 
type; (2) the independent commission, state or local 
district, which may be (a) elective, (b) appointive 
without nominations, (c) appointive from nominations, 
(3) the advisory commission; (4) the public corporation, 
bi-state, state, or local, the members of the board of 
which may be (a) elective, (b) appointive from nomin-
ations, or (c) appointive without nominations; and (5) 
railroad and other private corporations which have 
general control over the waterfront of a particular 
port.* 
The main factors of government organization are 
the political unit which selects the members of the port 
authority board of commissioners and that which gives 
financial support to the port authority.l 
1. ~ Government Departmental Agency 
This form of organization is rapidly decreasing 
in the United States. In the ports studied by Professor 
Fair, eleven utilized this method of controlling port 
operations.2 Ordinarily this type of control is utilized 
where the city controlls the port areas. The City Depart-
ments serving as Port Administrations are as follows: 
l.This information was mainly derived from the con-
clusions of Professor Marvin L. Fair's study of the organizat-
ion of sixty one port authorities. 8, pp.60-9l. 
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2.It is interesting to note that the Boston Port 
Authority was classified in this category because of its limited 
control over policy and funds, and existed as the only 
state departmental authority revealed by the study. Since 
the Port of Boston Commission has no additional powers, it 
is reasonable to asru me that it would be similiarly classified. 
*8, pp.60. 
TABLE XIV 
TRENDS IN TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS OF PORT AUTHORITIES 
1921-1951 
TyPes Number Established by Period 
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Prior to 1921 1921-1930 1931-1940 1941-1951 
Government 
Departments 5 1 
-
Independent 7 2 5 
Commissions 
Public 7 8 3 
Corporations 
Source: Port Administration in the United States by 
Marvin L. Fair, Cambridge, Maryland Copywright 
1954, p.78.Corne11 Maritime Press. 
3 
3 
10 
The Bureau of Harbors, Baltimore. 
The Department of Public Works, Chicago. 
Port and Harbor Commission, Cleveland . 
The City Commission, Jac k sonville. 
The Dept. of Port Operat i ons and Development, 
Maine. 
The Board of Harbor Commissioners, Milwaukee. 
The Department of Marine and Aviation, New York. 
Bureau of Port Operations, Philadelphia. 
2. The Independent Commission 
There were twenty-two ports in the study which 
were under the jurisdiction of independent commissions. 
The two main advantages of such an org anization are the 
establishment of a governing group which is largely removed 
from political influences, and t h e utilization of an a g ency 
which can combine admini strative functions with legisl ative 
and judical powers. 
In state indep endent commissions the members are 
generally appointed by the governor and conf irmed by the 
council or t h e state senate. In city commissions usually 
the mayor or city manager appoints the commissioners with 
the approval of the city council, and in county commissions 
the board of county commissioners usually ap points the board 
members. In some areas the port commissioners are elected 
to off ice. 
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The four state independent commissions in the 
study were the Alabama State Docks Board, the Board of 
Harbor Commissioners for the Territory of Hawaii, the 
Commissioners of Steamship Terminals of New London and 
the Board of State Harbor Commissioners of San F'rancisco 
Harbor. Independent Commissions which were established on 
a local level were Astoria, Washington; Baltimore, Maryland; 
Corpus Christi, Texas; Detroit, Michigan; Fort Pierce, 
Florida; Gulfport, Mississippi; Houston, Texas; Long Beach, 
California; Oakland, California; Port Angeles, Washington; 
Port Everglades, Florida; Portland, Oregon; Redwood City, 
California; Saint Paul, Minnesota; and San Diego, California.* 
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The independent commission is not a corporate body 
and does not have individual rights separate from the regular 
agencies of the government. It cannot issue its own securities 
under its own corporate name, and does not have the right 
to sue or be sued. However, it may have functions and powers 
considerably in advance of the ordinary government agency. 
It may have the right to acquire land and facilities, and 
it may prepare plans for the future development of the port 
and undertake the construction of facilities. In some ports 
the independent commission regulates privately owned terminals. 
*8, p.64. 
TABLE XV 
DISTRIBUTION OF PORT AUTHORITIES BY Nm~BER OF 
COMMISSIONERS AND TERMS OF OFFICE FOR 1951 
No. of 
Commissioners 
1 • 
3 • 
5 • 
7 • 
9 • 
10 • 
11 • 
12 • 
16 • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
. . " 
• • • 
• • • 
• • 
Length of Term 
in Years 
1 • • 
2 • • 
3 •• 
4 • • 
5 •• 
6 •• 
7 • • 
10 •• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
• • 
No. of ports 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • " 
• • • 
• • • 
• • 0 
• • • 
• • • 
• 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
e o 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
4 
15 
26 
4 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
No. of 
Port Authorities 
• • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • 
1 
3 
7 
17 
10 
12 
2 
1 
Source: Port Administration in the United States by 
MarVin L. Fair, Cambridge,Maryland Copywright 
1954 p.76. Cornell Maritime Press. 
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3. The Advisory Commission 
The establishment of an advisory commission in 
place of a port authority has occured in several instances. 
However, this device has usually been abolished to establish 
an independent commission or a corporate port authority. 
The most recent instance of an advisory commission appears 
to be the twenty-one member Advisory Council to the Port 
of Boston Commission.! This organization appears to be the 
only one of its kind in existence in the United States. 
4. The Public Corporation 
The study of the sixty-one port administrations 
revealed that thirty or nearly fifty percent of these organ-
izations were composed of public corporations. Like the 
private corporation, the public corporation is an artifical 
being which exists only in contemplation of law. As such it 
may sue or be sued, incur debt, enter into contractual 
obligations, and issue securities in its corporate name. 
It is an independent entity but cannot be considered com-
pletely autonomous, since it is ordinarily subordinate to 
the chief executive and legislative body of the state in 
which it is located. 
The public corporation is an instrument designed 
to remove the incorporated organization from political in-
fluences, and to provide the minimum of controls needed to 
1. See page 157 above. 
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insure protection of the public interest. In this way it is 
intended to establish the freedom of action necessary for the 
organization to operate in an efficient business-like manner. 
The three bi-state port agencies, the Port of New 
York Authority, the Delaware River Port Authority, and the 
Bi-State Development Agency at St. Louis, are all public 
corporations. All have commissioners appointed by the 
Governors of the respective States, and their actions are 
subject to the veto of the Governor of the State from which 
they were appointed. 
The state authorities which are public corporations 
are the Georgia Ports Authority, the Board of Commissioners 
for the Lake Charles Harbor and Terminal Department of 
Louisiana, the Maine Port Authority, the Board of Commissioners 
of the Port of New Orleans, the North Carolina State Ports 
Authority, the South Carolina Ports Authority and the South 
Jersey Port Commission. These corporations are administered 
in each case by an appointed commission. A continuing body 
has been insured at all but South Carolina and Maine, by the 
use of staggered terms. 
There are fifteen local, county or municipal 
corporations located as follows: Beaumont, Texas; Brunswick, 
Georgia; Coos Bay, Oregon; Brownsville, Texas; Galveston, 
Texas; Long View, Washington; Los Angeles, California; 
Monroe, Michigan; Norfolk, Virginia; Pensacola, Florida; 
Raymond, Washington; Seattle, Washington; Tacoma, Washington; 
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TABLE XVI 
NUM:BER OF MEMBERS AND TERMS OF OFFICE 
OF PUBLIC PORT AUTHORI TIES IN 1951 
Port 
-
Albany 
Astoria 
Baltimore-Pt. of Comm. 
Baltimore-Bureau of Harbors 
Beaumont 
BiState 
Boston 
Brownsville 
Brunswick 
No. of Com-
missioners 
5 
5 
7 
l{a) 
5 
10 
5 
3 
Camden (So. Jersey Port Com.) 
Charleston 
5 
7 
5 
Chicago 
Coos Bay 
Corpus Christi 
Delaware River (Del.R.Port 
Fort Pierce 
Detroit 
Georgia (Ga. Ports Auth.) 
Gulfport 
Honolulu 
Houston 
Jacksonville 
Lake Charles 
Long Beach 
Longview 
Los Angeles 
Miami 
Milwaukee 
Mobile 
Monroe 
New London 
New Orleans 
New York {c) 
New York {d) 
Norfolk 
Oakland 
Port Angeles 
Pensacola 
Philadelphia 
Port Everglades 
l(a) 
5 
3 
Auth. )16 
5 
5 
3 
5 
5 
5 
(b) 
5 
5 
3 
5 
(b) 
5 
5 
5 
7 
5 
l{a) 
12 
5 
· 5 
3 
11 
l(a) 
3 
{continued) 
Term 
3 
2 
5 
5* 
6* 
5* 
7* 
7 
2-l, 51(' 
4* 
3* 
4* 
4 
4 
2* 
4 
6* 
6* 
4* 
5* 
1 
3* 
10* 
3* 4 
5* 
6* 
4 
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TABLE XVI 
(continued) 
NUMBER OF MEIV1BERS AND TERMS OF OFFICE 
OF PUBLIC PORT AUTHORITIES IN 1951 
No. of Com-
missioners Term 
-
Portland, Me. 
Portland, Ore. 
Raymond 
Redwood City 
St. Paul 
San Diego 
San Francisco 
Savannah 
Seattle 
Stockton 
Tacoma 
Tampa 
Toledo 
Vancouver 
Wilmington, Del. 
Wilmington, No. Car. 
* Staggered Terms 
(a) Dept. Head 
(b) City Commission 
(c) Dept. of Marine & Aviation 
(d) Port of N. Y. Authority 
5 
5 
3 
5 
3 
3 
3 
10 
3 
5 
3 
5 
B(e) 
3 
3 
7 
(e) One addi t ional member has term of one year 
Source: Port Administration in the United States by 
Marvin L. Fair, Cambridge, Maryland Cornell 
Maritime Press, Copywright 1954, p.75. 
3 
5~( 
6* 
5* 
6* 
4* 
4?:-
5* 
6* 
4* 
6* 
4* 
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Tampa, Florida; and Vancouva, Washington. There are also 
multi-county or district corporate port authorities at 
Albany, New York and Savannah, Georgia. These authorities 
are also governed by a board of commissioners. Ten of these 
ports have appointed board members while seven of them have 
members elected to the board. 
5. The Private Port Corporation 
The Texas City Terminal Railway Company of Texas 
City, Texas and the Parr Richmond Terminal Comp any of 
Richmond, California are two of the outstanding examples 
of this type of port administration. These comp anies are 
port authorities in that each company administers practically 
all of the port. These private corporations are subject to 
taxation and the regulation of normal government laws. 
The advantages of the private terminal company 
are that it enables a business type of management, and it 
provides for a co-ordinated development and .operation of the 
port which greatly facilitates efficient port operation. 
However, this type of organization is extremely~erable to 
exploitation by selfish interests, and the good of the 
entire port area may not be taken in consideration when 
policies are established and decisions made. 
The trend towards the establishment of public 
corporation port authorities is very noticable in recent 
years. However, there have been many independent commissions 
also established. Professor Fair's study of sixty-one of the 
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major ports in the United States revealed that of all the 
ports administered by state agencies, the port of Boston 
stood alone with a state departmental agency with limited 
powers. 
c. Port Management 
The excellent management bodies found at several 
United States ports have been described as the key to the 
success of those ports. This section deals with some of 
the management methods used at such ports. 
1. The Board of Commissioners 
The board of directors of a public authority 
is composed of the app ointed commissioners. The epitome 
of such ·a body is a group of h igh caliber individuals, 
divorced from political influences, and of high esteem in · 
co~munity life. The reward for serving on such a board is 
the knowledge of having contributed to the public good, and 
therefore these positions are usually unp aid. The selection 
of members for such a body should be undertaken with ex-
I treme care, for a ports progress will be charted by this 
group for many future years. 
2. The Port Director. 
The Board of Commissioners of a port is generally 
accountable to the governor and to the state legislature. 
This group is generally charg ed to carry out a development 
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program, and to assist them in this duty a port director 
or manager is usually selected to head the administrative 
staff. The selection of a port director is perhaps the most 
important single decision tha t the board of commissioners 
is ever required to make. The port director must have 
unusual executive ability; he must be able to effectively 
deal with both businessmen and public officials; he must 
be an outstanding leader; and he must be technically and 
financially minded to deal intelligently with the complex 
intricacies of port operation. He must excel as a business 
executive and as a capable public official. The establish-
ment of public confidence in the port authority and the 
enhancement of its prestige is largely accomplished through 
the actions of the port director. 
Many port authorities in the United States have 
not given proper attention to the selection of a port 
director, and as a result this position is f requently 
vacant. Nearly eighty percent of the major port authorities 
in the United States have maintained their directors for an 
average of less than five years.* The port of Boston is 
probably one of the worst offenders in this group, since it 
had three different directors from the period of 1946 to 1950. 
This can be contrasted with the Port of New York Authority 
which has had two directors in the thirty years the post has 
*B,p.l60. 
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been established there. 
It is essential that the right port director be 
chosen for the job. He should then be maintained free 
of political pressure and assured a long term tenure. 
This will greatly aid in co-9rdinating port policy and 
tend to add stability to port development programs for 
future years. 
The board of commissioners usually selects the 
general counsel of the organization and the assistant port 
director. The remaining management staff personnel are 
often selected upon the recommendation of the port director. 
3. Organization 
The type of port management organization is 
usually dependent upon the activities of the port and the 
facilities to be administered. A port authority which has 
the operation of a large number of piers to be handled 
requires a large operations staff. On the other h~~d, port 
authorities established mainly for promotional purposes 
require a large promotion department. However, regardless 
of the type of departments established, in ~lmost all 
instances the functional type of organization is used. 
The main functional departments generally 
established are those of operations, traffic, engineering 
and finance. Purchasing is frequently placed in operations 
although it may be placed in other departments. At the 
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port of New Orleans, port promotion is handled under a 
commerce department which includes statistics. Separate 
departments are usually set up for auxiliary transportation 
facilities such as a beltline railroad, and the depart-
ment head or superintendent generally reports directly 
to the port director. 
4. Operations Department 
The duties of the op_erations department generally 
vary with the functional requirements of a particular port 
authority. However, usually it is responsible for terminal 
operations, the assignment of ship to berths, and the 
supervision of wharves, piers and other facilities. In 
some ports this department is responsible for the enforce-
ment of safety rules. A superintendent is generally in 
charge of each separate facility under the department. The 
main operating divisions under the Port of New York Authority 
Operations Department are the Tunnels and Bridges Division, 
the Terminal Division, the Airports Division, and the 
Central Maintainance Division. 
5. Engineering Department 
The chief engineer and the engineering department 
are often considered only second in importance to the port 
director. This department is responsible for the design 
and construction of facilities. It is the engineering 
department that must constantly keep watch over the facilities 
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of a port to insure that they are mechanically modern, 
efficient, and able to maintain a competitive rate of 
freight and cargo interchang e. 
6. Traffic Department 
The function of rate protection is often a 
primary duty of the traffic department. This department 
also deals with the rates of inland carriers serving the 
port, local port and terminal charges, and traffic pro-
motion. In ports where the port authority operates the 
terminals, the assessment and administration of local 
terminal rates is a major task for the traffic department. 
7. Finance Department 
The creation of a separate finance department is 
not too prevalent among a large segment of the u.s. port 
authorities. However, as many of these authorities come 
to recognize the need for more adequate cost accounting and 
the establishment of budgetary controls, this dep artment 
will undoubtedly gain greater prominence. 
IV. THE PUBLIC CORPORATION AUTHORITY 
The public corporation is an instrument of govern-
ment that is being used more and more in the United States 
today. Although this study has revealed that there are 
many port authorities in the United States that are not public 
corporations, they would appear to be incorrectly named if 
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the following definition by Luther Gulick is accepted: 
An authority is a governmental business corporation 
set up outside of the normal structure of traditional 
government so that it can give continuity, business 
efficiency and elastic management to the construction 
or operation of a ~elf-supporting or revenue-producing 
public enterprise.* 
In order to avoid confusion in this study the term public 
corporation authority will be used since it is more specific 
and automatically eliminates independent commissions and 
other types of non-corporate port authorities. 
Since the public corporation authority is a 
corporation, it is immortal. It conducts its business in 
a manner similar to private business corporations. Although 
it is outside of the normal structure of government, the 
corporate authority enjoys the immunities of government and 
neither its securities, property and income are subject to 
taxes, nor is it subject to many government regulations and 
laws. This type of body is not subject to direct govern-
mental controls, but it is usually enjoined at its creation 
to accomplish a broadly defined program of development. The 
methods of achieving such a program are left to the discretion 
of the authority, but its accomplishment gener ally requires 
flexibility of operation, and a forward-looking and venture-
some attitude with faith in the calculated future. 
Corporate authorities are usually desi gned to be 
*114, p.47. 
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self-supporting, and as such, facilities developed by such 
bodies s h ould be able to carry their own way after initial 
periods required for them to attain their estimated 
revenue. These bodies are especially adaptable where 
stability of management policy for long term development 
is essential, and greater management flexibility is desired 
than can be ob t ained under the normal operations of govern-
ment. 
'rhe success of a public corporate authority is 
dependent upon many factors. It must gain community con-
fidence through the actions of an ~tut e management that is 
keenly aware of community needs. Through an active program 
of experimentation and development it must continually move 
forward, and should make the public aware of its forward 
progress. It must have good personnel management with 
employees that have a genuine pride in t h e authori t y. It 
must employ the best of business practices, and must keep 
free of politics. It must develop a spirit of co-operation 
with government a g encies with which it must deal, and it must 
be keenly aware of the economic influence that it exerts on 
the community as a whole. 
The establishment of a public corporation authority 
is not without some jeopardy. Luther Gulick lists the 
following dangers of the corporate authority: 
First, that the thing to be done cannot succeed 
under the conditions contemplated. Good illustrations 
are railroad, canals, and port developments where there 
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are no adequate economic foundations. The t hing to be 
done must be economically and socially sound. No amount 
of g ood management can save what is a blunder from the 
start. 
Second, the danger that t he men put in charge of 
the enterpri se are incapable of carrying it through or 
bog down as time goes on. 
Third, the danger that the major policy decisions 
of the authority fail to run p arallel with the demo-
cratically determined decisions of other agencies affect-
ing the same area, or actually run counter to those 
decisions.~~ 
The public corporation authority, if it i s prop erly 
handled, can be an extremely useful imple ment in port devel-
opment. However, it is not without its dangers and draw-
backs. The primary re quisite for the success of such an 
organization appears to be its establishment on a sound 
political free basis by persons who genuinely and honestly 
have the good of the community at heart. No one in<H vidual, 
no one group, and no political party can be favored. If 
such a state of mind can be achieved at its inception, a major 
contribution will have been made to the success of any 
corporate authority established. 
V. A PORT MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR THE PORT OF BOSTON 
A. ~ Of Organization 
The establishment of the proper or ganization 
structure will play a major role in the future develop-
ment of the port of Boston. 
1. Selecting the Organization 
-~114, p. 51 . 
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The five main types of organization discussed 
have been the government departmental agency, the independent 
commission, the advisory commission, the public corporation, 
and the private corporation. In considering a type suit-
able for the port of Boston several of these can be immed-
iately ruled out. The private corporation is completely 
unadaptable since this implies ownership of the waterfront 
by a single private enterprise. This is extremely unlikely 
at the port of Boston where the waterfront is owned by 
numerous and varied interests. An advisory commission type 
was established here in 1911 as the "Directors of the Port 
of Boston." This organization proved ineffective, and it 
was abolished after five years of operation. Furthermore, 
on the basis of the problems indicated, it can readily be 
seen that an organization of this type would not have the 
necessary authority to effectively develop the Port. The 
government departmental a gency-form of org anization has been 
in control of the port of Boston for the major part of the 
last century. Although the abolished Port of Boston Authority 
and the present Port of Boston Commission have been given 
increased powers, they have been unable to establish an 
overall port development program. Stability of the Port 
Director's post has not been achieved, and political re-
strictions and control have been predominant. The port 
of Boston has declined to its present day position under this 
form of organization. This leaves two types of organiz-
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ations left for consideration, the independent co~mission 
and the public corporation. 
2. The Independent Commission 
The independent co~mission form of organization 
could readily be adapted to the port of Boston. Since it 
is an agency that is established within the normal frame -
work of government , it can perform regulatory functions as 
well as port administration. This dual function appears to 
be its main advantag e, however , and it is diff icult to imagine 
such an organization with sufficient lattitud e of action to 
accomplish the difficult and comprehensive deve lopment pro-
gram tha t must be achieved at Boston in coming years. It 
appears t hen , that the day for establishi n g an independent 
commission has p assed for the port of Boston. The Port has 
already fallen in the port competi tive race, and a more 
flexible organization must be established if i t is to make 
a successful recovery. 
3. The Public Corporation 
The public corpora tion appears to be the form of 
organization that is best suited to the p res ent needs of the 
port of Boston . 'I1he establishment of such an org anization 
will not be without some risks and uncertainti es . However, 
with the established succe s s s tory of su ch an organization 
as t he Port of New York Auth ority to p atent i ts a ctions 
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after, the port of Boston would not be playing the often 
costly roll of the pioneer, but would be following a course 
that has proven successful elsewhere. There is no 11patent" 
formula for port success, but it appears that the best risk 
that a port can take is to provide an effective, capable 
management that can intelligently develop the full potential 
of the port without political interference. The public 
corporation authority appears to be the best means f or the 
port of Boston to accomplish this aim. 
B. Establishing The Public Corporation 
Authority 
The establishment of a public corporation 
authority at Boston will not be an easy task. 'l'he Commis-
sioners must be selected with extreme care, and they in 
turn must make a wise and careful choice of a Port Director. 
The management staff must also be chosen with great dis-
cernment, because the actions of t his group will mainly 
determine the success or failure of the new authority. 
The establishment of the organizational structure 
wherein the policies established by the Board of Commissioners 
can be effectively administered will be an important manage-
ment task in the early phases of the authorities' formation. 
The creation of the functio nal departments of operations, 
engineering , finance, traffic, personnel, port promotion, 
terminals, and airports will undoubtedly be required. 
Furthermore, a flexibility of organization should be insured 
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to provide for rapid adaptability to chang ing needs. 
The establishment of the authority is but the 
start, from there on effective organization must be devel-
oped to enable it to successfully carry out the development 
program with which it is charged. 
c. The Massachusetts Port Authority 
The proposed legislation accomp anying the report 
of the Special Commission on the Massachusetts Port 
Authority appears to contain practically all the prere-
~ites for the effective establishment of a public corp-
ora tion authority at the port of Boston. This authority 
will have jurisdiction over all of t he ma jor facilities in 
the Port area, and will be provided with the necess ary powers 
to carry out an effective program of action. Upon its 
enaction into law, this legislation will have provided a 
milestone in the progress of the port of Boston. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CO NCLUSIONS 
The port of Boston has lost its former position 
of ocean trade dominance and is not providing the transport-
ation services so vitally needed by the New Eng land area. 
Many problems face the Port in future years that may be 
turned into competitive advantages if they are properly 
handled. The Port is in urg ent need of a management body 
that can effectively carry out an aggre s sive yet sound 
program of port development. The object of this study is 
to develop an organizational structure that will enable the 
accomplishment of this aim. 
The reasons for Boston's decline as a leading 
seaport are numerous and complex. Some of the retarding 
factors can be attributed to the geographical location of 
the Port, others to external influences outside the Port 
area, and still others to internal conditions that lie 
within the power of the Port itself to correct. 
Boston's early success was largely due to the 
excellent natural harbor and the enterprising Yankee trader. 
This profitab le combin a t ion provided for a pro sperous p ort 
operation which reached the height of its success in the 
late 1850's. After this time, however, the Port continually 
declined and was plagued t hrough the y e ars with a lack of 
exp ort carg o and adverse fr e i ght rates. Boston was never 
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able to establish a trunk line railroad to the West, and 
had no major railroad interested in its development. 
Shipping interests moved to New York, and when ocean 
freight rates were equalized during World War I, the advant-
age of the Port's closeness to Europe was nullified. 
In the ensuing years Boston suffered from poor 
co-ordination between ocean terminals, run down pier 
facilities, poorly located warehouses, a lack of waterfront 
zoning, and poor traffic solicitation. Labor also became 
a serious problem at the Port, and Boston lost much of 
the New England trade. There was no strong central governing 
power during this period, and an urgent need for an effective 
port management body became very apparent. 
A study of the present day traffic at the Port 
reveals that the majority of Port tonnage is comprised of 
petroleum, coal, and other bulk commodities. Boston has 
reached a point where it is mainly serving the local New 
England hinterland in inbound trade. The ratio of total 
inbound cargo tonnage to outbound cargo tonnage for the 
year 1953 is approximately fifteen to one and emphasizes 
the marked unbalance in port trade. It appears that 
foreign trade must be ~essively developed to provide the 
necessary outbound cargoes from the port of Boston. 
Terminal facilities play an import ant role in 
the · attraction of cargoes through a port. Before they 
become the determining factor, however, the geographical 
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convenience and favorable freight rate to a particular 
cargo must be established. The terminal facilities at 
Boston appear to be undergoing a progressive but restricted 
plan of development. Since funds have not been forth-
coming from the Legislature, the Master Plan has not been 
developed as originally planned. However, Boston possesses 
some very modern pier facilities in the Mystic, Hoosac and 
East Boston developments. It appears that the lack of 
ocean terminal facilities is not depriving Boston of large 
amounts of cargo in its present day operations. The lack 
of a belt line railroad, however, does appear to be a major 
obstacle to inter-terminal switching operations within the 
Port. 
The Port of Boston Commission is able to exert 
control over facilities which it owns. However, since it 
owns such a small part of the waterfront and its facilities, 
and practically no supporting facilities, the Commission 
does not have the necessary control over the Port to 
provide the co-ordination between facilities that is 
necessary to enable the Port to function as an open gateway 
to trade. The poor practices that hinder the free flow of 
commerce through port facilities must be eliminated. 
Future problems and developments that face the 
Port in the future are: the obtaining of outbound cargoes 
and western rail connections, a belt line railroad is 
needed for amore efficient freight interchange, and port 
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industrial supports needs strengthing through waterfront 
zoning and a favorable service versus tax factor, a plus 
labor factor must be obtained for future years, and the 
ever present problem of adverse frei ght rates must be over-
come. The obtaining of iron ore cargoes seems unlikely 
with the development of the Saint Lawrence Seaway. However, 
the development of a world trade center and atomic energy 
give the port a strong hope for the future. 
The key to the future success of the port of 
Boston definitely lies in the development of a management 
group that can take effective action. The present Port of 
Boston Commission is unable to effectively cope with the 
Port 1 s problems. The Port of New York Authority offers a 
good example of progressive port development to Boston, 
since this public corporation authority has achieved out-
standing success in port development. 
The public corporation and the independent 
commission are the two most common forms of organization 
used at other ports. However, it appears too late to 
establish the independent commission at Boston since wide 
latitude in port development is needed. The public corp-
oration therefore appears to be the organization structure 
best adapted to the future development of the Port. The 
establishment of such an entity is not without dangers, but 
it appears that the best risk a port can take is to provide 
an effective, capable manag ement that can effectively develop 
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the full potential of the port without political inter-
ference. 
The appointment of the Board of Commissioners 
and the selection of a career Port Director without regard 
for political considerations is one of the most important 
steps in establishing a proposed authority. Then a flexible 
organizational framework needs to be developed that will 
enable the management policies established by the Board of 
Commissioners to be effectively administered. The creation 
of the functional departments of operations, engineering, 
finance, traffic, port promotions, terminals, and airports 
will undoubtedly be required. 
The proposed legislation for the creation of a 
Massachusetts Port Authority appears to contain the necessary 
requirement for the creation of an effective public corp-
oration authority at Boston. This legislation has been 
passed by both houses of the State Legislature and now 
awaits a court ruling on its constitutionality. Since 
the Mystic River Bridge Authority and the Massachusetts 
Turnpike Authority have already been established in 
Massachusetts as public corporations, a favorable decision 
is expected. 
The establis~ment of the Massachusetts Port 
Authority is only the beginning. The magic word "Authority" 
does not imply endless resources and sudden success. This 
organization is to take over many facilities that h ave 
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never been self-supporting. At its birth it will have 
practically no credit rating, and no standing in the 
community. Many of its employees will be civil service 
workers who will be somewhat skeptical of this newly created 
organization. The task ahead is a difficult one. Many 
of the problems discussed in this study will require many 
years to overcome. However, it will be a great relief to 
the entire surrounding community as well as to all of New 
England to know that politics have been taken out of the 
Port, and that these problems are being dealt with in a 
capable manner that will provide the best opportunities 
for the future growth and progress of the port of Boston. 
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APPENDIX A 
c 0 p y 
UNITED STATES SENATE 
Committee on Armed Services 
May 5, 1955 
Mr. Leon A. Murphy 
67 Cottage Avenue 
Winthrop, Massachusetts 
Dear Mr. Murphy: 
With further reference to my lett er of 
April 13, I enclose a copy of a communication from the 
Director of the Port of Boston Commission. 
I trust the enclosure contains the 
information you are seeking. 
LS/bb 
Enclosure 
Sincerely yours, 
S/ Leverett Saltonstall 
United States Senator 
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Hon. Leverett Saltonstall 
United States Senate 
Wash ington, D.C. 
Dear Senator Saltonstall : 
AP PENDIX A 
(continued) 
c 0 p y 
May 2 , 1955 
Please accept my apologies for delay in replying to your 
communication of Apr il 13 reg arding lv'Ir. Leon A. Murphy. We have 
been endeavoring to obtain information on possib l e developments 
as respe cts both questions of I!r. Murphy . 
1Ni th reference to 11 what action i s being taken to eliminate 
the r ail di f ferential t hat has handicapp ed the Port of Boston f or 
so many ye ars," as you are so well aware, your g ood self and 
Senator 1\:ennedy have been considering sui t ab le l e g islat ion f or 
submission at an appropriate time to alleviate t h e differential 
handicap. 
The Port o f Boston Commission and p ort int erests have been 
successful in establishing the competitive position of Boston on 
ex lake grain , and are presently anxiously awaiting the decision 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission in the Iron Ore Case wh:Lch 
requests parity with the Ports of Philadelphia and Baltimore on 
iron ore. In even t the decision o f the Int erstate Commerce Com-
mission is favor able to the Port of Bo ston, the Position of the 
Port and of Massachusetts economy will be tremen d ously improved. 
At t h is time , due to the New En g land railroad situation 
rela ting to the Boston & Maine Railroad and the New Haven Railroad, 
this Commission has un dertaken a v er y watchful attitude to deter-
mine the effect of the Port of Boston. 
VVith reference to Mr. Murphy 's re que st for information re-
l ating to the bill to improve the Boston Army Base , H R 9242 ( 8 3rd) 
authorized the Secretary of the Army to lease to the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts t he termisal facilities of the Boston Army Base, 
comprising nine berths, the buildings thereon, and possible inclu-
sion of one or two sections o f the Quartermaster's Warehouse Build-
ing known as "Building 4. 11 
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This legislation a lso authorized t h e expenditure of 
$10,000,000 by the federal government for rehabilitation of the 
terminal facili ti e s. 
Chapter 575 of t he Acts of 1954, Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts, authorized the Port of Boston Cow~is sion to lease from the 
federal government the terminal faci lities o f the Bo s ton Army Base, 
and t he Commonwealth to expend ~1,100,000 in the rehabilitation 
prog ram. 
The tot a l expenditure of ~11, 000,000 in the r ehabilitation 
progr am f or the t ermina l facil i t ies include s t he widening of the 
aprons b y approximate l y 26 feet and the in s t a ll ation of a cement 
foundation wall suitable to r es i st the effect of ma rine b or er a t -
tack and/or penetration. 
Up on comp letion of t h e rehabili tation pro gram, t he Boston 
Army Base 'rerminal faciliti es , whi ch is t he large st in the Port of 
Boston and as larg e as any in t h e United States , wi ll continue t h e 
use of t hese excellent facilit i es and fo r al l in tent s and purposes 
t h e rehabilitat ed facili t i es c an be con sidered as new . 
Vii th the proposed alterations and r ehabilitation progr ams 
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a t Commonwealth Pier and Castle Isl and, t he pr esent l y - operating new 
and modern facilities a t Mysti c Pier, Hoosac Pier and East Bos ton 
p iers, Bos ton is now con s i dered as havi ng the newe st and most 
mode rn facilities i n t h e entire country. 
We trust tha t t h i s g i v es you the necessary inf or-ma tion, and 
t hank you f or your continued i nter es t and coop eration in b ehalf 
o f the Port of Boston. 
JFO ' H mm 
Enc. ( 2 ) 
Re spec tfully , 
POR 'I' OF BosrroN CO l\1MISSI ON 
J ohn F . 0 1 Halloran, Director 
APFENDEX B 
G 0 P Y 
CONGRJ:<.;SS OF' THE UN I T'ED STA'l'ES 
House of Representatives 
Mr . Leon A. Murphy 
67 Cottage Avenue 
Washington, D.C. 
May 11, 1955 
Winthrop 52, Massac huse t ts 
Dear J11 r • Murphy: 
Vi th further reference to my letter of Apri l 
22n d, I am enclo sing the rep ort I have received from the 
Chairman o f the Interstate Commerce Commission in 
response to my inquiry regar di ng your desire to obtain 
inf orma tion on the s ub jec t of e limination of the r a il rate 
differenti a l whi c h has handicapped the Port of Bos t on 
Al so , you will find material I rece i v ed from 
the Libr ary o f Congr ess , in your interest , on the subje ct 
o f the Port of Boston. 
With a ll good wishe s and hop i n g this material 
will be o f some assis t ance, I remain 
Sincerely yours, 
S/ 'rhomas J . Lane 
Enc losures. 
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(continued) 
c 0 p y 
Interstate Commerce Commission 
Wa shington 25 
Honorable Thomas J . Lane, 
Hous e of Represent a tives, 
~ashington, D.C. 
My dear Mr. Lane: 
May 9, 1955 
This will acknowl edge receipt of your l etter of April 
22, in which you st ate that Mr. Leon A. Murphy, 67 Cottage 
Avenue, Winthrop, Mass., has contacted you regarding his 
desire to obt a in information on the subject o f e limination 
of the rail r ate differential which has handicapped the 
Por t of Boston. 
Investig ation and Suspension Docket No. 6074, Iron Ore 
Eastern Ports to C. F . A. Points, is the only case now pending 
before t h e Co~~ission whi ch might be of interest to N~. 
Ivlurphy. This c ase wa s heard in December and briefs were 
filed in March. A proposed report will be prepared by an 
examiner, but when same wi ll be issued I do not know. 
The elimination of rail rate differentials on traffic 
to Bo s ton can only be accomplished by negoti ation with the 
railroads or by filing a formal complaint with this Commission. 
You may rest assured that this matter will have our 
careful consideration. 
With kindest regards, I r emain 
Sincerely, 
S/ Ri c hard B' . IVi i tch ell 
Chairman 
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APPENDIX C 
The f ol l owi ng article appe ared on page 10 of 
The Chr i stian Science Monitor on Jul y 19, 1955 • 
. . "\'t~ll' , ..... ,,J.:lllltl 
( 
1flllllllf,llt 
B~on Port Bill 
Held ·~adequate 
o'The Christian Science Monitor: 
I read with interest the recent 
Monitor articles on the proposed 
],Sessachusetts Port Authority. 
However, there are a few addi-
tional considerations that I be-
ieve make the legislation as 
proposed in House No. 2983 in-
adequate. 
In December, 1954, Governor 
Heyter appointed a Revenue Au-
thority Advisory Committee and 
:requested the members to: 
l. Study the possible consolida-
'tion into a joint authority of the 
Mystic River Bridge, the Sum-
ner Tunnel, and any future traf-
fic faci)ity such as a second ye-
, hicular tunnel under, or a h1gh 
level bridge over, · Boston Har-
bor, exploring the possibilities of 
private financing of such a single 
authority; 
2. Explolje the possibility of 
including in such an authority 
the facilities of the Port of Bos-
ton Commission and of the State 
Airport Management Board; 
3. Study the pattern estab-
lished· by the Port of New York 
Authority with its unified con- , 
trol over the construction and 
operation of such diverse epter- , 
· prises as bridges, tunnels, park-
ays, airports, docKs, etc. 
The report of this committee 
was at best disappointing. In-
stead of making a thorough 
study of how to best incorporate 
the Port of Boston, the two Air-
ports, the Sumner Tunnel, the 
Mystic River Bridge, and the 
·proposed new facility across 
Boston harbor into an organiza-
tional unit that would permit 
the management to operate as 
·aggressively and as efficiently as 
a private business and yet to 
operate within the realm of the • 
public interest, the committee's 
mdn intent seemed to lie with 
·the idea that it would be more 
advantageous to build a second 
tu.nnel rather than a new bridie 
across Boston Harbor. (The pro-
osed legislation wouJii harness 
he newly ·created .authority 
with this CQ]lclusion.) 
· The -~or.l:\m~ee exple!Wed its. 
failu}Oi - ~'imti"ally in~orate 
the' ~ t in its proposed merger.· 
as follows : . 
"This decision was due in 
part to the $17,868,000 out-
standing on the Port of Bos-
ton construction bonds, the 
payment o.f which could not 
have been absorbed in the fi-
nancial plan. Still another · 
reason why its acquisition 
was not recommended at this 
t·· e is that the committee f that only by considerable 
~ can the financial future 
ot: e Port be soundly ascer-
tltined." 
It seems Incredible that an 
authority of the t0·pe- :recom-
mended sho"Jki fail to itlclude 
the port in the initial plan when 
the port logically forms tbe nu-
cleus of such a proposal. ' 
The creation of a Port Au-
thority is not without dangers. 
Gulick states: "An authority 
should be the last resort not the 
first bright idea. If there is any 
doubt use the regular machin-
ery of government, a machinery 
which has been developed over. 
many years of experi~>nce to 
guarantee democratic control, 
the coordination of political de-
cisions, and the protection of 
daily operations." Thus, when 
the decision to use an authority 
is made, every effort possible 
should be made to insure it~ 
success. . 
The two most important , 
dangers that stand out in the 
present proposal are: 
1. A lack of proper mana-
gerial talent. 
' 2. A lack of balance in the. 
management that would permit 
favored facilities to be devel-
oped while other facilities might 
. be neglected. 
, These dangers can be greatly 
, reduced in the following way: 
(a-)' Allowing the newly created 
authority to have its own system 
of employees completely sep-
arate from the State Civil Serv-
ice. This will allow the authority 
to be run like a private corpora-
tion and permit highly talented 
persolll¥1 to be attracted to its 
~ervice, (b) Incorporate at the 
outs~ aU. of the facilities that 
' are tO ~ included under the 
' jurisdiction of the authority so 
that when the management is 
appointed, all the various fa-
cilities can be considered in the 
original concept, the plans for 
development laid, and from 
that point on systematically 
' carried out. 
Bold steps are needed l,f', tl\e: 
I transportation a. uthority pro-posed for the Port of Boston is to succeed. The primary need is 
to provide a progressive, vigor-~ ous management with tbe expe-· 
rience and acumen , tG properly · 
size up situations and With the 
necessary autonomy and author-
.ity to properly caru out deci-
.~ons and recommended plans of 
action. It is sincerely desired 
that the Legislature will take 
these bold steps, and will create 
a port authority that includes 
the 1Port. Leon A. Murphy 
Winthrop 52, Mass. 
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~ ~t.:Jt'l~ 
.... 
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Cl >Cl •OPERATE SR C. BULK TERMINALS 
<l•REG.FERRIES?TUNNELS OR BRIDGES 
;$ :i$-OPERATE PUBLIC WHARF 
?< >< ?<-FLOAT OWN SECURITIES 
Kl Kl •OPERATE RAIL SUPPORT 
N -LEASE RAIL SUPPORT 
~-APPROVE OR LIC. H.M.*PILOTS 
~-LICENSE STEVEDORES 
~-REG. PRIVATE TERMINALS 
"'"~ .,... -OWN & DEV. IND. SITES 
01 01•0PERATE AIRPORTS 
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C\2 
COOS BAY 
CORPUS CHRISTI 
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FORT PIERCE 
GALVESTON 
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NEW YORK3 
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EF HIJK R X 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 0 P Q R S T U V W X Z, 1 
-~~~~FG I~KL B~ QRST*~VRX~a 
.Mf-B*Olf])f~F G H-*I J*K*L M*N* Q S T*~V*V'I.* 
kJf C*lJfE F G*H I J K*L* P*Q R S~· X* 1 
ABCDEFGHIJKL NOPQRS U XY 
3'4 
4*5* 
-4 
A*B*C* E F G H I J K L M*N*O*~Q*R S T?HJlf-V*W*X Y-* 
B C D E F G H I J K L M N ()a- P Q R S U*. W* X 
4 ~ 
1 2 3 4 
ABCDEFGHIJKLMN PQRS U X 
BCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRST WX Z1 
BCDEFGHIJK N PQ T WXY 
»BCDEFGHIJKLMN PQRS~U X Z 
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRS V X Z 
BCDEFGHIJKL N P RSTU WX 
ABCD F . GHI~KLM OPQRS V X 
ABCD F HI~KL NOPQRS Z 
ABCDEFGHI~KLMNOPQRSTU W YZ 
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXY 
~BCDEFGHIJ*KL~~~~Q~STUWWX a» 
B C D E F G H I J K L M P Q R S T U 
ABCD FGHIJKLMNOPQRSTU X 1 
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRST V X ~ 
ABCDEFGHIJKL N PQRST VWX 
B*O*D*E*F G I ~L* Q R S 'P*Ulf W*X 
ABCDEFG IJKLMNOPQRSTU W 
ABCD FGHIJKL PQRSTU WX 
ABC E GHIJKL NO Q S 
z 
z 
z 
e3 4 
4 
4 
3 4 
3 4 
4 
2 4 
5* 
4 5 
3:ll-4 
ZM-4 
4 
3 4 
3 4 5* 
4 5 
5 
4 5 
4 
CD F HIJKL PQR T 
ABCDEFGHIJKLMN PQRS U 
wx 
XY 
4 5 
1 2 3*4 
CD FGHIJKL PQRSTU 
ABCDEFGHIJKLM PQRSTU WX 
A CDEFGHIJKLM 0 QRSTU W 
A CDEFGHI~KL PQRSTU WX~ 1 
4 5 
4 5 
:5*4 
ABCDEFGHI KLM PQ STU WXY 2 4 
ABCDEFGHI KLMNOPQRS X 4 5 
- Continued -
ro 
0 
(.\} 
SAN FRANCISCO A. B CDEFGHI JKLM 0 P Q R S u XY 
SAVANNAH A*BM-0* F G H I J K L M*N 0 Q R S '(J}V* X-*"Y*Z* 
SEATTLE A B*C D E F G H I J K L PQRSTU wx 
ST. PAUL DEFGHIJKL Q R STU 
STOCKTON A B C D E F G H I J K L N PQRSTU W XY 
TACOMA A B C D FGHIJKLMN P Q R S T U WXY 
TAMPA A B C D E F HI L N P Q R S T X a 
TEXAS CITY A B C D E F G H I K L M N P Q R S T XY 
TOLEDO F L R S 
VANCOUVER A B C D E F G H I J K L N PQRSTU WXY 
WILMINGTON, DEL. .A,BCDEF HI J K L N 0 P Q R S T U z 
WILMINGT£N, NO. CAR. A*Bf'CI*Bf-FGHIJKL P*Q R*S T w Y* 
DELAWARE M Q 
* Does not perform funation, but has legal power to do so. 
" 
1 
Aetion subject to prior specific approval of a government body. 
Navigation commission of the Delaware River and its navigable tributaries 
(navigation authority only) 
2 
3 
4 
City cQmmission 
Dept. of Marine & Aviation, City of New York. 
Port of New York Authority. 
3 4 
4 
4 5 
3 4 
2 4 
4 
3" 4: 
4 
4: 
4 
4: 
1 3 
Source: Port Administration in the United States by Marvin L. Fair, Copyright 1954. 
cornell Maritime Press.-pp. 51-53. 
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APPENDIX E 
PORT ADMINISTRATION CONTROL OF VESSEL 
BERTH ASSIGNMENTS IN 1951 
Lease 
Baltimore 
New York City 
Philadelphia 
Port of New 
York Authority 
Tampa 
Texas 
Preferential 
Boston 
Los Angeles 
Milwa1,1kee 
New Orl.eans 
Port of New 
York Authority 
San Francisco 
Indefinite No Control 
Albany Bi-State Dev. 
Astoria Agcy.(St.Louis) 
Beaumont Cleveland 
Brownsville Chicago 
Brunswick Coos Bay 
Camden Delaware River 
Charleston Port Authority* 
Corpus Christi Fort Pierce 
Gulfport ' Detroit 
Honolulu Georgia State 
Houston New London 
Jacksonville Norfolk 
Lake Charles Port Angeles 
Long Beach Portland, Maine 
Longview Portland, Oregon 
Mobile Raymond, Wash. 
Miami St. Paul 
Monroe, Mich. Savannah 
New York City Wilmington,N.c. 
Oakland Wilmington,Del. 
Pensacola 
Port Everglades 
Redwood City 
Richmond, Cal. 
San Diego 
Seattle 
Te.coma 
Toledo 
Stockton,Cal. 
Vancouver 
ir To date, the Delaware River Port Authority has not assumed 
administration of wharf facilities. 
Source: Port Administration in the United States by 
MArVin L. Fair, Cambridge, Maryland Copywright 
1954, p.l58. Cornell Maritime Press. 
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APPENDIX F 
PORT RAILROADS NOT RUN BY PORT ADMINISTRATION IN 1951 
Mileage 
(Tracks) 
Beaumont,Tex. 12.0 
Brownsville,Tex. 15.0 
Camden,N.J. 4.0 
Corpus Christi, 11.41 
Tex. 
Houston,Tex. 100.00 
Long Beach,Calif. 30.0 
Los Angeles, Calif.llO.OO 
Miami, Fla. 
New Orleans, La. 
Philadelphia,Pa. 
Tacoma, Wash. 
7.5 
128.0 
5.6 
18.0 
Owner 
Port Adm. 
Port Adm. 
Port Adm. 
Port Adm. 
Port Adm. 
Port Adm. 
City & 
Rrs. 
City 
City 
City 
City 
Operator 
Terminal Assn. contract 
M.P.R.R. by contract 
Penn- Reading Seashore 
Line (a) 
Terminal Assn. by contract 
(Rotation) 
Terminal Assn. by contract 
Terminal Assn. by contract 
Joint city and R.R. board 
of control (b) 
Fla. East Coast R.R. 
Ind. City Commission 
Phil.Belt Line R.R.Co.(c) 
City Commissioner of Pub-
lic Utilities 
(a)---Belt line facility supplemented by private rail trackage. 
(b)---The Harbor Belt Railroad of Los Angeles is operated 
jointly by the port and the railroads entering the port. 
The Board of Control has four members appointed by the 
city and one by each of the four railroads. 
(c)---The belt line is not complete, being confined to a 
portion of the waterfront on the Delaware River. Further-
more, part of the trackage belongs to the Pennsylvania 
Railroad. The three entering railroads maintain and 
operate the belt. 
Source: Port Administration in the United States by 
Marvin L. Fair, Cambridge, Maryland Cornell 
Maritime Press, Copywright 1954, p.ll9. 
APPENDIX G 
PORT RAILROADS RUN BY PORT ADMINISTRATION IN 1951 
Port 
Albany, N.Y. 
Charleston, S.C. 
Galveston, Texas 
Jacksonville, Fla.. 
Milwaukee, Wis. 
Mobile, Ala.. 
Port Everglades, Fla.. 
San Francisco, Calif. 
Stockton, Calif. 
Texas City, Texas 
Miles of Track 
20 
15 
45 
12 
11 
46 
12 
66 
12.3 
43 
Source: Port Administration in the United States by 
Marvin L. Fair, Cambridge, Ma.ryland Copywright 
1954, p.118.Cornel1 Maritime Press 
211 
R 
s 0 M 
PORT FACILITIES AT 
DORCHESTER BAY AND 
NEPONSET RIVER 
SCALE OF FEET 
tOOO 0 
N 
OOIICH£ST£11 
L L 
BAY 
PORT FACILITIES AT 
WEYMOUTH FORE AND 
WEYMOUTH BACK RIVERS 
SCALE OF FEET 
1000 0 :5000 
LOGAN AIRPORT 
0 s T 0 N 
~ 
. 
~ 
w 
-?-• ~ ~ 
~ 
0 
c, 
8110 A 0 
tJIIINCY BAY 
S 0 II N 0 
SCAt..[ Of Mll.ES 
' 
---------------------------------
~ 
0 
~ 
C::> 
f8! 
(!] 
0 ~ 
<Q @ 
~ 
• ~ 
Q 
® 
• 
.[!] 
·00 
OLO HARBOR fil 
LEGEND 
CUSTOM HOUSE ~ MOLASSES HANDLING 
GENERAL CARGO TERMINALS- ~ ~~~~~Glt_ m~8 TERMINALS- FERTILIZER PLANT 
COASTWISE 8 INTERCOASTAL TRAOE c FISH PACKING PLANTS 
COAL HANOLING PLANTS 
* 
DRY DOCKS 
BUNKER COAL ® MARINE RAILWAYS 
OIL HANDLING PLANTS ® MARINE REPAIR PLANTS 
BUNKER OIL a SHIPBUILDING PLANTS 
LUMBER t:jANDLING ~ RAILWAY PASSENGER STATIONS 
GRAIN HANDLING & FERRIES- PASSENGER 8 VEHICULAR 
GRAIN ELEVATORS M ORE HANDLING 
STORAGE WAREHOUSES 0 SAND,GRAVEL,STONE,CEMENT, SHELL 
COLD STORAGE WAREHOUSES ~ IRON AND STEEL 
SULPHUR HANDLING [ZSJ CHEMICAL PLANT 
• NUMERALS WITHIN SYM80LS REFER TO DESCRIPriONS IN TEXT 
BOARD OF ENGINEERS 
FOR RIVERS AND HARBORS 
PORT FACILITIES AT 
BOSTON, MASS. 
SCALE Of HET 
1000 0 1000 2000 3000 
SUBMITTED • APPROVED • 
DRAWN BY !J.J!,~-
JU 
us .. o - n (P~ ,. m) 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
. . 
I. Books 
1. Bethel, Lawrence L., and others. Industrial 
Organization and Management. New York, McGraw 
Hill, Second Edition, 1950. 
2. Bird, Frederick L., A Study of the Port of New York 
Authority. New York, Dun & Bradstreet, 1949. 
3. Campbell, William G., A Form Book for Thesis Writing. 
New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1939. 
4. Carson, Arthur R., Commercial Activity of the Port 
of Boston. Boston University College of Business 
Administration Thesis, 1934. 
5. Clapp, Edwin Jones., The Port of Boston. A study 
of the traffic and operating problems of Boston and 
its place in the competition of the North Atlantic 
Seaports. Yale University Press, 1916. · 
6. Colburn, Henry w., Economic Aspects of the Port of 
Boston. Boston University College of Business 
Administration Thesis, 1939, 
7. Cunningham, Brysson., Port Studies. With Epecial 
reference to the western ports of the North Atlantic. 
New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1929. 
8. Fair, Marvin L., Port Administration in the United 
States. Cambridge, Maryland, Cornell Maritime Press, 
1954. 
9. Hubbell, George s. Writing Documented Papers. New 
York, Barnes & Noble, 1951. 
10. Lederer, Eugene H., Port Terminal Operation. New 
York, Cornell Maritime Press, 1945. 
11. MacElwee, Roy s., Port Development. Boston and London, 
McGraw-Hill, second edition, 1926. 
12. MacElwee, Roy s., Ports and Terminal Facilities. 
Boston and London, McGraw-Hill, second edition, 1926. 
13. McDowell, Carl E. and Gibbs, Helen M., Ocean Trans-
portation. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1954. 
14. Mott, George Fox_., ! Survey of United States Ports. 
How ports operate, Vfllat trade flows, Why ports falter, 
Facts, Trends, Values., New York, Arco Publishing 
Co. ,.1051. 
II. Booklets and Pamphlets 
15. Action ~ Boston 1 s Airport, Seaport, Transportation, 
Industry and Commerce. Boston Chamber of Commerce. 
January 19 45. 
213 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
(continued) 
16. A Plan to Establish a New England International 
Trade Mart. Initiated by David c. Adkins. Re-
vised, May 1954. 
17. A Plan to Establish a World Trade Center in New 
Englalld-.- Submitted by the Mayor's Committee for 
the World Trade Center. 
18. Gateway to Massachusetts. Mass. Committee for Port 
Development and the Greater Boston Development 
Committee. March 1945. 
19. Lancaster, Southworth., Port Cargo Terminal Design. 
A typewritten copy used for student lecture purposes. 
20. Lancaster, Southworth., The Operation of Port 
Terminals. A m~~uscript copy used for lecture 
purposes. 1943. 
21. Lancaster, Southworth., The Importance of Water 
Transportation to New England. A paper presented 
by the Port of Boston Authority before the New 
England Region of the National Rivers and Harbors 
Congress. Taunton, Mass. May 1952. A manuscript 
copy. 
22. ~ World Trade Center In ~ England. by the Mayor 
John B. Hynes, Committee for the World Trade Center 
in New England, Richard s. Robie, Chairman. 
23. Tilton, George P., The Port of Boston. Boston, 
George D. Hall Inc.l935. 
24. Tobin, Austin J., The Administration of~ K££1 
Authority. Given before the Greater Philadelphia-
South Jersey Council. October 1952. 
III. Newspapers and Periodicals 
25. 11 Atomic Power". New York Times, August 16, 1954, 
p.60. 
Christian Science Monitor 
26. Bergenheim, Robert c., 11 Hynes Backs Plans for Port. 11 
June 23, 1955. p.4, eels. 1-3. 
27. "Critics Move to Block McGinnis Dual Rail Bid." 
July 23, 1955. p.2, eels. 5 & 6. 
28. "D. & H. Drops Opposition to McGinnis 11 • July 26, 
1955. p.2, eels. 6,7. 
29. "Expansion of Logan Urged to Aid Boston. 11 May 19, 
1955. p.ll, eels. 2,3. 
30. "Final Vote on Port Bill Seen Tonight". April 11, 
1956. p.l5, col.8. 
214 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
so. 
51. 
52. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
(continued) 
Guidry, Frederick H., "Boston Appraises McGinnis." 
April 16, 1955. p.2, cols. 3-5. 
"Herter Prods Vote On Port Authority. 11 April 4, 
1956. 
"Huge Grain Cargo to Load in Boston." June 13, 
1955. p.2, cols. 5,6. 
"Kennedy Asks Cut in New England Rail Rates. " 
May 12, 1955. p.9, cols. 4,5. 
Kenney, Harry c., "$600 Million Blueprinted for 
New York Port Authority. 11 March 15, 1956. p.8, 
cols. 1-5. 
Martin, Everett G., A series of 4 articles on the 
port of Boston. Dec. 17,19,22,26, 1953. 
Martin, Everett G., "New Activity for Boston Port." 
May 20, 1955. p.l, cols. 5,6 & 7. 
Martin, Everett G., "Boston Port Agency Balked." 
June 21, 1955. p.l, cols. 1-4. 
Martin, Everett G., "Legislative Mill Processes 
Port Authority Bill. 11 July 6, 1955. p. 6, co ls. 4-8. 
Martin, Everett G., "Bay State Horizons Widen 
After Study of New York Port Authority." July 11, 
1955. p.4, cols. 1-8. 
Martin, Everett G., 11 AFL Delegates Rap Port Authority 
Bill." August 9, 1955. p.2, cols. 5-8. 
Martin, Everett G., "Hub Port Authority Proposal 
Whets Debate." March 5, 1956. p.2, cols. 1-5. 
Martin, Everett G., "Giveaway Seen in Port Authority.n 
March 7, 1956. p.2, cols. 5-8. 
Martin, Everett G., "Port Authority Success Factor 
Sifted." March 9, 1956. p.2, cols. 5-8. 
Martin, Everett G., "Port Authority Plan Aims 
Clarified." March 13 1956. p.5, cols. 3-6. 
Martin, Everett, G., 11Free Hand on Rates In New 
England Urged." May 7, 1956. p.l, col.4. 
"Merger of B. & M. and NYNH&H Held Against Interest 
of New England. 11 July 18, 1955. p.2, cols. 1,2. 
Mills, Edgar M., "Legislators Mired in Bills." July 
7, 1955. p.2, cols. 6-8. 
Mills, Edgar M., "Political Haze Shrouds Port Bi l l's 
Prospect." August 25, 1955. . 
Mills, Edgar M., "Favorabl e Report by Comrni ttee 
Foreseen on Proposed Port Aut h ority for Bos t on." 
February 23, 1956. p.2, cols. 4-8. 
t-Aills, Edgar M., 11 Bay State Port Bill Tacks Around 
Reef." April 5, 1956. p.l, cols. 1,2. 
Mills, Edgar M., "Amendments Mire Port Bill." April 
6, 1956. p.2, cols. 1-3. 
215 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
70. 
71. 
72. 
T5. 
74. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
(continued) 
11 N.E. Told to Lower Industrial Hurdles." May 19, 
1955. p.2, cols. 6,7. 
"New Hope Rises for Passamaquoddy. 11 January 21, 
1955, p.lO, cols. 1-4. 
"Port Authority Bill Due for Court Test." May 11, 
1956. p.6, cols. 1,2. 
nPort Bill Awaits Court Ruling." May 17, 1956. 
p.l5, col. 1. 
Smith, Everett M., 11 Battle for Control of B. & M. 
Under Way." April 13, 1955. p.l, cols.3,4. 
Smith, Everett M., "McGinnis B. & M. Rule Up to 
ICC. 11 April 14, 1955. p.l, co ls. 1-3. 
Sparkman, James K., "Brownsville to Boston. 11 A 
series of 15 articles appearing in the Christian 
Science Monitor from December 15, 1954, to February 
2, 1955. 
"State Proposal Hit To Buy Hub Tunnel." July 26, 
19 55. p • 2 ' co 1 s • 6 ' 7 • 
Strout, Richard L., "Eisenhower Asks Nevv Foreign 
Aid. 11 March 19, 1956. p.l, cols.7,8. p.lO,cols.l-8. 
"Survey Started for Rowe A-Plant. 11 May 9, 1956. 
p • 1 ' co 1 s • 7 ' 8. 
Boston Daily Globe 
Banner, Earl., 11 Port Authority Battle on Taxpayer's 
Boon--or Banker's Dream? 11 March 8, 1956. p.l. 
11 B.C. Panel Indorses Port Bill." March 7, 1956. 
p.l, col.l. 
Black, Herbert., ''Why Boston Is Using New Orleans As 
A Model for Building A Port." October 10, 1954. 
"Business Backs Port Bill; Labor for More Study." 
July 7, 1955. p.l, cols. 1,2. 
"Exports Handled by Boston Port up 42% in 1955." 
March 7, 1956. p.3, col.4. 
11 Hynes To Push Plans for Trade Center Today." 
October 24, 1954. 
Lewis, William J., "Business-Labor-Civic Bloc on 
Port Bill Routs Democrats." March 9, 1956.p.l,cols.4-6. 
Lewis, William J., "House Coalition Approves Port 
Bill. 11 April 6, 1956. p.l, ools. 5,6. 
Lewis, William J., 11 Port Bill Survives 10 Hour 
Conflict." April 6, 1956. p.l, col.S. 
Lewis, William J., "House Expected to Pass Port 
Bill Early in Week." April 7, 1956. p.3, col.l. 
Lewis, illiam J., nPort Bill Opposition Crumbles 
in House." April 10, 1956. p.l, col.5. 11 Lewis, illiam J., "Port Bill Creeps Past Roadblock. 
April 11, 1956. p.l, col.l. 
216 
75. 
76. 
78. 
79. 
80. 
81. 
82. 
83. 
·84. 
85. 
86. 
87. 
88. 
89. 
90. 
91. 
93. 
94. 
95. 
96 . 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
(continued) 
Lewis, William J., "House Votes Port Bill, 150 to 
70." April 12, 1956. p.l, co 1. 5. 
Lewis, William J., "Port Bill Foes Map Plans for 
New Fight in Senate." April 13, 1956. p.ll,cols.3-8. 
Lewis, William J., "Port Bill Wins Tests in Senate." 
April 17, 1956. p.l~ col.5. 
Lewis, William J., 'Last-Ditch Bid to Stall Port 
Bill Fails." May 3, 1956. p.l, col.l. 
"More Cargoes for Boston Aim of Washi:r.g ton Study." 
May 7, 1955, p.l2, cols. 6,7. 
Owens, C.R., "Super Authe5rity Plan Looms as Top 
Issue in Legislature's Bin." November 27, 1955. 
11 Port Authority". August 18, 1955.p.l6, cols.l,2. 
"Port Bill Lashed as Banker Plot to Reap Profits." 
March 6, 1956. p.23, col.3. 
"Report Favors Port Authority Only 2 of Study Group 
Dissent." February 1, 1956. p.3, cols. 3-5. 
Riley, Arthur A., "Boston's Port in Staunch Bid for 
Further Upswing." November 27, 1955. 
"Senate Foes File 25 Amendments in Port Measure." 
April 19, 1956. 
"Senate Lists 34 Queries on Port Bill for Court." 
May 17, 1956. p.l, cols. 2,3. 
Journal of Commerce 
11 Boston Port Gains in Export Tonnage. 11 March 15, 
1954. p.31, col.4. 
Manthrop, Stanley., 11 ICA Holds Key to Port's 
Prosperity." August 12, 1955. p.l and la. 
Manthrop, Stanley., "Long-Term Port Build up 
Charted." August 11, 1955. p.l and la. Second of 
a series. 
Manthrop, Stanley., "N.Y. Port Plans Seen Bearing 
Fruit. 11 August 10, 1955. p.l and la. First of a 
series. 
Boston Herald 
Adkins, David G., "$75,000 Pledged for Boston World 
Trade Center. 11 July 17, 1955. p.6, cols. 1-5. 
D.evin, Edward., "Herter Urges New Port Board. 11 
June 23, 1955., p.l, col.4. 
Hanley, Wayne., "Herter, Swinell Act To Block 
McGinnis." July 19, 1955. p.l, cols.4,5. 
HNo Catch All Please." ( MTA In Port Authority). 
July 19, 1955. p.l2, cols. 1,2. 
"Port Plan Attacked by Murphy. 11 February 26, 1956. 
p.l8, col.3. 
Stratton Arthur., "Brilliant Young Bostonians 
Found in' New York Port Authority." July 10,1955. 
p.l, cols. 1,2. 
217 
97. 
98. 
99. 
100, 
101. 
102. 
103. 
104. 
105. 
106. 
107. 
108. 
109. 
110. 
111. 
112. 
113. 
114. 
115. 
116. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
(continued} 
"Where Now On Railroads." July 19, 1955. p.l2, 
cols. 1, 2. 
"World Trade Center called Economic Benefit to 
Boston. 11 November 19, 1954. 
"Port Authority Buys Brooklyn Facilities From New 
York Dock. 11 The Wall Street Journal. June 30, 
1955. p.l, col.4.----
11Port of New York. 11 New York Herald •rribune. 
Jan. 1955. European Editron-special Supplement. 
24 PP• 
Boston Post 
11Boston Plans Big Shipping Center For Port." 
January 4, 1953. 
"Northeast Plays Big Port Role. 11 May 21, 1950. 
~.D-7. 
'World Trade Mart Gets Boost." October 26, 1954. 
Boston' Traveler 
Charest, Roll"', "First Atomic Reactor May be 
Located Here.' Jan.4, 1955. p.23, cols.1-3. 
"Hub Port Bill Finally In High Court. 11 May 17, 
1956. p.4, eels. 3-6. 
"Hub Port Loses U.S. Cargoes Due To ' A Very Inferior' 
Setup." May 6, 1955. p.l, cols. 3. 
"Person To Person. 11 April 20, 1956. p.26. An 
editorial on the proposed Mass. Port Authority Bill. 
"Port Authority Clears Hurdle." April 5, 1956. 
p.l4, cols. 4,5. 
"Port Bill Faces 40 Revl si ons. 11 April 10, 1956. 
p.57, cols. 1-4. 
"Senate Port Debate Set." April 19, 1956. 
"State Legislators Sail Into Port Merger Bill." 
April 9, 1956. p.6, cols. 1-5. 
11 Victory Seen Monday on Port Merger Bill. 11 April 6, 
1956. p.9, col.3. 
"East Boston Pier No.1 Dedicated by Governor C.A. 
Herter. 11 The Mariner. October 1954. No. 10, Vol.l, 
p.26,27,&37. 
Gulick, Luther., "'Authorities' And How To Use Them." 
The Tax Review. November 1947. Vol. VIII. No.11 
pp.47-52. 
"Pan Atlantic Line Quitting-Boston-Gulf Service 11 
Boston Marine Guide. March 18, 19 55. p.l, col.4. 
Perkins, Frank H. and JA, Melvin., "Mystic Pier 
No. 1." and the Port of Boston Author ity." World 
Ports. August 1952. pp.l9-26. 
218 
219 
117. 
118. 
119. 
120. 
121. 
122. 
123. 
124. 
125. 
126. 
127. 
128. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
(continued) 
Sullivan, Austin P., "The Port of Boston Unsolved 
Problems Handicap Its Contribution to the Prosperity 
of New England." Monthly Review. Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston. Vol.32, No.2. February 1950. 
pgs. 1-7. 
Boston University Business Review 
Doody, Francis s., liThe St. La'l.vrence Project and 
New England." Spring 1955. Vol.2, No.l,pp.l0-18. 
Lancaster, Southworth., "Port Freight Rates: An 
Exercise in Managerial Discretion." Spring 1955. 
Vol. 2, No.1, pp.lQ-23. 
Civil Engineering 
Itschner, Emerson c., 11 St. Lawrence Seaway and Power 
Projects Started." November 1954. Vol. 24, No.ll, 
pp.33-39. 
Kurylo, Walter., "Are High Navigational Clearances 
Too Costly." May 1955. Vol.25, No.25. pp.33-36. 
Exporters Digest 
Binney, Ralph M., "New England's Goods and Know-
How Build Overseas Markets." April 1955. pp.l2,20. 
"Port of Boston Starts Active Campaign for More Trade. 11 
April 1955. p.26. 
Military Engineer. 
Cullman, Howards., "The Port of New York Authority." 
May-June 1953. Vol.XLV. No. 305. pp.l84-189. 
Garges, R.P., 11The St. Lawrence Seaway." March-
April 1953. Vol XLV, No. 304, pp.81-86. 
Neher, c.c., "The Port of Baltimore." Vol.XLVII. 
No. 317, pp.l95-198. 
Robinson, Bernard L., "St. Lawrence Seaway Project." 
July-August 1954. Vol.XLVI. No. 312. 
Spindler, W. H., 11Labrador Iron Ore." May- June 
1954. Vol. XLVI. No. 311. pp.l86-188. 
IV. Publications of Government Agencies, Associations, §i£. 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts General Laws. 
129. "An Act Abolishing The Boston Port Authority, and 
Establishing A Port of Boston Authority and Defining 
Its Powers and Duties." Chapter 619. Acts of 1945. 
130. 11 An Act Abolishing The Port of Boston Authority 
and Establishing The Port of Boston Connnission. 11 
Chapter :608. Acts of 1953. 
Boston Port Authority Annual Reports. 
131. Eleventh Annual Report., City of Boston Document 
37, 1940. 
I 
I 
132. 
133. 
134. 
135. 
136. 
137. 
138. 
139. 
140. 
141. 
142. 
143. 
144. 
145. 
146. 
147. 
148. 
149. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
(continued) 
Twelveth Annual Report., City of Boston Document 
37, 1941. 
Thirteenth Annual Report., City of Boston Document 
37, 1942. 
Fourteenth Annual Report., City of Boston Document 
37, 1943. . 
Fifteenth Annual Report., City of' Boston Document 
37, 1944. 
Port of Boston Authority Annual Reports 
First Annual Report., December 31, 1945 (a 
manuscript copy.) 
Second Annual Report., December 31, 1946. (a 
manuscript copy.) 
Third Annual Report., December 1947. Commonwealth 
of' Mass. House No. 1600. 
Fourth Annual Report., December 1948. Commonwealth 
of Mass. House No. 2251. 
Fj_fth Annual Report., December 1949. Commonwealth 
of Mass. House No. 2240. 
Sixth Annual Report., November 1950. (a manuscript 
copy.) 
Seventh Annual Report., May 1952., Commonwealth of 
Mass. House No. 2409. 
Eighth Annual Report., January 1953. Commonwealth 
of Mass. House No. 1977. 
Port of Boston Commission Reports 
Report to the General Court of the Commonwealth of 
Mass., December 15, 1953. (a manuscript copy.) 
First Annual Report., January 1955. Mass. Public 
Document No. 164. 
Commonwe~lth of Massachusetts Legislative Documents 
"Special Report of The Department of Public Works 
and The Boston Port Authority Relative to the 
Adequacy of Terminal Facilities And To The Construct-
ion of A Modern Grain Elevator." House No. 171. 
January 1931. 
"Report To The Boston Port Authority on the Practi-
cability of Establishing A Free Port at Boston, 
Massachusetts." by-iFugl-Meyer, H., House No. 1950. 
February 1935. 
"Report On The Practicability of Establishing a Free 
r.ort at Boston , Mass." House No. 1951 . June 1936, 
Report Of The Special Commission Relat ive To ~he 
Boston Port Authority and t he Produc tion and Derelo'P• 
ment of the o.mmerc e of The Port of B J. 11 
No. 209. Dece::lber 1937. 03v0/}1 ~1/r."J 
220 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
(continued) 
165. Pouder, G.H., "Port Promotion Protection and 
Administration." A Baltimore Association of 
Commerce Staff Field Survey and Report on Eight 
Atlantic and Gulf Ports. March-May 1954. Baltimore 
Assoc. of Commerce: July 1954. 
166. Rose, John K., "Some Reasons For The Decline Of The 
Port of Boston Authority." The Library of Comgress 
Legistative Reference Service. August 28, 1953. 
A manuscript copy. 
167. "The Port of Boston Massachusetts. 11 Port Series No. 
3 (Revised 1946. ) 
168. "What Every Ocean Shipper Should Know." Port of 
Boston Authority. 
169. "World Trade News." u.s. Dept. of Commerce. Field 
Service Bulletin. Boston, Mass. August 31, 1953. 
Proceedings American Society of Civil Engineers. 
170. Bastow, Joseph G., "Futu;re Development of the Metro-
politan Oakland International Airport." June 1955, 
Vol. 81. separate 721. 
171. Billard, D.P., "Deep Water Harbors in the Southeast. 11 
February, 1954, Vol. 80. seperate 409. 
172. Gilman, Roger H., "Transportation Planning: The Port 
A Focal Point." 1956. paper 893. 
173. Herring, Frank w., "Modern Design of General Cargo 
Marine Terminals. 11 February 1955, Vol. 81, seperate 615. 
174. Liebman, Joachim E., "Proposed Modern Marine Terminal 
at ·san Diego. 11 June, 1955, Vol.81. Seperate 724. 
175. Pickard, Jerome P., "Industry Location Factors." 
1956. paper 886. 
176. Post, Wilfred M. Jr., "Transportation Planning; The 
Airports A National Facility." 1956. paper 894. 
177. Rader, Earle M., "Development of an International 
Airport. 11 February 1954. Vol. SO separate 406. 
178. Roterus, Victor., "Planned Industrial Districts. 11 
1956. paper 879. 
179. Shutts, Elmer E., "Development of The Port of Lake 
Charles, La. 11 February 1955, Vol.81 separate 614. 
180. Stafford, Paul H., "Planning an Airport." February 
1954. Vol. 80. seperate 410. 
181. Talley, B.B., "Channel Depths for Modern Ports." 
February 1955, Vol. 81. separate 610. 
182. Talley, B.B., "Development of the Delaware River 
for Cormnerce. 11 September 1954. Vol.80. seperate 503. 
221 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
(continued) 
183. 11 l?rei ght Rates and New England's Competitive 
Position." Report No. 12. 1954. 
184. 11 The New England Transportation System and its 
Uses." Report No. 13. 1954. 
222 
v. Personal Sou~ of Information, Correspondence, Interviews. 
185. 
186. 
187. 
188. 
189. 
190. 
. 191. 
192. 
193. 
Bemis, E.F., U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of 
Foreign and Domestic Commerce. 
Binney, Ralph M., Vice President, The First National 
Bank of Boston. 
Carney, David., Statistican, Port of Boston 
Commission. 
Halloran, John., Chairman, Maritime Association, 
Greater Boston Chfu~ber of Commerce. 
Harris, Robert H., The Mystic Terminal Company. 
Lancaster, Southworth., Special Lecturer, Boston 
University College of Business Administration. 
Thompson, Hugh., A letter to Congressman Thomas 
J. Lane dated May 4, 1954, g iving some of the data 
used by Mr. Thompson in a debate with former 
Governor James Michael Curley on the St. Lawrence 
Seaway at the Columbus Forum in Boston on April 22, 
1954. 
Tobin, James., Promotion Department. Port of Boston 
Commission. 
Wey, George., Chief Engineer, Port of Boston 
Commission. 
Note: Nos. three and nine were not used for infor-
mational references, but were used only as a 
guide for the thesis form. 
